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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will serve to answer the central question: “What is the future for Special 
Operations Forces in the Arctic?” The Arctic environment demands specially trained 
military personnel and units. Over time, the requirement for states to be able to operate in 
the Arctic is increasing while, for many, the capability to do so is decreasing. Future 
operations in the Arctic will depend on Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and 
Multinational (JIIM) relationships. The operational environment of the Arctic currently 
lacks infrastructure, satellite and communication coverage, and strategic-through-tactical 
mobility. 
The key recommendations from this thesis are: 
• Current and/or future exercises should reflect Arctic-specific challenges. 
• Networks, such as the Global Special Operations Forces (SOF) Network, 
should be empowered to address Arctic challenges. 
• National SOF should participate regularly in Joint and International Arctic 
training exercises. 
• Unit commands and mission planners should see analogies between 
current problems in other littoral regions of the world and the Arctic, and 
prepare accordingly. 
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The undeniable geophysical changes taking place in the Arctic are bringing about the 
availability of what some argue to be the world’s last remaining surpluses of undeveloped 
natural resources. This high concentration of scarce resources also happens to be located 
in one of the most ecologically sensitive environments of the world. The environment of 
the Arctic is fundamentally unlike any other region of the world, with a combination of 
sea, massive glacial masses, very little land, and sub-zero temperatures nearly year round. 
Nations-states are racing to lay claim to the resources with very specific yet independent 
strategies for environmental stewardship, economic development, and above all, their 
respective security. Similar to the evolution of other regions of the world, this situation 
will present challenges to governments and their military forces that might be charged 
with responding to such challenges in this region. 
In order for nations to project elements of influence in this region, their militaries 
must be able to conduct and support operations along the full spectrum of conflict. The 
Arctic has been historically characterized as a non-militarized area, with matters of 
dispute being handled through diplomatic channels. As such, the Arctic has existed on the 
“peaceful” end of the spectrum of conflict. However, the current regimes and 
organizations designed to handle such matters are not adapting to the speed of physical 
change in the region. Furthermore, the geopolitical events taking place in other regions of 
the world will undoubtedly spill onto the canvas of politics in the Arctic. Very soon, the 
diplomatic channels for conflict resolution in the Arctic could be overcome by 
geophysical and geopolitical events, resulting in a politically sensitive and elementally 
harsh operating space. When states are left to their own means of projecting force into 
such a region, their Special Operations Forces will likely be the force of choice. Small 
groups of specially trained, mature, regional experts with years of international 
relationships will be the only components of state-funded elements of national power: 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the Arctic. 
It is important to understand that the difficulties of operating in the Arctic apply to 
all who may operate in this region. As such, even when analyzing three international SOF 
 xxi 
from states with varying levels of involvement in the Arctic, universal conclusions can be 
drawn about the assessed capabilities needed for this region. These universal conclusions 
are: 
• The Arctic environment demands specially trained military personnel and 
units. 
• Over time, the requirement for states to able to operate in the Arctic is 
increasing while the capability of many has been decreasing. 
• Future operations in the Arctic will depend on Joint, Interagency, 
Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) relationships. 
• The operational environment of the Arctic currently lacks infrastructure, 
satellite and communication coverage, and strategic mobility. 
The key recommendations from this thesis are: 
• Current and/or future exercises should reflect Arctic-specific challenges. 
• Networks, such as the Global SOF Network, should be empowered to 
address Arctic challenges. 
• National SOF should participate regularly in Joint and International Arctic 
training exercises. 
• Unit commands and mission planners should transpose current problems 
of other littoral regions of the world onto the Arctic and prepare 
accordingly. 
Because the Arctic is a unique region, challenges in this area will require equally 
unique solutions. The responsibility and environmental considerations for this region are 
too great for any one state to undertake. Sharing the responsibility of security for the 
Arctic not only improves the individual levels of preparedness, but also builds 
preparedness among international SOF communities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE ARCTIC 
A. A SPECIAL MISSION OPERATION IN THE ARCTIC 
The night vision goggles (NVGs) dimmed as the Aurora Borealis gained intensity. 
The previous video noise in the NVGs was replaced by halo effects from the drizzle at 
the top of the stratus clouds. To the right, about 20 nautical miles (nm) out, a wall of 
nimbus stratus clouds rose up several thousand feet and appeared to reach down to the 
Arctic Ocean.  
“I am glad we are not in that stuff,” Jake said, “that would make Texaco more 
difficult.” The pilots had engaged and fully relied on the autopilot, which was coupled to 
the embedded GPS and inertial navigation system, the EGI. The Outside Air Temperature 
gauge showed minus 4 degrees Celsius. The ice rate meter indicated light ice but 
increasing and approaching moderate. Nick, in the left seat, announced he was turning on 
the anti-icing on the helicopter. Anti-icing was required at least ten minutes prior to 
refueling in moderate ice conditions, and 20 minutes prior in heavy ice, to make sure the 
refuel probe would engage properly. According to the radar, they were 13 minutes out 
from the C-130 tanker orbiting at checkpoint Texaco. The anti-ice advisory lights came 
on, indicating all the circuits were functioning. Pete, the Special Operations Force (SOF) 
team leader in the back, complained about the cabin getting cold and asked that the heater 
be turned on. Jake responded, “Negative,” as the heater was automatically turned off with 
the anti-ice system operating. The heater would deprive the engine of too much bleed air 
and the MH-60R would not be able to keep up with the C-130 tanker.  
As briefed, Nick tuned to the appropriate frequency when passing phase line N66. 
“We’ll soon be inside ‘the Circle,’” Jake said. “I know,” said Nick, as he checked his vest 
and dinghy. This was a habit that Nick caught himself doing. It was typically a routine 
when coasting out over water, but they had been flying over the ocean for five-and-a-half 
hours, jumping from Shell to Chevron, and now Texaco orbits, so it was most of all an 
indication of increased stress from flying over such a hazardous region for an extended 
period of time. Nick rationalized and told himself there was nothing to be concerned 
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about. The MH-60R had never let them down, he thought. It would not on this mission 
either. 
Nick was Air Mission Commander for the rescue party, which was, in fact, part of 
the larger mission package. Just hours ago, the Norwegian assault party supported with 
other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assets, had successfully executed an 
extremely complicated hostage rescue operation (HRO) and eliminated the “tangos.” The 
mission had gone flawlessly, having been “rehearsed like a ballet,” and the speed in 
execution caught the perpetrators by complete surprise. They probably thought the vast 
Arctic Ocean was a sufficient barricade against a rescue force, but it was not. Just a year 
ago, it would have been; however, six months back, nearly the same units trained on this 
contingency in a bi-annual Arctic SOF exercise. To add further irony, the cruise liner that 
was now captured, was the same ship used for training in a similar scenario six months 
ago.  
The Eurodam was a ship from the Holland America Line, which on their “Norse 
Legends” cruise traveled up to see the polar ice cap. In the exercise, it was “stranded” 
300 nm off the Norwegian coast, west of the city Harstad, about mid-way between the 
Island of Jan Mayen and the Norwegian mainland. The cruise liner in the exercise was 
held captured by a right-wing Norwegian citizen, threatening to “blow it up and sink it, 
drowning everyone on board.” The problem for the rescue force in the exercise was that it 
was not, as in previous years, staging out of Evenes in Norway. Though the exercise was 
still hosted by the Norwegians, the scenario simulated a hostage rescue operation in the 
Arctic in late September. The weather off the west coast of Norway in March replicates 
Arctic conditions further toward the North Pole, well in current ice-free conditions. 
Therefore, the Danish Forces were staging out of Nuuk, Greenland, along with the U.S. 
contingency under the Danish Arctic Command, which was augmented by a 
multinational SOF cell, supporting the staff. The Dutch and Norwegian forces were 
staging out of the northernmost airbases in Denmark, Airbase Aalborg, home of the 
Danish Special Operations Command (SOCOM). This organizational setup—and its 
logistic footprint and significant mobility requirements—proved to be crucial in 
identifying the most important gaps in the Arctic SOF capability, range, response time, 
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and command and control, to include communication difficulties, interoperability, and 
knowledge about each other’s capabilities. 
Only a few operators and one aircrew were “new” since exercise Cold Response. 
This is not surprising when talking about the Danish or Dutch militaries because of their 
limited size, but even for the United States the recent leap in Arctic capability caused 
them to send crews with recent experience. It was a pack of superior trained personnel, a 
network of friends, with great trust and confidence in each other’s skills. These skills and 
confidence were a direct result of the recent training, which otherwise would have 
resulted in crucial shortcomings hampering interoperability and ultimately mission 
success.  
AMC Nick had been briefed directly by the SOCOM commander about the 
political drama, which luckily did not reach the tactical level, but had huge diplomatic 
implications for the national decision makers. Only by adhering to recent established 
binding agreements was it possible to gain traction in a situation with conflicting national 
interests and establish a response force. This political turmoil had unfolded in the 
strategic planning of the mission where it became obvious the Canadian forces were not 
able to partake in the mission. As a result of their opposition toward NATO’s presence in 
the Arctic, Canada had not been part of previous or recent Arctic NATO training, and 
hence was not part of the recent Arctic Response Force (ARF) Agreement between the 
United States, Norway, and Denmark. As a non-Arctic nation, the Netherlands had 
agreed to provide tanker capability on an availability basis—something the United 
Kingdom, Germany, or France were not willing to do—as well as to provide SOF on an 
ad hoc basis, pending request and parliament approval. Pending request and parliament 
approval, Russia provided C2 support with its Arctic Satellite Constellation, ASC. All of 
this was made possible because of the recent ARF agreement. This was also why the 
Canadians stood out and why their C-130 and helicopters, the Cormorant—which is 
almost the same as the Danish EH-101, Merlin—did not have air-to-air refueling (AAR) 
capability, and why the Canadian helicopters were unable to refuel from the fuel bladders 
used on missions in the Arctic. The bladders were dropped by U.S. C-17s, using a Joint 
Precision Air-Drop System (JPADS) into an area “pit stop,” which is a floating refueling 
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point in the vicinity of the target. This refueling ability turned out to be an essential 
capability; it enabled the helicopters to remain “on station,” not having to climb up 
through the clouds in order to refuel, delaying the rescue effort. In essence, the fuel 
bladders were a modified version of the helicopter in-flight refueling (HIFR) used for 
years by the Navy in all of the participating countries—except that now the helicopter 
was not hovering next to a ship, and it was not dependent on Navy presence and response 
time. Instead, it hoisted down a rescue swimmer, who hooked up the hoist-cable-guided 
refuel probe (HCGRP) to the bladder valve. By using aircraft bleed air, the bladder was 
pressurized, enabling refueling and preventing potential contamination during a suction-
type refueling. By using this type of refueling, the helicopters had overcome the tyranny 
of distance in the Arctic, and the helicopter range now matched response time. Now 
the only limitation was aircrew endurance.  
After five-and-a-half hours over water, Nick, Jake, Pete, and their team in the 
back were strained, even though they had previously flown up to ten hours straight in the 
Afghan desert. Nick was not sure which he preferred, but he was sure this mission could 
not be any worse than the Afghan mission. The experience from the most recent training 
in exercise Cold Response had paid off and proven critical to Arctic SOF capability. 
Jake elevated the radar to maximum range while the cruise ship was still beyond 
the acquisition range; however, the helicopters were on track. They had received precise 
coordinates—supposedly originating from Russian satellites—though in reality, the 
coordinates did not come from satellites; they were most likely reported from Russian 
unmanned submarines on surveillance missions in international waters in the Arctic. 
“That was not important,” Lieutenant General Isberg, the Danish SOCOM commander 
had said; the important fact was that Russia was willing to cooperate and diplomatic 
relations had overcome the recent strained political efforts. Still, the coordinates had not 
been confirmed as reliable by the Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) staff at the Arctic 
command until two hours into the flight. The RCC had compared the grid to that of a 
previously reported position by the cruise liner—as part of the mandatory Arctic 
reporting system—prior to the hijacking.  
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Russia is not the only nation to use this kind of autonomous submergence vehicle. 
The United States has a classified program, originating from the Mystic (DSRV-1) Deep 
Submergence Rescue Vehicle. These unmanned submarines are officially used to monitor 
the oil drillings in the Arctic sea. This role was part of a multinational agreement between 
the United States, Canada, and Denmark. The goal was to avoid a disaster like the BP oil 
spill in the Mexican Gulf in 2010, or the Exxon Valdez incident in Alaska in 1989. The 
Exxon Valdez oil spill had shown what could happen in the Arctic, and environmental 
organizations and international pressure had forced the three governments to act and 
ensure this would not happen again. The DSRV was not just capable of monitoring oil 
spills; if disaster struck, the DSRV had an underwater incendiary device, which could 
weld the well shut in seconds, preventing oil or gas from escaping. Though the U.S. 
DSRV was too far away to partake in this particular mission, its capability and role was 
similar to that of the Russian submarine, and although the Russians claimed their sub was 
also used for humanitarian and environmental reasons, it was, in fact, performing the 
same task as the U.S. sub, monitoring shipping and illicit trafficking in the Arctic. The 
dependence on the DSRV was also why the Danish (Greenland) offshore rigs were 
placed farther north than what was optimum from an economic perspective. The Danish 
government had been under pressure when negotiating in parliament.  
Environmental considerations required the rigs to be placed farther north than was 
economically preferable. This placement of the rigs was a consequence of the DSRV 
response time in case of an oil spill on a Danish rig. In the end, environmental concerns 
won. The position of these offshore rigs had consequences for the Danish search and 
rescue (SAR) capability, which now had to be able to reach farther north, in turn 
improving SOF air mobility as well. This extended range was going to prove its worth on 
this mission. Nick and his crew were very well aware of the “political clutter,” as they 
called it. They also knew that it was time to prove this Arctic mission concept. Nick 
understood that whatever the outcome, this mission would have strategic implications 
going far beyond the rescue itself, and he was determined for the mission to succeed. 
“This mission will validate the ARF concept, the range of the Danish Long-range Arctic 
SAR (LASAR), and the ability to collaborate in a multinational setting on Arctic security 
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matters,” Lieutenant General Isberg had said shortly before they stepped out to the 
aircraft. He added, “I know how this might affect you guys, but don’t worry about that, 
let me sort out the weeds back here, and you guys go do what you do best; get the job 
done! You’ve done it all before, and I am confident you’ll pull this one off as well,” he 
said as he walked off.   
Danish long-range SAR capability is unique compared to conventional SAR, yet 
it is similar to other nations’ SOF air mobility. As a dedicated SAR resource, this asset 
extensively supports SOF. It is also in this SOF context—lessons learned from exercise 
Cold Response—the LASAR capability gained its current competence. The Danish 
LASAR is typically comprised of a C-130J (modified for helicopter AAR), 1–3 EH101 
Merlin, and 1–3 MH-60R Seahawk (depending on mission type and conditions). The C-
130 carries rescue operators from the Danish SOF, Frogmen Corps, along with Arctic 
Rescue and Medical specialists (ARMSPECS), a fuel tech, and a Tactical Landing Zone 
(TLZ) crew. This concept is based on the C-130 lead flying toward the scene of the 
incident. Once the helicopters are within fuel range—including 30 minutes for hoist 
operations—the C-130 rushes ahead in order to drop rescue rafts and possibly fuel 
bladders, and insert the Frogmen by parachute to expedite and coordinate the initial 
effort.   
With three-plus-three helicopters on this mission, the LASAR element was at its 
largest. The C-130 was in the lead until reaching checkpoint Shell, where the helicopters 
refueled while the C-130 climbed up to refuel from a Dutch KDC-135 tanker also 
supporting the mission. From then on, Nick and his MH-60R were in the lead of the six 
helicopters as they flew north into the Arctic as part of the mission, which was not only 
the first Arctic SOF mission under the ARF, it was also recognized as the most complex 
multinational SOF mission ever. Because of recent training and exercise, equipment 
adaptation, and networking among partners—following binding security cooperation 
agreements between Arctic stakeholders—the mission was to be a success.  
The previous scenario is fictional; however, it is rooted in the analysis of this 
study, and founded on “mission overlays” from actual historical events described later in 
this study, such as a Canadian SAR mission, the Achille Lauro HRO in the 
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Mediterranean, and Operation Eagle Claw. This short story highlights the key 
conclusions from the study and identifies how the issues—from strategic alliances to 
tactical considerations— can be overcome by proper preparation, thereby setting the path 
to success in future Arctic SOF missions.  
B. THE NEAR FUTURE ARCTIC CHALLENGE 
With the melting of polar ice, the Arctic is evolving into a region of significant 
strategic importance, particularly for the five Arctic littoral nations: Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, Russia, and the United States (Figure 1). While the High North has always been 
important to the “Arctic Five,” the current geopolitical intricacies of the region present a 
number of challenges that may only be exacerbated as the ice continues to melt.1  The 
considerable economic potential of the Arctic poses significant challenges for 
sovereignty, the environment, and security.2 While the current Arctic security 
environment is characterized by cooperation, the potential for armed conflict is always a 
possibility.3 Consequently, the national strategies of the Arctic Five, as well as other 
states with vested interest, speak to an increase in military capabilities and presence in the 
Arctic.4 Amidst the transformation of the High North, this thesis will serve to answer the 
question: What is the future for SOF in the Arctic?    
Around 2050, the Arctic Ocean is projected to be virtually ice-free in the summer, 
with only multi-year ice persisting between the islands of the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago and in the narrow straits between Canada and Greenland.5 These regional 
changes have disproportionate global economic and environmental implications. First, 
1 James Kraska, Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011). 
2 Kathryn Isted, “Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes and Environmental 
Policy Considerations,” Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 18, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 350.  
3 According to Peter J. Marzalik, “Analysts have long expected the Arctic to become a battleground 
for world powers.” Peter J. Marzalik, “Canada Challenging Russian Claims in Arctic,” August 21, 2014, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69641.   
4 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff-MN/ACT, “Multinational Experiment 7: Outcome 1: 
Maritime Security Region: The Arctic,” July 8, 2013, 16. 
5 Eamer J. Donaldson et al., C.H. 2013, Life Linked to Ice: A Guide to Sea-Ice-Associated Biodiversity 
in This Time of Rapid Change, CAFF Assessment Series No. 10, Conservation of the Arctic Flora and 
Fauna, Iceland, 5.  
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with the pace of global warming, sea ice melt, and permafrost thaw, the Arctic and its 
abundant energy and natural oil and gas resources are more than ever exposed to 
development.6  The Arctic holds an estimated 13 percent (90 billion barrels) of the 
world’s undiscovered conventional oil resources,7 and 30 percent of its undiscovered 
conventional natural gas resources.8 Second, the Arctic’s mineral reserves hold abundant 
deposits of iron, nickel, copper, coal, gold, uranium, tungsten, and diamonds. Until 
recently, many of these scarce mineral reserves were not exploited because of their 
inaccessibility and high development costs. Third, the Arctic can provide large quantities 
of fish (i.e., salmon and cod) for the fishing industry in the Arctic and sub-Arctic waters. 
These seas already suffer from illegal fishing and overfishing, and with the Arctic sea ice 
receding, and a limited presence of law enforcement agencies, this is likely to increase. 
Fourth, it is expected that with the melting of the ice, both Arctic shipping routes—the 
Northwest Passage (NWP) and the Northeast Passage, or Northern Sea Route (NSR)—
will be used more and more by commercial shipping. This ‘polar’ route could become 
highly lucrative, as it is 40 percent shorter than the traditional route through the Suez 
Canal.9 Finally, tourism is already expanding to the Arctic, resulting in an increasing of 
number of cruise ships throughout the region. It is expected that this number will 
continue to grow in the near future. 
6 James F. Collins et al., A Euro-Atlantic Action Plan for Cooperation and Enhanced Arctic Security: 
Conference Report and Recommendations to the Arctic Council and Interested Parties (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 11–12, 2013), 8.  
7 Conventional oil is petroleum oil hydrocarbons, extracted and brought to the surface through the 
traditional oil well. In contrast, there is also unconventional oil. Examples are: oil shales, oil sands-based 
synthetic crudes and derivative products (heavy oil, Orimulsion), coal-based liquid supplies, biomass-based 
liquid supplies, gas to liquid (GTL)—liquids arising from chemical processing of gas. International Energy 
Agency's (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2001, 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2008-1994/weo2001.pdf.  
8  Hobart King, “Oil and Natural Gas Resources of the Arctic,” Geology.com, 
http://geology.com/articles/arctic-oil-and-gas/. 
9 Sergey Smirnov, “Maritime Security and Arctic Issues: Challenges, Threats, and the Human Factor,” 
in From APEC 2011 to APEC 2012 American and Russian Perspectives on Asia-Pacific Security and 
Cooperation, ed. Rouben Azizian and Antyom Lukin (Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacific Center for Security 
Studies, 2012), 85. 
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Figure 1.  Comprehensive view of the Arctic environment.10 
The modern world has seen and overcome many challenges in recent times. While 
these challenges pose significant difficulties, they have played out in regions that for 
hundreds of years remained geophysically unchanged. The Arctic region will not look the 
same two decades from now. The sea ice is receding, coastal areas are eroding, and 
weather patterns are changing. Add the increasing geopolitical importance of the region 
because of the availability of natural recourses and the opening of new trade routes, and 
10 Stephen Rountree, U.S. News and World Report, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/. 
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the world might be facing unprecedented security issues in a remote region with a unique 
and rapidly changing environment. As the Commander of the U.S. Special Operations 
Command Europe recently stated, “While Africa may be the challenge for this 
generation, the Arctic will be the challenge for the next.”11 This thesis touches on several 
interesting challenges for the military, in the future Arctic region.  
The Arctic is not just a climate or temperature, but rather a region. This region is 
now changing in a way no other region in the world ever has changed before. Even more 
remarkable, most people today will live to see it! In order to envision the military 
challenges that follow from this rapid and unprecedented change, dynamic thinking is 
required. How does one operate in an area that is extremely restrictive to military 
operations, with a very limited sea, land and air accessibility, immense communication 
issues, and very limited local infrastructure? It takes more than just individual cold 
weather gear to operate successfully in this region. 
Second, it is likely that there will be conflict in the Arctic region. Scarcity of 
natural resources and, therefore, the geostrategic importance of the region will make sure 
of that. Already, the lists of reported significant military activities (SIGACTS) in the 
Arctic over the last 12 months are extraordinary12 and difficult to discount. Any potential 
military conflict is going to be extremely politically sensitive, complex, and may range 
from small-scale state on state scenarios to humanitarian assistance, supporting search 
and rescue, to fighting organized crime, terrorism, and piracy. 
Third, from the U.S. perspective, the Arctic region is an intersection of several 
strategic U.S. military commands (NORTHCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM). Moreover, 
there is a shared responsibility of the region between U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security and U.S. Department of Defense. As a result, the responsibility for security and 
11 Quote from Major General Brad Webb, Commander of U.S. Special Operations in Europe 
(SOCEUR) during the SOFIC in Tampa, FL, May 20, 2014. 
12 Russian SIGACTS in 2014 established the Northern Fleet Unified Strategic Command in 2014, and 
planning to establish an Arctic Command in 2017. Russia re-opened military bases on Wrangel Island, 
Nova Zembla, Kotelny Island, the Franz Josef Archipelago, and the Kola Peninsula. Russia conducted its 
biggest airdrop in the Arctic ever in March 2014, and held its biggest military exercise, “Vostok” 2014, 
since the end of the Soviet Union, with more than 100,000 troops participating in September 2014. Russia 
plans to build and re-open ten more naval bases in the Arctic region. 
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crisis intervention will be shared among different organizations and agencies. More 
important, the need for international partnerships to overcome capability gaps and “the 
tyranny of distance” is greater in this region than any coalition has seen in the past. As 
the potential for land grabs and resource availability increases, each state that is invested 
in the protection of the Arctic, can offer something to the overall projection of 
stewardship and security, soft or hard. 
Fourth, in this fundamentally changing region, standard measures of capability 
and equipment functionality may be misleading. Currently, standard military equipment 
is not usually tested at environmental extremes typical of the Arctic. In order to prevent 
catastrophic failure of military equipment and risk to lives, joint exercises in field 
environments is the way in which to conclude with an extreme cold weather capability. 
Under current financial constraints on defense spending, replacing large stocks of 
military equipment is not feasible. However, if the responsibility of equipment and 
personnel aligned to the Arctic is distributed across multiple Arctic states under mutually 
agreed upon partnership, the costs would be offset to any one country involved. 
The key conclusions of this thesis include: 
• The Arctic environment demands specially trained military personnel and 
units. 
• Over time, the requirement for states to able to operate in the Arctic is 
increasing while the capability is decreasing. 
• Future operations in the Arctic will depend on Joint, Interagency, 
Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM) relationships. 
• The operational environment of the Arctic currently lacks infrastructure, 
satellite and communication coverage, and strategic mobility. 
The key recommendations of this thesis include: 
• Current and/or future exercises should reflect the potential Arctic-specific 
challenges. 
• Networks, such as the Global SOF Network (GSN), should be empowered 
for solving Arctic challenges. 
• National SOF should participate regularly in joint and international Arctic 
training exercises. 
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• Unit commands and mission planners should transpose current problems 
of other littoral regions of the world onto the Arctic and prepare 
accordingly. 
Because the Arctic is a unique region, challenges in this area will require equally 
unique solutions. The responsibility and environmental considerations for this region are 
too great for any one state to undertake. Sharing the responsibility of security for the 
Arctic not only improves the individual levels of preparedness, but also builds 
preparedness among international SOF communities. 
1. Defining the Arctic 
The Arctic region is an area of about 14.5 million km2, one sixth of the Earth’s 
surface.13 The word “Arctic” is a derivation of the Greek word ἀρκτικός (arktikos), “near 
the Bear,” which connotes that area lying under the “Big Dipper.” Astronomically, it is 
the whole area lying north of 66°33’N (the Arctic Circle).14 As shown in Figure 2, there 
are a wide variety of definitions used by different organizations to define the Arctic 
region. Some include the tree line, others the isotherm (average temperature below 10°C) 
in July, or even the Aurora Borealis.15 Any boundary in this region will change with its 
application: environmental, biological, economic, jurisdictional, or social. For example, 
the Arctic Council working groups have different definitions that reflect each of their 
interests.16 This thesis will refer to the Arctic being the territory inside (North) of the 
Arctic Circle. Although this definition is debatable, it will serve the purpose of discussing 
the general political, economic, cultural, and military issues.  
13 “Polar Discovery,” Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, 2006, 
http://polardiscovery.whoi.edu/arctic/geography.html. 
14 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Naval Arctic Manual (ATP 17(D)), NATO 
Standardization Agency (Brussels, Belgium: SHAPE, April 2014), 1-1. 
15 Also known as the northern lights, named after the Roman goddess of dawn, Aurora, and the Greek 
name for the north wind, Boreas. 
16 G.R.I.D. Arendal, “Boundaries of the Arctic Council Working Groups,” October 9, 2013, 
http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/boundaries-of-the-arctic-council-working-groups_8385#.  
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Figure 2.  Different boundaries in the Arctic region.17 
2. Historical Context 
The recent history of the Arctic could reveal what the future holds. Despite severe 
climatic conditions, the region has always attracted people.18 Its first inhabitants date 
back some 20,000 years.19 The Arctic region continued to be developed by humans in 
Greenland and the northern parts of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. These areas were 
inhabited the latest of all. In the American Arctic, the population mostly migrated from 
west to east, in Eurasia—mainly from south to north. As a result, one thousand years ago 
the Arctic territory of the North was fully settled in by the ancestors of the indigenous 
peoples who live in this region to this day.  
17 Arctic Council, Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) Working Group, CAFF map no. 
46, “The Limits to the Arctic according to Various Definitions,” 2001, http://library.arcticportal.org/1378/.   
18 Arctic-info: Encyclopedia, “The History of the Arctic,” http://www.arctic-
info.com/Encyclopedia/Rubric/The%20History%20of%20the%20Arctic.  
19 “Polar Discovery,” Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. 
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Colonization and exploration by the Northern European states started in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth century, searching for resources and a Northern sea route to the 
Far East. Settlements of Europeans, which were few in number and were mostly strategic 
forts and trading points, began to appear in the Arctic region. The colonization process 
was the same throughout the Arctic region. At first, the indigenous peoples maintained 
their autonomy. Gradually, the native population was displaced or put in reservations to 
serve as a transition from primitive to “civilized.” Because of these policies, indigenous 
peoples in the whole Arctic region were forced from their traditional lands and had to 
constantly deal with many social problems, especially poverty and disease.20 
From a military historical perspective, the Arctic region has been a theatre of 
operations several times before in recent military history. During the Nazi-German 
Operation Zitronella in the Second World War, German and Allied troops fought over 
control of Spitsbergen. This marks the highest latitude at which a land battle has ever 
been fought.21 Also in the Second World War, the United States and Canada fought the 
Japanese in the Aleutian Islands Campaign in the Alaska Territory. Elsewhere, Nazi-
German Operations Rösselsprung and Wunderland were Arctic naval battles in the 
Second World War. These operations showed the difficulty of surviving, let alone 
fighting in the Arctic region.  
During the Cold War, the Arctic Region became known for its geostrategic 
importance and home of most of the “second strike” assets of both the NATO and 
Warsaw Pact. This brief history of the Arctic shows that military presence in the Arctic is 
not new. After the cold war, security policy was refocused and the Arctic was out of 
sight; however, recent climate change is pulling the Arctic back to center stage, and 
changing the geopolitical character beyond anything seen before. 
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the future role and mission of SOF in the 
Arctic. Furthermore, it examines what the capability requirements for SOF might be. As 
20 Arctic-info: Encyclopedia, “The History of the Arctic.”  
21 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: Random House, 1993). 
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mentioned previously, there is an absence of current military literature regarding the SOF 
in the Arctic. While this may be partly due to security classifications, it also speaks to a 
possible lack of foresight for the role of SOF in the High North. Despite the likelihood 
that boundary disputes will be solved via peaceful means in accordance with international 
law, there are numerous hypothetical vignettes that could require a SOF response in the 
Arctic.22 While it may be tempting to simply overlay current SOF capabilities onto the 
Arctic environment, the inherent complexities of operating in the High North preclude 
such a convenient approach.  
The scope of the research is focused on Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United 
States. These countries offer a perspective that is characteristic of the expected future 
interests in the High North; varying in size and across the spectrum of Arctic 
involvement, interests, and capabilities. While Denmark and the United States are part of 
the Arctic Five (A5), with sovereign territory in the High North, the Netherlands is a non-
Arctic state with observer status on the Arctic Council. For all three countries, any 
military activity in the Arctic will involve a complex balance of national policy, 
international law, diplomacy, and capabilities. Although the scope is limited to the three 
nations, the overall analysis and recommendations will be of value to all states with a 
vested interest in the Arctic. 
D. TARGET AUDIENCE 
The target audience is primarily the national SOF commands and the respective 
SOF unit leadership. The secondary audiences are planners and directors of exercises 
with an Arctic scope. These exercises could benefit from the vignettes developed in this 
thesis. In order to accommodate readers with varying interests, elements of the study are 
put in appendices, thereby shortening the study for all readers, while allowing elaboration 
on lengthy but essential elements of the study on subjects of particular relevance to some, 
but not for others. This does not distort or weaken the study, rather it creates a better 
foundation for the answering the research question.  
22 The vignettes discussed in Chapter IV of the thesis are: (1) Counter Proliferation (CP); (2) Hostage 
Rescue Operation (HRO); (3) Maritime Counter Terrorism (MCT); (4) Search and Rescue (SAR); (5) 
Strategic Reconnaissance (SR); (6) Arctic Security Forces Assistance (SFA).  
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E. THE PROBLEM 
There are different ways of framing the problem for SOF in the Arctic. First, 
although a considerable amount is written on Arctic security issues due to the changing 
environment, not much is written on the consequences for SOF. For example, SOF is not 
mentioned at all by the A5 in any of the military strategies or governing documents 
concerning the Arctic; therefore, there is a lack of guidance.23 Speaking with different 
national SOF commands, including the United States, the Arctic is on the agenda but 
does not yet have the priority it deserves. The lack of manpower within the different SOF 
and Combatant Commands (COCOM), as well as the current operational tempo, could 
well be the main factors for this neglect.  
Second, there seems to be a lack of interest in the Arctic in general that has left 
states unprepared.24 Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, but even more so since the 
start of the Global War on Terror, the Arctic has become a secondary or even tertiary 
theatre. Understandably, this has resulted in a general neglect of the region.  
Third, and most likely as a result of the second point here, there seems to be no 
thought on possible future scenarios requiring military/SOF response in the Arctic. There 
seems to be a lack of comprehensive research for SOF operations in the Arctic, which 
results in the absence of clear and plausible scenarios and vignettes that could be used for 
exercise and training. A clear example that underlines this point is the absence of 
plausible SOF scenarios used for the two biggest exercises in the Arctic: the bi-annual 
exercises Cold Response and Tundra25 in Norway, and operation Nanook26 in Canada. In 
23 Colonel de Jong, in interview with authors, May 15, 2014.  
24 This is a general theme from the interviews between authors and the various SOF commands and 
representatives. 
25 Exercises Cold Response and Tundra alternate each year, where the former is the larger exercise 
with predominantly conventional forces participating; the latter is more focused on SOF. Norwegian 
Armed Forces, “Cold Response 2014,” http://mil.no/excercises/coldresponse/Pages/default.aspx. 
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contrast, these exercises still use “classic” conventional/SOF scenarios to train 
participating troops. 
F. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis will serve to answer the central question: “What is the future for SOF 
in the Arctic?” Additional questions that logically follow from this central question 
include: 
• What could be the future role and missions for SOF in the Arctic? 
• Is there a lack of strategic guidance for the future role of SOF in the 
Arctic? 
• Is SOF (in general) prepared to conduct (likely) missions in the Arctic? 
In combination with the depicted hypothetical vignettes, research of the current 
capabilities will determine the level of preparedness and current capabilities to conduct 
SOF operations in the Arctic for Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United States. This 
will lead to obvious conclusions and recommendations for SOF. The recommendations 
made could serve as a guide to force development initiatives.    
G. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis first explains quantitative analysis of meteorological data that will 
provide insight into the unique and relevant future geophysical environment. Next, an 
analysis will be conducted on the geopolitical environment in the Arctic, with an 
emphasis on regional security implications. This is followed by an analysis of each of the 
countries’ SOF, using DOTMLPFI.27 An analysis of the strategic ramifications using the 
26 Operation Nanook is the foremost recurring sovereignty operation conducted by Canadian Forces 
(CF) in Canada's Arctic, held annually since 2007. It is a whole-of-government operation highlighting 
combined, joint and integrated military maneuvers. Conducted with personnel, vessels, and aircraft from 
the Army, Navy, Air and Special Forces, NANOOK is planned and directed under the authority of Joint 
Task Force North (JTFN), the regional command responsible for the conduct of all routine and contingency 
operations in Canada’s North. Headquartered in Yellowknife, NT. JTFN is one of six regional commands 
reporting to Canada Command in Ottawa, 
http://gordonfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/images/Operation%20NANOOK.pdf, 
http://www.community.gov.yk.ca/emo/op_nanook.html. 
27 DOTMLPFI stands for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, 
and interoperability. The DOTMLPFI method of analysis is a NATO-recognized method for measuring 
military capability and is explained in detail in Chapter III. 
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principles of DIME (diplomacy, information, military, and economics) will yield similar 
trends in security situations that will be used to construct scenarios/vignettes involving 
SOF in the Arctic.  
To reinforce the conclusions and recommendations, a scenario-based planning 
approach is chosen.28 A distinction has emerged between scenarios and vignettes, and it 
is important to differentiate between scenarios at the tactical and strategic levels. 
Scenarios are typically viewed as official higher-level storylines at the strategic level, 
serving as contingencies for defense planning. Vignettes on the other hand, are 
hypothetical tactical situations that are not officially approved, yet are nested within a 
higher-level scenario.29 This thesis uses vignettes—derived from the geophysical and 
geopolitical analysis—with the understanding that the methodology is consistent with the 
literature on scenario based planning. Figure 3 shows the relationship between scenarios 
and vignettes. 
 
Figure 3.  SOF scenarios in relation to vignettes. 
28 Typically, force planning employs one or more of eight different approaches. The eight alternative 
approaches to force planning reviewed by Barlett, Holman, and Somes (2002) are: top-down; bottom-up; 
scenario; threats and vulnerabilities; core competencies; capabilities and missions; hedging; technology; 
and fiscal. While none of the approaches is deemed superior in concept, scenario-based planning is 
particularly well suited to a problem with a large number of variables and uncertainties. Scenario planning 
enables a simplified method to examine a complex problem by limiting the scope to a specific set of 
variables. Paul J.H. Schoemaker, “Scenario Planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking,” Sloan Management 
Review 36, no. 2 (1995): 25–40. 
29 Thierry Gongora, Scoping Missions and Tasks for CANSOFCOM in the Canadian North (Canada: 
Defence R&D Canada, Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, 2012), 29. 
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The objectives of this thesis are threefold. First, the thesis provides vignettes that 
can be utilized by military and exercise planning staffs to improve the current (bi-)annual 
Arctic exercises involving SOF. The vignettes can also be used as a starting point for a 
detailed mission analysis, by other nations or (SOF) units not represented in this thesis 
team and with a vested interest in the Arctic. Second, in combination with the vignettes, 
the analysis conducted in this thesis can be utilized in war gaming by SOF commands 
concerned with the Arctic region. Third, the analysis followed by the conclusion and 
recommendations offers a unique insight into the potential shortfalls in the current Arctic 
capabilities of SOF in general.  
1. Methods 
The primary collection method will be the document analysis, augmented by the 
interviews with SOF units, and selected SOCOM and Theater Special Operations 
Command (TSOC) personnel. Together, this will provide an in-depth analysis of the 
Arctic spanning from a political-strategic perspective through the operational level and 
down to a more pragmatic tactical perspective. This will not only enhance the 
understanding of the entire Arctic (security) environment by identifying tactical 
constraints with possible strategic impact,30 but it will also serve as a catalyst in 
understanding the Arctic security issues, thereby establishing a recognized ownership of 
the “Arctic mission” at the SOCOM and SOF unit level of the involved nations. 
a. Governing Document Analysis 
A variety of documents ranging from international treaties, national and military 
strategies, official doctrine, and academic studies will be analyzed to investigate the 
strategic climate in the Arctic. The governing documents can be divided into three levels 
of analysis, ranging from international, to national, and to unit level. These documents 
will serve to illustrate the challenges that exist on an international policy level. Arctic and 
national strategies, and other governing documents of both A5 members and non-Arctic 
30 Though this study does not conduct a gap analysis as such, NATO’s Joint Analysis Handbook: 3rd 
Edition has been used to gain sufficient knowledge on how to access capability efficiency in relation to a 
proposed vignette. For further reading on this, see NATO, Joint Analysis Handbook: 3rd Edition (Brussels, 
Belgium: NATO, October 2007). 
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states, will serve two purposes in this study. First, they will provide a clear indication of 
national involvement and ambition in the Arctic. Second, they will provide a political 
mandate to national Arctic military institutions. At the unit level, established policies and 
doctrine provide insight towards military roles and ambitions, and to what degree it 
prioritizes fulfillment of its Arctic responsibilities.  
b. Interviews 
The interviewees are selected Danish, Dutch, and U.S. SOF unit commanders, and 
SOCOM personnel. The aim of these interviews is threefold: (1) to gather information on 
the current level of preparedness and capabilities for Arctic contingencies within the three 
nations mentioned; (2) to receive input for the vignettes and make these as realistic and 
acceptable as possible; and (3) to reflect on the research done up to that point, by the 
team.  
2. Resources 
The resources consulted in this research related to the force development 
framework are summarized by category in Figure 4. Similarly, the sources cited in the 
literature review are shown by category in Figure 5. 
 20 
 
Figure 4.  Force development framework. 
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Figure 5.  Literature overview. 
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II. THE CURRENT GEOPHYSICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL 
ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT 
This chapter describes the current geophysical and geopolitical situation in the 
Arctic region, and provides a comprehensive overview of why and how things are 
changing in the region. Together with the description of the current Arctic military (SOF) 
capabilities in Chapter III, this will logically result in the strategic ramifications described 
in Chapter IV. 
The first section is devoted to the geophysical change, and focuses on two main 
issues: (1) the Arctic environment is undergoing an unprecedented change; the sea ice is 
melting and transforming the Arctic region; and (2) the weather in the Arctic is affected 
by the changing climate, which is often overlooked. The Arctic weather is unique, 
unpredictable, and hazardous. These characteristics will likely increase as the Arctic sea 
ice melts. The degree of success for any operation in the Arctic will demand special 
attention and equipment to overcome the unforgiving and rapid-changing environment. 
The second section of the chapter describes how the availability of resources and 
opportunity afforded by the rapid geophysical changes has resulted in the promulgation 
of specific Arctic strategies, and not only from the Arctic States. It furthermore describes 
the current level of governance and how this is changing because of the increasing 
amount of stakeholders. This chapter closes with the current disputes and claims in the 
Arctic region.  
A. GEOPHYSICAL CHANGE 
This section lays out the future trend for the Arctic climate, and elaborates on 
certain meteorological conditions and metrics emphasizing the importance of preparing to 
operate in the Arctic environment. 
 23 
1. Climate Change 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the Arctic has received increased and significant 
political attention the last few years. The reason for this unprecedented devotion is the 
likelihood that climate change will rapidly expose abundant natural resources.  
Military planners need reliable information about the weather. The historical 
analogies in Chapter V show how insufficient knowledge about the weather influenced 
mission outcome and that weather can mean the difference between mission launch, 
cancellation, or delay, and ultimately the difference between failure and success. The 
current research focuses exclusively on climate change, and does not answer the 
question: “What will the future weather be like in the Arctic?” This analysis on Arctic 
climate change is a meta-study providing insight to that question. A more complete 
analysis is found in Appendix A; however, this section highlights the most important 
elements. 
The future trend is clear. Although predictions of an ice-free Arctic range from 
the years 2037–2100, it seems evident that the ice will continue to melt. The latest 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report predicts an Arctic Ocean 
where the ice has nearly disappeared by 2050. Considering this is the most recent and 
elaborate report, and the fact that it also represents an approximate mean value of the 
various prognoses, 2050 will be the adopted prediction for this study.  
2. Future Arctic Weather 
The weather in the Arctic sets forth special requirements towards tactical mobility 
in the Arctic region. Clouds will inevitably make it difficult for aviation operations due to 
low ceilings with poor visibility. Furthermore, there is a likely risk of encountering ice in 
the clouds if trying to mitigate adverse weather by attempting to climb above the lower 
cloud layers,31 which in itself could be difficult or impossible to accomplish due to 
Nimbus Stratus clouds and equipment limitations (see Figure 6). 
31 This is a common contingency if encountering weather conditions unsuitable for flight under Visual 
Meteorological Conditions in aviation mission planning. See Headquarters of the Department of the Army, 
Army Regulation 95-1 (AR 95-1) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014), 39, paragraphs 5–6. 
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Figure 6.  Cloud classification.32 
Although Arctic weather complicates aviation operations, commercial air traffic is 
pushed to the Arctic for the same reasons behind current geopolitical changes in the 
Arctic: economic incentive. It is the shortest route across the Atlantic connecting the East 
and West. From a civilian aviation perspective, the Arctic is considered a hostile 
environment.33 There are specific regulations and manuals pertaining to North Atlantic 
operations such as the North Atlantic International General Aviation Operations 
Manual.34 Although the military does not always follow the same safety requirements as 
its civilian counterparts, specific training, planning, rehearsal, and equipment is 
paramount in order to prepare for the adverse Arctic environment. This is particularly 
important if attempting to successfully conduct missions operating in, and not just above, 
the Arctic. 
32 NOOA, “National Weather Service: Jetstream – Online School for Weather,” 
http://www.srh.noaa.gov/jetstream/clouds/images/cloudposter.jpg.  
33 JAA, “JAR-OPS 4 Subpart F, section 1,” 
http://www.jaa.nl/secured/Operations/Helicopters%20Archives/03HSC_Documents/Jan-
Feb02/Comparison%20between%20HELO%20HAGO%20and%20HSO%20(HSC%20Orlando).pdf. 
34 FAA, North Atlantic International General Aviation Operations Manual, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2004, http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/media/NAT%20IGA%202004.pdf. 
 25 
                                                 
NATO ATP-17(D) Naval Arctic Manual was published during the time of writing 
this study. ATP-17(D) supports the findings in this study concerning the weather in the 
Arctic.  
The general character of cloud cover over the Arctic differs considerably 
from that considered typical foremost [sic] temperate regions. … The 
uniform and contourless stratus clouds … give to the Arctic its reputation 
of a dull and monotonous appearance ... the low stratus-type cloud 
constitutes from 70‒80 percent of all clouds observed.35  
Not only does ATP-17(D) validate this chapter, it also elaborates on some of the 
other meteorological metrics beyond this study and shows the importance of preparing to 
operate in the Arctic environment. ATP-17(D) also states how melting “in some cases, 
completely inhibits summer ground mobility. … Less than five percent of the Arctic 
lands are covered with permanent ice.”36 The ATP-17(D) adds: 
The Arctic littoral has distinctive processes at break-up or freeze of ice…. 
On coasts where the tidal range is considerable, boulder barricades are the 
most conspicuous sign of the action of sea ice. Typically, there is a narrow 
string of boulders parallel to the shore and several hundred feet out. They 
represent navigational danger on the approach to many open beaches ... 
Thermal erosion may also produce glacier-like mud streams.37  
These conditions may inhibit conventional littoral operations. ATP-17 also states 
that, “precipitation over most of the Arctic is very light and the annual amounts are so 
small that the region is classified as a desert based on annual precipitation.”38 Lack of 
precipitation is not the only commonality between Arctic and desert environments; ATP-
17 notes, “the lack of contrast, particularly where all surface objects are covered with 
new snow, results in the inability to distinguish objects close at hand.”39 This seems 
relevant to all mobility assets whether air, ground or naval. These white-out conditions 
are augmented by the uniformity40 of the Arctic; the lack of trees and other significant 
35 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Naval Arctic Manual (ATP 17(D)), 2‒10. 
36 Ibid., 1‒5. 
37 Ibid., 1‒8. 
38 Ibid., 2‒10. 
39 Ibid., 2‒9. 
40 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Naval Arctic Manual (ATP 17(D)), 1‒5, 2‒9. 
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vegetation,41 reducing visual cues, in turn hampering the ability to operate based on 
visual references in the same manner as in temperate regions. This condition is referred to 
as “Arctic white-out.”42 In the summer months, at which time the Arctic is most 
accessible, precipitation may fall as freezing rain or freezing drizzle. While this may 
inhibit airmobile operations, this is reported as less than ten hours per year.43 Therefore, 
the primary concern for mobility seems to be the low clouds, with possibly associated 
icing, and poor visibility in fog along with periods where ground mobility is impossible 
on the tundra.  
Not only is the Arctic a unique and hazardous ice desert, the Arctic is primarily a 
maritime environment. “The single feature that makes the Arctic Ocean markedly 
different from most of the world’s oceans is the presence of a perennial sea ice.”44 The 
sea ice imposes restrictions on ships operating in the Arctic. This will affect what type of 
ships can be used for staging or basing of SOF or as mobility assets. “In the Arctic, there 
are no generalizations that can be made about the occurrence of sea ice in relation to 
latitude … one of the most important forecasting problems is ice motion.”45 This is not 
only important for ships in the Arctic, remembering the correlations between sea ice, and 
cloud cover (see Appendix A), the uncertainty of sea ice conditions will affect forecasting 
of Arctic weather, in turn affecting ground, air, as well as naval forces, illustrating the 
uncertainty and hostility associated with operating in an Arctic environment. 
a. Conclusions and Recommendations 
As described in Appendix A, the single regression between annual total cloud 
covers and sea ice content (SIC) seasonal cycles, provides insights toward the weather in 
a future Arctic environment. This may shed light on some of the uncertainty in 
forecasting Arctic weather. As shown, the change in SIC explains 78 percent of the 
change in total cloud cover in the Arctic. Although there is more to the weather in the 
41 Ibid., 1‒2. 
42 Ibid., 2‒10. 
43 Ibid., 2‒11. 
44 Ibid., 4‒1. 
45 Ibid., 4‒5. 
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Arctic than just cloud cover and visibility—as NATO ATP 17(D) outlines—it is a good 
indicator for other meteorological metrics. In order to avoid disaster in future Arctic 
military operations, planners, aviators, and other mobility assets operating in a future 
Arctic environment should be aware of the specifics of the unique, hostile, and changing 
Arctic weather patterns. In short, ground mobility is likely inhibited in spring and 
summer months. Low clouds with reduced visibility and Arctic white-out conditions, as 
well as icing, impose restrictions on air mobility. The unpredictability of sea ice 
forecasting influences the maritime environment in which naval forces can operate in the 
Arctic; however, detailed knowledge of the weather and regional specifics can mean the 
difference between mission success and failure. Therefore, the forces going to operate in 
the Arctic region must prepare accordingly whether it be ground, air, or naval forces. 
B. ARCTIC GOVERNANCE, TREATIES, AND POLICIES 
Several treaty-based organizations and policies have been created to govern the 
land, sea, and other activities in the Arctic. Each is comprised of state-based, non-state, 
and nation-state organizations’ interests in the region. From organizations to oversee the 
environmental aspects of the region, narrowing down to the maritime and seabed 
boundaries, this section will describe the most prominent organizations that govern 
matters pertaining to operations in the Arctic. 
1. The Arctic Council 
There are several organizations interested in the Arctic, including international, 
non-governmental, and domestic entities. The principle and most influential organization 
on geopolitical matters is the Arctic Council.46 The Arctic Council, created in 1996, 
consists of the eight Arctic States (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the 
Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States). The Arctic Council was created as a 
forum to oversee and coordinate the Arctic States’ activities and involvement in the 
46 Tim Williams, “The Arctic: Organizations Involved in Circumpolar Cooperation,” Publication No. 
2008-15-E, Industry, Infrastructure and Resource Division, Parliamentary Information and Research 
Service, 2012, http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2008-15-e.pdf. 
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Arctic, centered on preservation of the environment.47 Membership in the Arctic Council 
is governed by the Declaration on Establishment of the Arctic Council (The Ottawa 
Declaration), and can be approved only by the Arctic States.48 The Declaration 
recognizes the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Saami Council, and the Association of 
Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation as 
Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council.49 Actions within the Arctic Council are 
outlined in the “Arctic Council Rules of Procedure” (2013), and are ultimately decided on 
only by the consensus of the Arctic States.50 The most recent document to be signed by 
the Arctic Council is the Kiruna Declaration (2013), in which climate change contributors 
and concerns over the outcome of economic endeavors are recognized.51 Of note, the 
Arctic Council forum does not discuss matters of security and, according to its charter, 
militarization of the Arctic is an undesirable course of action.52 However, the Arctic 
Council collaborates with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), both of which have jurisdiction over matters 
of maritime security and sovereignty rights in the Arctic.53 
The rapidly changing Arctic environment has generated a long list of regimes, 
institutions, and organizations—all stakeholders—to deal with Arctic issues.54 Although 
47 Arctic Council, “Arctic Environment Protection Strategy: Declaration on the Protection of Arctic 
Environment,” 1991, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/4-founding-
documents#. 
48 Arctic Council, “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council: Joint Communique of the 
Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council,” 1996, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/4-founding-documents#. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Arctic Council, “Arctic Council Rules of Procedures: as adopted by the Arctic Council at the First 
Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting,” 1998 (Revised 2013), http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/4-founding-documents#.  
51 Arctic Council, “The Kiruna Declaration, The Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council,” 
2013, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/5-declarations#.  
52 Arctic Council, “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council: Joint Communique of the 
Governments of the Arctic Countries on the Establishment of the Arctic Council.”  
53 Koji Sekimizu, “Arctic Council- Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials” IMO, 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/SecretaryGeneral/SpeechesByTheSecretaryGeneral/Pages/arcticcouncil.a
spx. 
54 Joint Staff-MN//ACT. Multinational Experiment 7: Outcome 1: Maritime Security Region: The 
Arctic. Suffolk, Virginia, July 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a582686.pdf. 
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all of these nations have territory in the Arctic, only five nations are Arctic littoral states 
and are referred to as the A5. The Arctic council holds a central position and includes 
other non-state actors, like indigenous communities, of which six have permanent 
member status.55 There are 12 observer nations,56 9 intergovernmental and inter-
parliamentary organizations,57 and 11 non-government organizations that are granted an 
“observer” status in the Arctic council.58 Figure 7 provides an overview of the construct 
of the Arctic council. As a policy-shaping rather than decision-making body, the Arctic 
council has proven to be an effective mechanism for fostering Arctic cooperation. 
However, with serious economic exploration of the Arctic in the near future, there is a 
need for institutionalizing the universal legal regulations on the rights, privileges, and 
responsibilities of Arctic and non-Arctic states pertaining to security issues, which is not 
part of the Arctic Council. 
The Chairmanship of the Arctic Council is a rotating position among the Arctic 
States, taking place every two years. Currently, 2013–2015, Canada holds the 
Chairmanship. The United States will assume the position for 2015–2017. 
55 Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Aleut International Association (AIA), Gwich’in Council 
International (GCI), Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the 
North (RAIPON), Saami Council (SC). 
56 Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom, People’s Republic of China, Italian 
Republic, State of Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Singapore, Republic of India. 
57 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), Nordic Environment Finance 
Corporation (NEFCO), North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO), Standing Committee of 
the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UN-ECE), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP). 
58 Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas (ACOPS), Arctic Cultural Gateway, Association of 
World Reindeer Herders (AWRH), Circumpolar Conservation Union (CCU), International Arctic Science 
Committee (IASC), International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA), International Union for 
Circumpolar Health (IUCH), International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), Northern Forum 
(NF), University of the Arctic (UArctic), World Wide Fund for Nature-Global Arctic Program (WWF). 
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Figure 7.  Overview of the members and observers of the Arctic Council.59 
a. The Ilulissat Declaration 
The inaugural Arctic Ocean Conference was held on May 27–29, 2008. The 
conference was a gathering of the five Arctic littoral states at the invitation of the Danish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Premier of Greenland to discuss matters pertaining to 
shipping regulations and the environmental implications of increased shipping traffic.60 
Interestingly, the only countries invited to the conference were Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, Russia, and the United States, which comprised the A5. As the Declaration 
implies, the specificity of the invitations is due to the Arctic coastlines and the countries’ 
ability to not only defend their national sovereignty, but to project reinforcement of the 
59 United States Government Accountability Office, “Arctic Issues: Better Direction and Management 
of Voluntary Recommendations Could Enhance U.S. Arctic Council Participation,” 2014, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/663245.pdf. 
60 Ilulissat Declaration, “Arctic Ocean Conference.” Ilulissat, Greenland 27 (2008), 
http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf.  
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Law of the Sea.61 Paragraph 6 summarizes the essence of the imminent concern for 
creating a basis for safety in the Arctic, not only to the environment as so many of the 
previous organizations highlight, but also to the increase of humans as research and 
commerce increase in the region. Paragraph 6 of the Ilulissat Declaration states: 
The increased use of Arctic waters for tourism, shipping, research and 
resource development also increases the risk of accidents and therefore the 
need to further strengthen search and rescue capabilities and capacity 
around the Arctic Ocean to ensure an appropriate response from states to 
any accident. Cooperation, including on the sharing of information, is a 
prerequisite for addressing these challenges. We will work to promote 
safety of life at sea in the Arctic Ocean, including through bilateral and 
multilateral arrangements between or among relevant states.62 
The purpose behind the specific invitations and topics of discussion are based on 
the global and economic influence that each of the five states wish to project into the 
Arctic as the region evolves. These countries’ adherence to proper stewardship of the 
Arctic will have a tremendous effect on setting the conditions for non-Arctic States’ 
involvement in the region. 
b. Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue in the Arctic 
During the 2009 Ministerial Meeting in Tromsø, Norway, a “Task Force” was 
formed, and SAR responsibilities in the Arctic were assigned.63 Members of the meeting 
consisted of the eight members of the Arctic Council. It was the first international 
agreement made specifically for the Arctic, resulting in clearly delineated boundaries of 
SAR areas of responsibility (AOR) as outlined in Figure 8. Additionally, outlined are the 
expectations of each participating state to maintain an adequate SAR capability within 
their AOR.64 The requirement to establish and maintain respective SAR Coordination 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Clinton Signs the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement with 
Other Arctic Nations,” Office of the Spokesman, 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163285.htm. 
64 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, “Agreement on Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic,” 2011, 3, 
http://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/N813EN.pdf. 
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Centers for the Arctic are stated, including the locations and duties of the centers. The 
Government of Canada maintains the document; however, the agreement is an 
internationally recognized order of responsibility for SAR responsibilities and 
boundaries, as provided by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies.65 The result of the agreement is the jointly published International 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual, which ships are required to carry 
according to the International Maritime Organization and the Safety of Life at Sea 
Convention.66 The resulting manual, agreement, and all other amendments are 
continually updated based on the necessity of mutually sharing information and the 
evolution of the region. 
65 Ibid. 




                                                 
 
Figure 8.  SAR areas of responsibility in the Arctic region.67 
2. The United Nations 
The United Nations (UN) plays a central role in the Arctic; this section lays out 
the various bodies under the UN pertaining to the Arctic. 
a. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came about in 
1973 after years of contested rights over fishing and exclusionary economic sea-shelf 
zones.68 The initial draft of the UNCLOS was adopted in 1982, and has since been 
67 Arctic Portal: The Arctic Gateway, “Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement,” 
http://www.arcticportal.org/features/751-arctic-search-and-rescue-agreement.  
68 United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, “The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective),” Exclusive Economic Zone, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm. 
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ratified by 165 countries and the European Union.69 The Convention maintains the rights 
and limits of the sea and territorial limits of undersea areas.70 The Convention gives 
equal representation to states, regardless of their size and naval status.  
In addition to protecting the rights of smaller states and their sea territories, the 
Convention provides laws for littoral passage that prevent countries from 
circumnavigating large areas for travel through coastal states’ territories. Any disputes 
among Convention members are handled either through state-to-state talks, or, should 
talks between states fail, arbitrated by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.71 
As maritime traffic and resource exploration increases in the Arctic, the laws and limits 
for such activities will become increasingly significant. The UNCLOS will also have to 
prove its worth—to prevent conflict—once disputes over territorial claims are to be 
settled. Where most other international organizations involved in the Arctic specifically 
will not discuss matters of military activity, the UNCLOS is the only governing 
organization that will address matters of international security, including the use of 
military force in the Arctic.  
Currently, all Arctic States are members of the UN; however, the United States 
has not ratified the UNCLOS.72 Although the United States continues to contribute to 
maritime research and security with the largest navy in the world, its non-ratification of 
the UNCLOS precludes the United States from disputing matters on the law of the sea, 
nor being bound by its provisions.73 Under the UNCLOS, the UN is the most legitimate 
security organization in international waters of the Arctic. 
69 United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, “Status of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,” table recapitulating the status of the Convention and of the related 
Agreements, 2014, http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf. 
70 Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, “The United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (A Historical Perspective).” 
71 Ibid. 
72 U.S. Arctic Research Commission, “Report on the U.S. Arctic Research Commission Goals and 
Objectives for Arctic Research, For the U.S. Arctic Research Program Plan: 2013‒2014,” 17, 
http://www.arctic.gov/publications/goals/usarc_goals_2013-14.pdf. 
73 United Nations, “Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea: The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective),” The Convention. 
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b. United Nations Commission on the Law of the Continental Shelf 
The purpose of the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (UNCLCS) is to settle claims on outer-continental shelf boundaries beyond 200 
miles of the coastal state.74 Figure 9 gives a detailed overview of how territory, waters, 
and airspace, including the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, are 
defined under international law. The UNCLCS is directed in accordance with the CLCS 
Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, April 17, 
2008.75 The CLCS provides a definition of continental shelf in Article 76, Part IV of the 
UNCLOS.76 States who are party to the UNCLCS have ten years from the time they 
ratify the UNCLOS to make a claim for settlement of outer-continental shelf boundaries. 
However, additional consideration is given for extenuating circumstances under which 
states have yet to ratify the UNCLCS, such as is the case with the United States. This 
Commission was the deciding body for matters of boundaries in the Antarctic between 
the seven states sharing territorial boundaries, and is becoming increasingly important in 
the Arctic for similar circumstances.77 
74 United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, “Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Purpose, Functions and Sessions: Purpose of the Commission. 
75 United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, “United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, CLCS/40/Rev. 1: Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,” 2008, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_documents.htm. 
76 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS):  Part VI: “Continental Shelf,” The 
Definition of the Continental Shelf and Criteria for the Establishment of its Outer Limits, 2013, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part6.htm. 
77 Richard C. Powell, and Klaus Dodds, eds., Polar Geopolitics? Knowledges, Resources and Legal 
Regimes (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014), 47‒50. 
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Figure 9.  Ocean and air boundaries.78 
c. International Maritime Organization 
The IMO is a specialized agency of the UN that primarily handles matters of 
maritime security, pollution, and safety between international parties.79 The IMO consists 
of 170 UN member countries, to include the United States, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Additionally, the provisions of the UNCLOS are relevant to the IMO for adjudication.80 
The IMO’s cornerstone initiative is the standards and codes for which polar-bound ships 
are constructed and maintained by. This “Polar Code” also sets the navigational 
boundaries for shipping routes and exploratory activity in the arctic regions.81 More 
78 Naval War College, Joint Maritime Operations, Block 2.1 “Operational Warfare at Sea,” 
PowerPoint slide 22, https://cle.nps.edu/xsl-portal/site/20df2175-9742-4c7a-a97e-
7e96c9b86039/page/838b0d24-2fbc-4723-b8a0-b84d092dad14. 
79 International Maritime Organization, “IMO: What it Is,” IMO website, 2013, 4, 
http://www.imo.org/About/Documents/What%20it%20is%20Oct%202013_Web.pdf. 
80 International Maritime Organization, “Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas,” IMO website, 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/PSSAs/Pages/Default.aspx. 
81 International Maritime Organization, “Shipping in Polar Waters: Development of an International 
Code of Safety for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code),” IMO website, 2014, 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx. 
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importantly, however, is the fact that the Polar Code will prescribe procedures and 
responsibilities for search and rescue operations in Polar waters.82 The emphasis of the 
Polar Code is on the protection of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSA). PSSAs are 
areas that are recognized for their “ecological or socioeconomic or scientific” importance 
and are vulnerable to damage by international maritime activity.83 Currently, the IMO 
does not recognize any PSSAs in the Arctic; however, the increase of maritime traffic for 
commercial and exploratory opportunities is expected to affect ecological vulnerabilities 
in the Arctic. 
Topics of penalties and adjudication of the Polar Code have not been addressed 
yet, as the code has been scheduled for approval in May 2014. However, if approval of 
the Polar Code is reached, under this agreement, members of the IMO will be equally 
bound by the standards and regulations contained in the code, regardless of their status in 
the UNCLOS. 
3. Other Authorities 
Besides the UN there are other supra-state authorities involved in the governance 
of the Arctic. 
a. International Seabed Authority 
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) organizes and controls activities 
pertaining to the administration of resources beyond national jurisdiction.84 The 
organization adjudicates over the seabed area outside of national control, and administers 
regulatory authority over activity revolving around seabed mining.85 ISA was initially 
established under the UNCLOS, and later became an autonomous international 
organization in June 1996. Since gaining autonomy, the ISA has continued to grow in 
82 Ibid. 
83 International Maritime Organization, “Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas.”  
84 International Seabed Authority, “About Us,” ISA website, 2007‒2013, 
http://www.isa.org.jm/en/about. 
85 International Seabed Authority, “Frequently Asked Questions,” No. 9, ISA website, 2007–2013, 
http://www.isa.org.jm/en/about/faqs#9. 
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membership and influence over matters of deep-seabed mining and exploration. 
Membership is divided into Council positions and Observer positions. The current 
Council list consists of 166 members, of which includes Denmark and the Netherlands.86 
The current number of observer states is 32, including the United States. 
There is very little unclaimed seabed in the Arctic. Figure 10 shows the 
international sea boundaries including unclaimed, current, and potential continental shelf 
claims. Only a small amount of the Arctic Ocean seabed remains unclaimed; however, a 
great deal of the area in the Arctic remains subject to continental shelf claims.87 The ISA, 
in conjunction with the UNCLOS, will be the authoritative organization for such 
matters.88 
86 International Seabed Authority, “Member States,” ISA website, 2007–2013, 
http://www.isa.org.jm/en/about/members/states. 
87 Powell and Dodds, Polar Geopolitics? Knowledges, Resources and Legal Regimes, 29. 
88 International Seabed Authority, “Frequently Asked Questions,” No. 9. 
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Figure 10.  International sea boundaries in the Arctic.89 
4. Conclusion 
Several states are members of the administrating and governing bodies pertaining 
to the Arctic waters, with varying degrees of participation in each. For example, the 
United States has member status in the IMO and Arctic Council, and observer status in 
both the UNCLOS and the ISA. China has member status in the IMO, ISA, and 
UNCLOS, and observer status in the Arctic Council. Russia has member status in the 
IMO, the ISA, the UNCLOS, and the Arctic Council. However, it is important to note 
that among all of the international organizations mentioned above, not one has been 




                                                 
charged with the responsibility of security governance in the Arctic. As the reader will 
see in the next section, each of the Arctic states, as well as Arctic observers, have their 
own strategy, each with generally similar regards for environmental stewardship, as well 
as individual national interests. It is possible that the open communications held in these 
venues by each of the representatives to date have been the reason for the successful 
prevention of militarizing of the Arctic.90 
C. ARCTIC STRATEGIES AND POLITICAL ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT 
The prospects of a further opening of the Arctic Ocean has led both the 
surrounding, and some extra-regional states and groups of states, to promulgate specific 
national Arctic strategies. Some of these strategies include references to an increased 
effort in the development of military forces with improved capability of operating in the 
Arctic.91 A close study of the strategies, concrete procurement and force plans of the 
“Arctic Five,” indicate that the effort is being placed in capacities geared more for 
surveillance, patrol, presence in areas of jurisdiction, and protection of sovereignty, than 
for war fighting and conflict.92 
1. The Arctic Five Strategies 
The strategies of the Arctic Five (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the 
United States), or A5, are codified in separate documents, each pointing out the goals and 
priorities in the region in an enumerated manner. The strategies are also all relatively new 
documents, coincidentally timed with the increasing access to natural resources and 
maritime routes. The first signs of significant changes in the Arctic were noted in 2006–
2009, coincidental with the U.S. Geological Survey estimate that there might exist 90 
billion barrels of undiscovered oil in the region. The potential for such large prospects 
has most likely had something to do with the recent promulgation of Arctic strategies. 
90 Powell and Dodds, Polar Geopolitics? Knowledges, Resources and Legal Regimes, 45. 
91 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff-MN/ACT, “Multinational Experiment 7: Outcome 1: 
Maritime Security Region: The Arctic,” 16. 
92 Ibid. 
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Prior to this estimate from the U.S. Geological Survey, Arctic strategies were either 
nonexistent or vague and inconsequential. 
There are common themes throughout all of the strategies, emphasizing 
environmental stewardship and the importance of cooperation and diplomacy. However, 
there are some specific ambitions within each of the strategies regarding the protection of 
sovereign rights and the promotion of economic development, respectively. Canada’s 
strategy, titled “Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future,” is built on the themes mentioned 
above, but also integrates themes of independence and sovereignty. Denmark’s strategy 
encompasses Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands and places less stress on 
sovereignty and more emphasis on cooperation and safety. However, it should be noted 
that Denmark currently has more disputes for land and boundary claims than any of the 
other Arctic states. Norway’s “High North Strategy” is a rather specific document, with 
objectives including “development of petroleum in the Barents Sea,” and “strengthening 
cooperation with Russia.”93 Russia’s strategy is also specific with an emphasis on 
security, research, and protection. Particularly aggressive, Russia’s strategy is the only 
one that specifically mentions their armed forces’ posture in the region. The most specific 
and extensive strategy produced for the Arctic come from the United States. Not an 
extensive document in itself, the United States initially published the “National Strategy 
for the Arctic Region,” which was in line with the aforementioned common themes. The 
more extensive aspects of the U.S. strategy are contained in the Department of Defense, 
Navy, and “Plan for Implementation,” where detailed steps for accomplishing U.S. goals 
in the Arctic, timelines, and lead departments for accomplishing each are described. An 
extensive summary of all A5 strategies can be found in Appendix B.  
2. Other Stakeholders 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the list of stakeholders in the Arctic goes beyond the 
A5 or Arctic eight. The following describes three Arctic stakeholders, which are all 
93 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy,” December 1, 
2006, http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/Ud/Vedlegg/strategien.pdf. 
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relevant and show the diversity of state and supra-state involvement relevant to this 
study. 
a. The Netherlands 
Although a non-Arctic state, the Netherlands has been involved in the Arctic 
region for many centuries. The Barents Sea is named after the Dutch explorer Willem 
Barentsz, who spent a winter on Novaya Zemlya in 1596–1997 in his quest for a 
Northern sea route to Asia. As a maritime and seafaring nation, the Netherlands has a 
great interest in Arctic affairs, and is one of the first observer nations within the Arctic 
Council.94 Recently, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a “Policy 
Framework for the Polar Regions (2011–2015),” to strengthen the international legal 
order, defend Dutch economic interests (e.g., fostering a knowledge economy and 
securing a meaningful role for the business community) and protecting global public 
goods (such as the climate, biodiversity, and energy).95 The main justifications for the 
current Dutch polar policy are: 
• A detailed understanding of the mass balance of the polar icecaps—and 
thus rising sea levels—is in the Netherlands’ national interest.  
• An obligation to promote the international legal order, a key objective of 
government policy for decades and enshrined in the Dutch constitution. 
• Environmental protection is a top priority of Dutch polar policy. 
• As one of the world’s 20 largest economies, the Netherlands should play a 
role in managing global public goods. 
• Economic interests, with the extraction of oil and gas and the fishing and 
shipping becoming commercially viable for Dutch businesses.96 
94 Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to: (1) non-Arctic states, (2) inter-governmental and 
inter-parliamentary organizations, and (3) non-governmental organizations. So far, 12 non-Arctic countries, 
nine intergovernmental, and 11 non-governmental organizations have been given observer status, 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/. 





                                                 
The main points for Dutch policy principles and objectives for the Arctic region 
are: 
• Contribute to the multilateral Arctic administrative structure, taking its 
lead in the maritime areas from the UNCLOS (1982). 
• Ensure that the exploitation of oil and gas takes place under very strict 
environmental and security standards. This should be assessed in the light 
of the special vulnerability of the Arctic environment and the position of 
the indigenous peoples.  
• Support, in response to demand, research, and development on 
safeguarding the sustainability of Arctic shipping and offshore technology. 
• Contribute proportionally to creating a network of protected marine areas 
in the North Pole region. 
• Protecting and preserving Arctic biodiversity.97 
From a military perspective, during the Cold War the Netherlands contributed to 
the defense of NATO’s ‘Northern Flank’ in Norway. This materialized by contributing 
Dutch Marines and Dutch Navy and amphibious shipping to the United Kingdom/Dutch 
Amphibious Force. To date, the Netherlands also contributes to the bi-annual NATO 
exercise Cold Response in Norway. With two Marine battalions and SOF units trained 
and equipped to operate in an Arctic environment, plus the ability to project and sustain 
these forces through its Naval Expeditionary and Air Force units, the Netherlands has the 
ability to conduct military operations in the Arctic region.98 
b. China 
Although the People’s Republic of China lies some distance from the Arctic, 
China has displayed a “growing interest in the region.”99 China received observer status 
97 Ibid., 4. 
98 Arctic and cold-weather capable is not the same within the Netherlands DOD. Arctic capable is 
defined as being able to operate within the Arctic Circle (N66°, 33’, 44”). 
99 Ronald O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress (CRS Report 
No.R41153) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 55. 
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in the Arctic Council in 2013, and “…Chinese leaders have begun to promulgate the 
notion that China is a ‘near-Arctic state’ and a ‘stakeholder’ in arctic affairs.”100  
At the time of writing, China has the second-largest economy in the world. China 
has an interest in the Arctic, as its economy is increasingly dependent on export.101 
“Beijing is keenly interested in having free access to the future northern waterways, 
which would drastically reduce both sailing times and transportation costs.”102 The NSR 
saves significant shipping time and costs.103 September 2013 marked the first Chinese 
commercial cargo ship to traverse the NSR. Furthermore, “China is the world’s largest 
consumer of raw materials and hydrocarbon resources.”104  
Other observers have argued that China’s interest is motivated in the 
Arctic’s emerging status as “the new fishing grounds—the world’s largest 
storehouse of biological protein. … Finally, some have also interpreted 
China’s growing interest in the Arctic as further evidence of its effort to 
expand its influence as a global player: “They know that [the] Arctic may 
be one of the hot spots of the 21st century.105 
Chinese Arctic affairs are handled by the State Oceanic Administration (SOA). 
The SOA oversees the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration which conducts all 
Polar matters of research and international engagement on behalf of China.106 The state-
run Yellow River Station is in Ny-Alesund, thus Norway heavily influences China’s 
Arctic involvement from where Arctic-related research is conducted.107 To date, China 
has not publicly released an Arctic Strategy. However, “In recent years, China has been 
100 Shiloh Rainwater. “Race to the North: China’s Arctic Strategy and Its Implications,” Naval War 
College Review 66, no. 2 (2012): 63. 
101 Some analysts have estimated that as much as one-half of China’s GDP is reliant upon exports and 
shipping. Source: O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, 55. 
102 Ibid. 
103 China's strategic Arctic interests, Strategic Comments 20, no. 22, i‒ii, 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13567888.2014.914777.  
104 O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, 55. 
105 Ibid. 
106 COMNAP, Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration, 
https://www.comnap.aq/Members/CAA/SitePages/Home.aspx.  
107 As of 2013, according to China’s twelfth five-year plan, three additional expeditions to the North 
Pole by 2015 are being planned. Rainwater, “Race to the North: China’s Arctic Strategy and its 
Implications.”  
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cultivating relationships with the Nordic countries…. In April 2013, China and Iceland 
signed a free trade agreement—China’s first such pact with a European government.” 
Three major Chinese oil companies have also entered into “a framework agreement with 
Russia’s Novatek to gain access to Russia’s Arctic gas fields.”108 
It seems that Chinese interest in the Arctic is quite profound. This combined with 
the notion that, “many Chinese believe that the Arctic should be considered as part of the 
global commons,”109 is conflicting with A5 perceptions, and may require further 
attention. Though Chinese foreign policy officially rests on respect for territorial 
integrity, indications do exist that China may be encouraged to challenge Canadian 
sovereignty claims in the Arctic.110 In short, increased Chinese interests in the Arctic have 
created greater cooperation with several Arctic nations; however, this increased Arctic 
focus has also highlighted potential issues for Sino-Arctic conflicts of interest. 
c. European Union 
The European Union consists of 28 European countries, connected in the interest 
of economic and political cooperation.111 The European Union (EU) is currently pending 
a status change request from Ad-Hoc to Observer status, with the decision to be made at 
the next Arctic Council meeting in Canada in 2015. As indicated by the “Council 
conclusions on developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region,” the EU 
will also take proposals for the development of the EU Arctic Policy, on or around 
December of 2015.112 Three permanent members of the Arctic Council are also members 
of the EU (Denmark, Sweden, and Finland). The regulatory authority that the European 
Union has extends into the Arctic due to the location of the member states in the Arctic. 
With the recent application of Iceland to the EU, the EU authority could extend further 
into Arctic waters by way of the European Economic Area, creating implications for 
108 Craig H. Allen. “Arctic Law and Policy Year in Review: 2013,” The University of Washington.  
109 O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, 55. 
110 Ibid. 
111 European Union, “How the EU Works,” http://europa.eu/about-eu/index_en.htm. 
112 Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on Developing a European Union Policy 
towards the Arctic Region,” Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, May 12, 2014, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142554.pdf. 
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European security forces for the Arctic area.113 The EU will continue to increase its 
participation on matters in the Arctic, primarily through its recently established Arctic 
Forum.114 
D. CURRENT DISPUTES AND CLAIMS 
The Arctic, then, is not a global commons or terra nullius like its opposite 
pole, Antarctica. Instead, its geopolitics are informed by the interests, 
whether direct or indirect, conflicting or communal, of states whose 
territory lies partly or entirely in the earth’s most northerly regions.  
Natalie Mychajlyszyn 
The scope for this segment is not to indicate a large conventional conflict is 
looming in the future. “Geopolitical issues are not exclusively conflicts over interests, 
although such concerns tend to dominate.”115 For further insight on what those disputes 
and claims may result in, and how this will place the stakeholders at the negotiation 
table—and how this might affect political negotiations once bargaining begins in the 
Arctic—see the game theory analysis in Appendix C, where two of the four mentioned 
current disputes, plus a hypothetical NATO versus Russia dispute, are included.  
The opening of the Arctic offers opportunities for increased commerce and 
resource exploitation, not only to the Arctic states, but to nearby surrounding states, and 
powerful global economies trying to gain foothold in an evolving region. While the 
pursuit of natural resources is the highest priority of some states, shorter shipping routes 
are the focus of others.116 Like many other previously developing regions around the 
world (e.g., the Persian Gulf), the Arctic is a region with “competing and complementary 
interests.”117  
113 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, “New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region,” 2012, 
150, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/StrategicDynamicsArcticRegion.pdf. 
114 Ibid., 153. 
115 Ibid., 3. 
116 Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation, “Interests and Roles of Non-arctic States in the Arctic: 
Report,” Munk School of Global Affairs, 2011, 
http://gordonfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/images/Arctic%20Seminar%20Report_3.pdf. 
117 Mychajlyszyn, “The Arctic: Geopolitical Issues,” 2. 
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The consensus-driven Arctic Council serves as a forum for the cooperation of 
Arctic states and other interested states on issues pertaining to the Arctic region.118 
“[C]ooperation frequently establishes a level of governance—in some cases formally, in 
others less formally—by which mutual understanding can clarify intentions and help to 
build trust.”119 The question then is, what happens to Arctic cooperative governance if 
cooperation does not continue to evolve or seize?  
Despite the existence of these councils and organizations, the Arctic is 
without a single, comprehensive, and developed regime by which to 
govern state behavior in the region. According to those who argue for such 
a regime, the councils and organizations that do exist are limited in scope, 
have unequal levels of membership, confuse decision-making procedures 
because of the variety of levels involved, and are generally ineffective.120 
A specific problem is that the regional institutions, or governance, in the Arctic, 
like the Arctic council, explicitly refrain from dealing with “matters related to military 
security.”121 Through the IMO, the Polar Code (set for approval in November 2014) 
would be the defining body for the regulation of shipping standards as commerce and 
tourism vessels traverse the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and international 
waters.122 The ISA administers matters pertaining to the extraction of natural resources 
from the seabed beyond states’ EEZ. The authoritative organization for the submission 
and approval of claims to littoral boundaries is the UNCLCS, which is still not ratified by 
the United States, one of the largest stakeholders in the Arctic. This possibly adds to the 
sensitivity of the political climate in the Arctic, and to the unpredictability in how the 
United States will act when claims and disputes are settled. Finally, the UNCLCS is the 
most defining organization for matters of territorial boundaries in the Arctic. The 
UNCLCS is the receiving organization for submissions and claims for states’ continental 
shelves, which set the mark for which all other boundaries and territories will be defined. 
118 Arctic Council, About the Arctic Council,” April 2011, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/about-arctic-council. 
119 Mychajlyszyn, “The Arctic: Geopolitical Issues,” 4. 
120 Ibid. 
121 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff-MN/ACT, “Multinational Experiment 7: Outcome 1: 
Maritime Security Region: The Arctic,” 27. 
122 International Maritime Organization, “Shipping in Polar Waters.”  
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Currently, the submissions for claims waiting to be reviewed by the UNCLCS are not 
made publicly available. According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service Report 
R41153, there are only four unresolved disputes over territory in the Arctic.123  
These include: 
• Canada-U.S., EU, and others’ NWP: Canada claims that the Northwest 
Passage is sovereign Canadian territory, and therefore gives way to 
Canadian right to surveillance, regulation, and control.124 
• Canada-U.S. Beaufort Sea: The United States and Canada have been 
negotiating over the shared boundary from the coast into the Beaufort Sea. 
• U.S.-Russia Bering Strait: The dispute between the United States and 
Russia over maritime boundaries in the Bering Strait has been is currently 
being negotiated, but has yet to be ratified by the Russian Federation.125 
• Canada-Denmark Hans Island: “Some analysts believe the two countries 
are vying for control over a future sea lane [NWP]…. Others claim that 
the governments are staking out territorial claims in the event that future 
natural resource discoveries make the region economically valuable.”126 
The Russian and Canadian claims for the Lomonosov Ridge have yet to be 
officially disputed. Currently Russia is working to fortify and resubmit a 2001 rejected 
claim to the UNCLOS for the Lomonosov Ridge, at the odds of Canada who submitted 
an official claim with the UNCLCS to portions of the Lomonosov Ridge in 2013.127   
The link between a relatively more accessible Arctic and resource exploitation is 
more complex than a simple cause and effect model would lead one to expect.128 The 
link between Arctic resource exploitation and inter-state conflict has similarly been 
questioned. Because most of the known resources lay within the EEZs of the Arctic 
123 Mychajlyszyn, “The Arctic: Geopolitical Issues,” 2. 
124 O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, 17. 
125 Kaj Hober, “Territorial Disputes and Natural Resources: The Melting of the Ice and Arctic 
Disputes,” Oil and Gas Journal 109, no. 6 (2011), http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-109/issue-
6/exploration-development/territorial-disputes-and-natural-resources.html. 
126 O’Rourke. Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, 18. 
127 United Nations, Oceans & Law of the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and The Law of the Sea: 
Submissions to the Commission: Partial Submission by Canada, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_can_70_2013.htm. 
128 Gongora, “Scoping Missions and Tasks for CANSOFCOM in the Canadian North,” 10. 
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states, it can be assumed that each of the Arctic states has a vested interest in respecting 




                                                 
III. THE ARCTIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT 
The first part of this chapter lays out the doctrinal foundation for SOF, and is 
supported by the discussion of SOF and Joint doctrine in Appendix D. This analysis 
shows that SOF is particularly suited to operate in the sensitive political Arctic 
environment, and that SOF is well suited to sustain operations in the hostile Arctic 
geophysical environment, as long as these skills in reality are maintained. This segment 
also points out how SOF and joint doctrine may not adequately bridge the gap between 
A5 policy and the vignettes emerging later in this study. Great range is typically 
associated with naval or maritime SOF platforms, but maritime platforms are slow 
compared to Air SOF; however, Air SOF typically has shorter range than its maritime 
counterpart. This paradox needs to be analyzed further to balance the requirements of 
range versus response time, while overcoming the tyranny of distance in the Arctic, in 
order to provide SOF with a sufficient platform for infiltration and exfiltration, tactical 
mobility, and sustainment in the Arctic.  
The second part of this chapter describes the current Arctic SOF capabilities of 
the three nations described in this thesis. As stated in Chapter I, given the diverse 
background of these three nations regarding their political stance, responsibilities, and 
military capabilities, this will provide an interesting insight into the relative military 
Arctic SOF capabilities and potential deficits.  
In the third part, an overview of the current existing command and control 
facilities—military and civilian—are provided for the A5. This will show how 
intertwined and interdependent military and civilian infrastructure and institutions are in 
the current Arctic region. This part will discuss the current military cooperation 
organizations in place, and the potential role it will play in the future.   
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A. CURRENT MILITARY COOPERATION, COMMAND, AND CONTROL 
CAPABILITIES IN THE ARCTIC 
This section will provide overview of the current military and civilian command 
and control (C2) structures and systems of the five Arctic littoral nations within the 
Arctic region. Furthermore, it will describe the different security organizations with 
potential interest in the Arctic region. This overview is useful for two reasons. First, it 
will provide insight into the general Arctic military capabilities of the different Arctic 
states, and their ability to detect and respond to contingencies in the Arctic region. 
Second, it will serve to highlight some of the biggest challenges in this region, including: 
(1) the lack of ability to communicate (especially North of the 70-degree north latitude), 
making effective C2 of any in the region extremely difficult; and (2) the lack of strategic, 
operational, and tactical mobility mostly as a result of the challenging distances or 
tyranny of distance, and the environment.  
C2 is the exercise of authority by a designated commander over assigned forces 
and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission.130 The C2 centers of the 
different Arctic nations discussed in this section have very few military units directly 
under command. In case of an emergency or contingency, military units will be assigned 
to these commands to fulfill specific tasks. 
One example of joint C2 in the Arctic region is the SAR agreement signed by the 
eight Arctic nations in 2011. The objective of this agreement is to strengthen aeronautical 
and maritime search and rescue cooperation and coordination in the Arctic.131 The RCCs 
mentioned in the SAR agreement are often used together as military C2 centers, and are 
augmented by military resources. Therefore, one can assume that these RCCs could also 
be used to coordinate, command, and control military forces in case of any contingencies 
in the Arctic region. 
130 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 
States (Washington, DC: March 2013), 27. 
131 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, “Agreement on Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic.”  
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An interesting aspect in the SAR agreement is to see how the different Arctic 
nations deal with SAR. Although in some countries the Department of Defense (DOD) is 
the leading agency, in others it is the Ministry of Interior or Emergency. This highlights 
an important issue; every nation has organized its rescue and security forces in the Arctic 
differently. Therefore, the importance of interagency operations in a multinational 
environment is emphasized. 
As a general point, before describing the C2 capabilities of the individual Arctic 
states and the security organizations involved in the Arctic, it is worthwhile noting that 
the Arctic today still lacks sufficient, mainly maritime, C2 infrastructure in order to 
facilitate economic development. Depending on the individual or collective military 
capabilities of the Arctic littoral nations, the same applies for the ability to execute 
military operations in the region. 
1. Canada 
The Canadian JTFN is one of the six regional commands reporting to the 
Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) in Ottawa. JTFN is responsible for the 
conduct of all routine and contingency operations in Canada’s North,132 and has 
detachments in Whitehorse, Yukon, and Iqaluit, Nunavut. JTFN is headquartered in 
Yellowknife, North West Territories (NWT).133 The most prominent military unit under 
JTFN command is the 1st Canadian Ranger patrol group.134 Furthermore, Canada has 
three Joint Rescue Coordination Centers (JRCC), Trenton, Halifax, and Victoria. JRCC 
Trenton is located at the Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Trenton, operated by the Royal 
132 Canada’s North is defined by Canada as the area north of 60 degrees north latitude, including the 
Yukon Territory, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Nunavik (the portion of northern Quebec north of 
60N latitude); and all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean, the Beaufort, the Lincoln and Labrador 
Seas, Baffin Bay, and the Davis Strait. The United States defines its Arctic as U.S. and foreign territory 
north of the Arctic Circle (66.5 degrees north latitude) and all U.S. territory north and west of the boundary 
formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers. Source: United States Northern Command, and 
Canadian Joint Operations Command. Framework for Arctic cooperation among North American 
Aerospace Defense Command, December 11, 2012, http://www.sldinfo.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/Framework-for-ARCTIC-Cooperation.pdf.  
133 Defence R&D Canada: Centre for Operational Research & Analysis (DRDC CORA). “Arctic 
Planning Scenarios: Scenario #1 – Defence Scenario,” July 2011, 37. 
134 Details of JTFN are at the Department of National Defense Website: 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-regional-jtf-north/detachments.page. 
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Canadian Air Force (RCAF), and the Canadian Coastguard (CCG). JRCC Trenton is 
Canada’s primary coordination center for responding to contingencies in the Arctic and is 
mentioned in the SAR agreement. 
Established in 1958, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is 
the United States and Canada bi-national organization charged with the missions of 
aerospace warning and control and maritime warning in North America.135  
NORAD is formed according to the three geographic regions: Continental 
NORAD Region (CONR), Canadian NORAD Region (CANR), and Alaskan NORAD 
Region (ANR). While both CANR and ANR have responsibilities in the Arctic and are 
organized according to national boundaries, NORAD routinely conducts operations 
across these lines. For the mission of maritime warning, NORAD supports 
USNORTHCOM and CJOC in their assigned missions to defend North America.136 
In September 2009, then Canada Command (Canada COM), NORAD, and 
USNORTHCOM signed the “Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation,” which 
codified the close relationships among the Commands and their supporting agencies to 
ensure a timely and coordinated response to defense and security challenges to North 
America.137 This document was followed by a Tri Command Vision (in March 2010), 
and a Tri Command Strategy (in December 2012). After the establishment of the CJOC 
in 2012, a “Framework for Arctic Cooperation” was signed. This framework identified 
opportunities for potential Tri Command cooperation in the Arctic among NORAD, 
USNORTHCOM, and CJOC.138 It furthermore supported the Tri Command Vision’s 
stated goal to improve unity of effort among the three Commands and with our respective 
mission partners. Its immediate goal was to promote enhanced military cooperation in the 
135 North American Aerospace Defense Command, “NORAD History,” 
http://www.norad.mil/AboutNORAD/NORADHistory.aspx.  
136 Framework for Arctic Cooperation among North American Aerospace Defense Command, United 
States Northern Command, and Canadian Joint Operations Command, December 11, 2012, 7. 
137 Ibid., 4. 
138 Ibid.  
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Arctic and identify specific areas of potential tri command cooperation in the preparation 
for and conduct of defense, security, and safety operations in the Arctic.139 
2. Denmark 
The Danish Arctic command or Arktisk Kommando (AKO) was established on 
October 31, 2012. The headquarters is located in Nuuk, Greenland, with a small liaison 
unit in Thorshavn on the Faroe Islands.140 There are also Danish units in Kangerlussauq, 
Station North, the famous SIRIUS patrol in Daneborg, and at Mestersvig. The command 
also maintains a liaison unit at the Thule Air Base (Qaanaaq), which is operated by the 
United States. The Danish Arctic command is a merger of the Island Command 
Greenland and the Island Command Faroe Islands. The main tasks of the new command 
are a mix of military and law enforcement type missions, including: (1) the military 
defense of Greenland and the Faroe Islands; (2) surveillance and enforcement of 
sovereignty; (3) fisheries inspection; (4) search and rescue services; (4) military 
surveillance; (5) pollution prevention; (6) hydrographic surveys; and (7)  various 
activities to support the civilian population.141 The Danish Arctic Command is a 
territorial command with an area of responsibility that extends from the waters around the 
Faroe Islands to the east, the Greenland Sea and the Arctic Sea to the north, and across 
the Denmark Strait and the Irminger Sea to the Davis Strait and Baffin Bay between 
Canada and Greenland. Figure 11 provides an overview of the Greenlandic geography 
while also showing the proportions of the AKO territorial command. 
139 Framework for Arctic Cooperation among North American Aerospace Defense Command, United 
States Northern Command, and Canadian Joint Operations Command, December 11, 2012, 4. 




                                                 
 
Figure 11.  Geography of Greenland and AKO territorial command 
proportions.142 
Through Denmark, Greenland has been part of NATO territory since 1955. The 
U.S. military involvement in the defense of Greenland is formalized in an important 
agreement signed in 2004.143 This agreement supplements the agreement of April 27, 
1951, where roles and responsibilities among NATO, United States, Denmark, and 
Greenland are outlined.144  
142 Kamikposted.dk, “Online Discussion on Maritime Proportionality Distortion,” 
http://www.kamikposten.dk/global/maskinrum/rutine/leksikon.aspx?tag=emne&folder=hvadermeningen&s
prog=da&punkt=Turisme&udvalgt=2012092415463616e.  
143 Agreement between the United States of America and Demark on the Defense of Greenland, 
August 6, 2004, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/170358.pdf. 
144 Nikolaj Petersen, “Negotiating the 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement: Theoretical and Empirical 
Aspects,” Scandinavian Political Studies, Bind 21 (New Series) (1998). 
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The U.S. air base in Thule is home to the 21st Space Wing’s global network of 
sensors providing missile warning, space surveillance, and space control to NORAD and 
Air Force Space Command. The base hosts the 12th Space Warning Squadron who 
operates a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System designed to detect and track 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) launched against North America. Finally, 
Thule is home to the northernmost deep-water port in the world.145 
There are three RCCs in the Danish territories: Maritime Rescue Coordination 
Center (MRCC) Grønnedal; RCC Søndrestrøm/Kangerlussuaq, and MRCC Torshavn. 
The first two are located on Greenland, and the latter on the Faroe Islands. 
3. Norway 
In 2010, Norway became the first Arctic nation to move its military command 
center within the Arctic Circle, transferring the Norwegian Operational Command 
Headquarters (HQ) from Stavanger to Bodø.146 Contingencies in the Arctic requiring 
military resources will likely be coordinated, commanded, and controlled through this 
HQ. Furthermore, Norway has multiple military bases north of the Arctic circle, mainly 
in Finnmark, from where military operations could be launched. As stated in the 
Norwegian Arctic strategy, “the presence of the armed forces increases predictability and 
stability, and is decisive for our ability to respond to emergencies in the High North.”147 
Norway has two main RCCs: JRCC Stavanger and Bodo. The latter is responsible 
for contingencies north of the 65N, and mentioned as such in the SAR agreement.  
4. Russian Federation 
In 2010, it was reported that Russia had reorganized its six military commands 
into four larger joint commands, Southern, Western, Eastern, and Central Command, see 
145 Peterson Air Force Base, “Units: 821st Air Base Group,” 
http://www.peterson.af.mil/units/821stairbase/index.asp. 
146 Rick Rozoff, “Top of the World: NATO Rehearses for War in the Arctic,” Global Research, April 
24, 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca/top-of-the-world-nato-rehearses-for-war-in-the-arctic/30508. 
147 Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy,” 19. 
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Figure 12. In this structure, Command West, headquartered in Moscow, is responsible for 
the Northern Fleet.148  
 
Figure 12.  New Russian military command structure.149 
Reports stated that by the end of 2014, Russia would form a new Arctic command 
to protect its interests in the Arctic. “The new command will comprise the Northern Fleet, 
Arctic warfare brigades, air force and air defense units, as well as additional 
administrative structures.”150 According to the report, “The military structure will be 
responsible for protecting Russia’s Arctic shipping and fishing, oil and gas fields on the 
148 Trude Pettersen, “New Military Command System in Russia,” Barentsobserver, October 25, 2010, 
www.barantsobserver.com. 
149 Ibid.  




                                                 
Arctic shelf, and the country’s national borders in the north.”151 According to multiple 
reports, this new command is going to be named “the Northern fleet—Strategic Joint 
Command.”152 This new command seems to be part of a bigger Russian plan to 
regenerate military presence and command and control facilities in the Arctic Region. 
President Vladimir Putin said, “A united system of naval bases for ships and next-
generation submarines will be created in the Arctic to defend Russia’s interests in the 
region.”153 The Russian Defense Ministry has already announced plans to reopen 
airfields and ports on the New Siberian Islands and the Franz Josef Land archipelago, as 
well as at least seven airstrips on the continental part of the Arctic Circle that were 
mothballed in 1993.154 It seems that Russia is working hard to establish both military and 
civilian command and control infrastructure in the Arctic to be able to respond to any 
contingencies in the North. Although this Russian ‘build up’ is often viewed with 
suspicion by other Arctic nations, the 17,500 km of Russian Arctic shoreline,155 should 
put things in perspective. This revitalization of Russian Forces in the North is 
underscores the Russian’s need to protect what is left of the Russian strategic nuclear 
forces, and how the central role of these forces in securing Russia’s “second strike” 
capability play in the Arctic.156  
In his speech before the Russian Security Council on April 24, 2014, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin outlined six national priorities for the Arctic Region.157  
151 Ibid. 
152 Foreign Military Studies Office, “Foreign News & Perspectives of the Operational Environment,” 
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/OEWatch/201403/Russia_10.html. 




155 Kraska, Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change, 138. 
156 Ibid., 93.  
157 These priorities are: (1) improve quality of government control, (2) implement measures of the 
state program Socioeconomic Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation through to 2020, 
(3) the legal formalization, in line with international law, of the outer boundary of Russia’s continental 
shelf in the Arctic Ocean, (4) develop the best economic model for the development of the Northern Sea 
Route, (5) maintain environmental security, and (6) ensure comprehensive security of the Russian Arctic 
zone. 
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Oil and gas production facilities, loading terminals and pipelines should be 
reliably protected from terrorists and other potential threats. Nothing can 
be treated as trivia here. All security issues should be practiced in the 
course of regular joint exercises and training involving units of the 
Defense Ministry, Emergencies Ministry and other services. We should 
also improve reliability of our Arctic border protection, including through 
strengthening the marine component of the border patrol groups of 
Russia’s Federal Security Service. At the same time, we should enhance 
the military infrastructure. In particular, I am referring to the creation in 
our section of the Arctic of a single basing structure for new generation 
surface vessels and submarines.158 
Two more rescue centers—in Murmansk and in Nadym—may open this year in 
the Russian Arctic. With three rescue centers recently opened in Naryan-Mar, 
Arkhangelsk, and Dudinka, this will bring the total to five rescue centers capable of 
responding to any urgent situations in the Arctic. This is part of a bigger plan of the 
Russian Emergencies Ministry, announcing plans to build ten integrated rescue centers by 
2015 on Russia’s Arctic coast.159  
5. United States 
As presented in this thesis, there are three geographical combatant commands and 
one functional combatant command that share responsibility for the Arctic region. These 
geographic combatant commands include: The United States Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM), European Command (EUCOM), and the Pacific Command (PACOM). 
The only functional combatant command is The United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM). Important changes took place in April 2011, when President 
Obama assigned responsibility for the Arctic to NORTHCOM.160 Furthermore, the April 
2011 change in the DOD’s Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigned Alaska to 
158 President Vladimir Putin, “The Implementation of Russia’s State Policy in the Arctic in the 
Interests of National Security” (speech before the Russian Security Council in Moscow, April 22, 2014). A 
translation of the whole speech can be found at http://eng.state.kremlin.ru/security_council/7065.  
159 Vladimir Baronov, RIA Novosti, May 27, 2014, 
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140527/190168924/Russia-to-Build-2-More-Emergency-Rescue-Centers-on-
Arctic-Coast.html. 
160 For an article discussing the change, see Jim Garamone, “Unified Command Plan Reflects Arctic’s 
Importance,” American Forces Press Service, April 7, 2011. 
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NORTHCOM,161 where previously NORTHCOM and PACOM had shared 
responsibility for Alaska and adjacent waters (Figure 13). In the same document, and 
again stated in the U.S. DOD Arctic Strategy of 2013, it states, “Commander U.S. 
Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) is responsible for advocating for Arctic 
capabilities. In execution of this responsibility, CDRUSNORTHCOM will collaborate 
with relevant Combatant Commands (COCOMs), the Joint Staff, The Military 
Departments and Services, and the Defense agencies to identify and prioritize emerging 
Arctic capability gaps and requirements.”162  
The civilian RCCs mentioned in the SAR agreement are Joint Rescue 
Coordination Center Juneau (JRCC Juneau) and Aviation Rescue Coordination Center 
Elmendorf (ARCC Elmendorf). 
161 Although the UCP itself is a classified document, the information required for this section of the 
thesis is revealed in the (UNCLASS) CRS report, “The Unified Command Plan and Combatant 
Commands: Background and Issues for Congress,” January 3, 2013. 
162 The United States Department of Defense, “Arctic Strategy,” November 2013, 8, 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_Arctic_Strategy.pdf.  
 61 
                                                 
 
Figure 13.   U.S. geographical realignment after the UCP 2011.163 
a. Northern Command/NORAD 
Established in 2002, as the newest COCOM, “USNORTHCOM’s mission, as part 
of the geographical realignment after the Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2011 is to 
conduct homeland defense, civil support, and security cooperation to defend and secure 
the United States and its interests…. USNORTHCOM’s area of operation encompasses 
the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to 
approximately 500 nautical miles.”164 Although this does not suggest the North Pole is 
included, Figure 14 shows how the Arctic region is now divided between NORTHCOM 
and EUCOM. 
163 U.S. Department of Defense, “Unified Command Plan,” April 27, 2011, 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2009/0109_unifiedcommand/.  
164 Andrew Feickert, The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Backgrounds and 
Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. R42077) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 
3, 2013), 42, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf.  
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Figure 14.  Arctic region split between NORTHCOM and EUCOM.165 
Because of the growing geo-strategic importance of the Arctic, 
CDRUSNORTHCOM has designated the Arctic as a key focus area. Along these lines, 
NORTHCOM is currently examining how to support other U.S. government agencies in 
the region with SAR assets, humanitarian assistance (HA), disaster relief (DR), and law 
enforcement. As part of this examination NORTHCOM has identified deficiencies in all-
domain awareness, communications, infrastructure, mobility, SAR, enabling capabilities, 
Arctic Ocean charting, and the ability to observe and forecast Arctic environmental 
change.166 
In response to the recognized force gap pertaining to the Arctic region, Joint Task 
Force Alaska (JTF-AK) was formed in 2002 as a subordinate command of NORTHCOM. 
Their role is to work with local Alaskan civil authorities for crisis response and 
evacuation. JTF-AK has the capability of executing the full spectrum of DOD defense 
capabilities in order to protect U.S. national interests.167 By virtue of its relatively small 
size as a DOD Joint Task Force, JTF-AK is very dependent on the provisions of the 
165 U.S. Department of Defense, “Unified Command Plan,” April 27, 2011, 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2009/0109_unifiedcommand/. 
166 Feickert, The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Backgrounds and Issues for 
Congress, 42. 
167 U.S. NORTHCOM, “Fact Sheet: Joint Task Force Alaska” states, “Within its JOA, JTF-AK plans 
and, if directed, integrates the full spectrum of DOD homeland defense efforts and provides defense 
support to a primary agency, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Prevention, crisis 




                                                 
Alaskan Command (ALCOM) infrastructure, which is part of PACOM, as well as the 
contributing efforts of the Canadians and Norwegians for Arctic response. As the 
political and physical environment continues to change in the Arctic, so might the need 
for the organizations responsible for the region.  
At the end of 2012, U.S. Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH) was 
established. SOCNORTH is a subordinate unified command of SOCOM under the 
Operational Control of NORTHCOM whose most prominent strategic objectives include 
the following. 
• SOCNORTH provides NORTHCOM with access to the global special 
operations intelligence network to support NORTHCOM’s defense in-
depth concept. This to identify and engage enemy threats prior to entering 
the homeland. 
• SOCNORTH is the lead component for NORTHCOM’s support to CT and 
CP/WMD activities.168  
NORAD is collocated with NORTHCOM, and as described previously, a bi-
national U.S. and Canadian command. By virtue of the command’s forward presence and 
operational posture in Alaska and Canada, NORAD will continue to play a significant 
role in DOD’s ability to meet national security challenges in the Arctic. NORAD also 
embodies the unique and enduring partnership between the United States and Canada in 
defense cooperation—a partnership that will prove vital in the Arctic.169 
b. European Command 
EUCOM has traditionally been the single combatant command dealing with the 
Arctic region. This changed with the establishment of NORTHCOM and the publication 
of the 2011 UCP.170 Although NORTHCOM is the leading COCOM for the Arctic 
Region, with six of the eight Arctic nations in EUCOM’s AOR, EUCOM is still very 
168 U.S. NORTHCOM, “Fact Sheet, U.S. Special Operations Command North,” 
http://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/FactSheets/ArticleView/tabid/3999/Article/1900/us-special-
operations-command-north-provisional-command.aspx.  
169 U.S. Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest 
Passage,” May 2011, 15, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Tab_A_Arctic_Report_Public.pdf.  
170 U.S. Department of Defense News Release, “DOD Releases Unified Command Plan 2011,” April 
8, 2011. 
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much involved in coordinating Arctic security issues. To coordinate these issues with the 
different Arctic nations and stakeholders, EUCOM even has an Arctic Strategy Branch. 
In close cooperation with the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, EUCOM is the co-
sponsor of the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR). This Arctic security forum, 
consisting of high-ranking military officers from the eight members of the Arctic 
Council, plus France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, is one of the very few 
forums on the Arctic dealing with security issues. Held in June 2011, their first meeting 
addressed a range of concerns, including infrastructure, the environment, joint exercises 
and training, and marine domain awareness. In August 2012, the ASFR was focused 
mainly on how to improve the communications infrastructure in the high north.171 In 
2013, the conference was held in Finland and focused on increased shipping traffic 
because of the ice melt.172 
U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) is EUCOM’s TSOC, and 
is responsible for SOF readiness, targeting, exercises, plans, joint and combined training, 
NATO/partnership activities, and execution of CT, peacetime, and contingency 
operations.173 The SOF units under SOCEUR, permanently based in Germany, had 
extensive experience in operating in the Arctic environment; however, due to 
commitments in other geographical areas, this experience has diminished over the years. 
c. Pacific Command 
With the creation of NORTHCOM in 2002, and the UCP in 2011, PACOM’s 
AOR changed and eventually PACOM’s territory in the Arctic region (with the exception 
of part of the Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk) and Alaska were assigned to 
NORTHCOM’s AOR. However, all Alaskan Forces (with the exception of the Alaskan 
171 “Arctic Nations Meet to Discuss Communication, Maritime Domain Awareness Strategy,” 
EUCOM website, August 30, 2012, http://www.eucom.mil/blog-post/24109/arctic-nations-meet-to-discuss-
communication-maritime-domain-awareness-strategy. 
172 “Arctic Security Forces Round Table: A New Way to Live by an Old Code,” EUCOM website, 
September 9, 2013, http://www.eucom.mil/blog-post/25348/arctic-security-forces-round-table-a-new-way-
to-live-by-an-old-code. 
173 U.S. Special Operation Command Europe (SOCEUR), “Our Mission,” 
www.soceur.eucom.mil/pages/home.aspx. 
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NORAD at JBER and the Missile Defense Agency and Aerospace Command at Fort 
Greely, who fall under STRATCOM),174 remained assigned to PACOM in the Forces for 
Unified Commands Memorandum.175 Contrary to its geographic proximity to the Arctic, 
ALCOM is a Subordinate Unified Command of PACOM,176 and focuses most of its 
operational efforts to the Pacific and East Asian regions. Strangely, the ALCOM is not 
mentioned in the CRS report as one of the subcomponents of PACOM.  
Any crisis or military intervention in the Arctic region would be heavily 
dependent on the infrastructure and capabilities of the ALCOM units. As ALCOM are 
physically located in Alaska within the NORTHCOM AOR, a realignment of command 
relationship between NORTHCOM and PACOM may be necessary for NORTHCOM to 
respond to an event in the Arctic region. As the C2 structure of the geographic COCOM 
currently stands, NORTHCOM does not have a force provider to fill any troop 
requirements toward the Arctic. As the NORTHCOM Commander, General Jacoby 
described,177 “The C2 function that is traditionally carried out by military forces for a 
COCOM is carried out for NORTHCOM by the Department of Homeland Security and 
other domestically based interagency organizations.” 
d. Special Operations Command 
Unlike Combatant Commands, with specific geographic AORs, SOCOM is a 
functional Combatant Command with global responsibilities.178 SOCOM is the lead 
command tasked with synchronizing the planning of global operations against terrorist 
networks, and can execute global operations when ordered to do so. This could include 
174 “ALCOM is headquartered at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER), Alaska. DOD forces in 
Alaska include more than 22,000 U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps personnel, 
and 4,700 Guardsmen and Reservists.” http://www.jber.af.mil/alcom/. 
175 Feickert, The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Backgrounds and Issues for 
Congress, 48. 
176 U.S. Pacific Command, “Organization Chart,” 
http://www.pacom.mil/Organization/OrganizationChart.aspx. 
177 GEN Jacoby’s notes on the NORTHCOM posture statement to the House Armed Service 
Committee, February 2014, http://www.northcom.mil/Portals/28/Documents/TRANSCRIPT%20-
%20HASC%20Posture%20Hearing%2026%20Feb%2014.pdf. 
178 Posture statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN, Commander United States Special 
Operations Command, before the 112th Congress Senate Armed Service Committee, March 6, 2012, 2. 
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the Arctic region. Combat-ready SOF forces will normally deploy under the control of 
the GCC’s TSOC. This worldwide focus requires SOCOM to look at the specifics for 
every different operating environment in the world. Talking to J5 representatives of the 
SOCOM, the Arctic region is not high on SOCOM’s priority list.179 However, in the 
closed-loop diagram made by the SOCOM J5 department, the Arctic problems are 
addressed. Although there is an increasing importance of the Arctic within the U.S. 
SOCOM, there is no specific guidance to answer the “so what” for SOF. In the 2014 SOF 
Commander conference, U.S. Special Ops Commanders stated that future SOF needed 
two things: ISR in Africa, and communications in the Arctic.180  
6. Other Security Cooperation Organizations 
Apart from coordination, command and control means and resources available to 
the five Arctic littoral nations, there are other overarching security cooperation 
organizations who need to focus on security in the Arctic. Because the Arctic council 
does not deal with security issues in the Arctic, one could argue that there is a security 
gap to be filled. The ASFR tries to bridge this gap and is an initiative of Norway and the 
U.S. EUCOM. It focuses on bringing all the relevant military players to the table to 
discuss security issues pertaining to the Arctic region. From a Western perspective, 
NATO an obvious and existing military organization to fulfill a role in dealing with 
security issues in the region. The Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and the EU 
are less obvious security organizations, but could have roles to play as well. There is no 
security organization or forum that constitutes all eight Arctic nations, let alone all the 
nations with a security interest in the Arctic region.  
a. Arctic Security Forces Roundtable 
The ASFR has been held since 2011, and is an annual meeting of senior military 
and Coast Guard leaders from eleven countries designed to further broaden partnerships 
179 Information retrieved during an interview with Deputy of International Engagement, and the Chief 
of the Strategy Division (J56), U.S. SOCOM, February 28, 2014. 
180 Paul McLeary, “U.S. Special Ops Commanders: We Need ISR in Africa, Comms in Arctic,” 
Defense News, May 20, 2014, www.defensenews.com. 
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and cooperative efforts among nations with strategic interests and responsibilities in the 
Arctic. In 2014, the participants included Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States.181 
The ASFR meeting is a great opportunity for the defense agencies of the participating 
nations to provide support to civil authorities, to share ideas and collaborate, to talk about 
lessons learned, and focus on how to work together with the future challenges in the 
Arctic.182 This venue is unique in the sense that it is the only forum designed specifically 
to discuss matters of military response to arctic crises.  
b. NATO 
During the Cold War, NATO’s role in the Arctic region was undisputed. 
Although NATO’s Article 5 has a geographical southern delimitation, it does not have a 
northern one. Bases in Iceland and Norway were used to coordinate a NATO response to 
any Warsaw Pact threat against its Northern flank. 
Today, NATO’s role in the Arctic region is controversial. With four of the Arctic 
five nations being members of the alliance, one would expect an obvious role in terms of 
security for NATO in the Arctic region. However, the opposite is true. At the 2008 
NATO summit in Bucharest, five guiding principles for NATO activity in the Arctic 
Circle were outlined: (1) “information and intelligence fusion;” (2) “projecting stability;” 
(3) “advancing international and regional cooperation;” (4) “supporting consequence 
management;” and (5) “supporting the protection of critical infrastructure.”183 However, 
in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept, Arctic security was not included. In fact, the word 
181 Patrick Foughty, U.S. European Command, “United States, Norway co-host 4th annual Arctic 
Security Forces Roundtable,” August 28, 2014, http://www.eucom.mil/media-library/article/26802/us-and-
norway-co-host-fourth-annual-arctic-security-forces-roundtable. 
182 Major-General Randy Kee, the EUCOM Director of Policy, Strategy, Partnering and Capabilities, 
Harstad, Norway, August 28, 2014. 
183 James Jay Carafano, Ariel Cohen, Sally McNamara and Richard Weitz, “EUCOM Should Lead 
U.S. Combatant Commands in Defense of National Interests in the Arctic,” The Heritage Foundation, 
March 28, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/03/eucom-should-lead-us-combatant-
commands-in-defense-of-national-interests-in-the-arctic. 
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Arctic was not found in the 2010 Strategic Concept or the 2012 Chicago NATO summit 
declaration.184  
During a visit of the NATO Secretary General to Norway in 2013, he stated that it 
is likely that Canadian opposition was the reason for this. As a sovereign nation-state, 
Canada has a prerogative to determine what role, if any, NATO should have in Canada’s 
Arctic region.185 In a Q&A session with the NATO Secretary General, Ander Fogh 
Rasmussen, the Secretary General made clear what NATO’s responsibilities in the Arctic 
region were. 
I’m not suggesting a militarization of activities in the Arctic region. But a 
number of NATO Allies are bordering the Arctic region or they have 
territory in the Arctic region. And of course, they would expect that 
NATO’s Article 5 applies to all NATO territories, including a NATO 
territory in the Arctic region. So seen from that perspective, we also have 
obligations to make sure that the Arctic region remains a region of peace 
and stability.186 
It was expected that at the NATO summit in September 2014, the Arctic region 
would again be discussed as one of the future priorities for NATO; however, other 
current events clearly overshadowed this summit, and the Arctic was not mentioned at 
all.  
The strongest supporters of an increased role for NATO in the Arctic are Norway 
and Denmark. Although the word NATO is carefully avoided in Norway’s Arctic 
strategy, the document explicitly states that the Norwegian government aims at 
implementing an increased level of military training maneuvers in Northern Norway, 
together with ‘allied counties,’ so they can familiarize themselves with the unique 
conditions and the area.187 With Russian planes infamously conducting a mock bombing 
184 Luke Coffey, “NATO in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities,” The Heritage Foundation, 
June 22, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/06/nato-in-the-arctic-challenges-and-
opportunities. 
185 Ibid. 
186 NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “America, Europe and the Pacific” (comments 
at the Marines’ Memorial Club Hotel in San Francisco, July 9, 2014), 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_111659.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
187 Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy,” 20. 
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run on the Norwegian Northern defense command HQ at Bodo in 2008,188 and recent 
increases in bomber flight in European Airspace, their sense for collective security is 
understandable. The biggest and most prominent bi-annual NATO exercise, held on 
Norwegian soil, is called Cold Response.189 Another Arctic nation that is likely to be in 
favor of increased NATO involvement in the Arctic region is Denmark, with both 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands as part of NATO territory. These territories were of 
great importance in the NORAD ballistic missile defense network, better known as the 
Distant Early Warning (DEW) line.  
Canada is the least supportive of any NATO involvement in the Arctic.190 Like 
Norway, Canada has invested heavily in its Arctic defense and security capabilities. 
Unlike Norway, the Canadians have made it clear that they do not want NATO involved 
in the Arctic. Generally speaking, there is a concern inside Canada that non-Arctic 
NATO countries favor an alliance role in the Arctic because it would afford them 
influence in an area where they would otherwise have none.191 So far, the United States 
has seemed indifferent to NATO’s involvement in Arctic. The wars in the Middle East 
Region are likely to have caused this indifference. With the U.S. drawdown out of 
Afghanistan, the Russian aggression towards the Ukraine, and the increasing interest of 
China in the Arctic Region, this indifference towards NATO involvement in the Arctic 
region is likely to change. The U.S. tried to persuade Canada to be more perceptive 
towards the NATO involvement in the Arctic.192 As a direct consequence of the current 
NATO reluctance towards the Arctic, the NATO Special Operation Forces Headquarters 
188 Kraska, Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change, 291. 
189 Information on Cold Response 2014, for all participating Forces, 
http://mil.no/excercises/coldresponse/Documents/Cold_respons_2014_Important%20information%20for%
20all%20participating%20forces_engelsk_21.02_LR.pdf. 
190 O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, 60. 
191 Coffey, “NATO in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities.” 
192 Robert, W. Murray and Tom Keating, “Containing Russia Should not Mean Bringing NATO to 
the Arctic,” Globe and Mail, April 25, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/containing-
russia-should-not-mean-bringing-nato-to-the-arctic/article18208720/. 
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(NSHQ) recognizes the increasing importance of this region; however, they do not have 
any resources allocated towards it.193 
A last relevant point to mention in the context of NATO and security cooperation 
is the existence of a NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The NRC was founded in 2002, and 
cooperation was strengthened up to December 2013. However, ever since the start of the 
crisis in the Ukraine, the level of any cooperation in this forum has been non-existent. 
The current crisis in the Ukraine will further alienate the relationships between Russia 
and NATO. Whether the four Arctic littoral states are in favor of any role of NATO in the 
Arctic, Russia will view any individual or collective military response to Russians 
military buildup in the Arctic as a “NATO escalation.”  
c. NORDEFCO 
In 2009, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden established the NORDEFCO 
arrangement. Despite not having an armed force, Iceland is also a member.194 The 
organization is coordination oriented, and not a command structure like NATO. The main 
focus and purpose of NORDEFCO is “to strengthen the participating nations’ national 
defense, explore common synergies, and facilitate efficient common solutions.”195 With 
Sweden and Finland not being part of NATO, this organization fulfills an important role 
in Defense Cooperation in the Scandinavian countries. There are also some noteworthy 
developments pertaining to the Arctic. Norway, which took over as chair of NORDEFCO 
in January 2014, has pushed for a new style of Nordic military cooperation that is more 
specialized and goal-oriented, and has the potential to deliver mission-specific forces.196 
Although NORDEFCO will increase coordination and interoperability between its 
members, unlike NATO, it has no C2 responsibility whatsoever. 
193 NSHQ Chief of Staff and key staff members during a video teleconference discussion with 
authors, December 17, 2013.  
194 James Kraska and Betsy Baker. “Emerging Arctic Security Challenges,” Policy brief, Center for a 
New American Security, March 2014, www.CNAS.org. 
195 NORDEFCO Annual Report 2013, http://www.nordefco.org/NORDEFCO-Annual-Report-2013. 




                                                 
B. ROLES AND MISSIONS FOR SOF 
It is important to understand that Arctic security, as framed by analysts and 
governments, goes well beyond a narrow conception of national security limited to 
conventional military threats.197 This explains why the requirements for the military to 
operate in the Arctic often concerns missions on the full spectrum of conflict and often in 
support of other government agencies (OGAs). Even at the highest end of the spectrum of 
Arctic missions, it is not always clear if the mission is a military one or a constabulary 
one belonging to another department.198  
As described previously, the Arctic political environment has evolved 
dramatically in recent years. With the high likelihood of future SOF involvement, the 
question now is whether doctrine has evolved and been maintained. This question 
becomes even more relevant when looking in the preface of AJP-3 (B) where it states, 
“The successful execution of military operations requires a clearly understood 
doctrine.”199 In an alliance perspective it seems equally important to appreciate “the 
strategic environment is fluid, … it is impossible to predict precisely how challenges will 
emerge.”200 In fact, this underlines the comment made by U.S. Secretary Gates, “we have 
an impeccable record of failing to predict anything.”201 Hence, by realizing we cannot 
predict the future, it seems more critical to prepare for, and shape, the future in order 
achieve national objectives. It appears valid to take this a step further and claim for a 
doctrine to be applicable and understood it must be relevant and consistent with the 
demands placed upon it, to include operations in not just a joint frame, but also in a 
multinational (NATO) frame. This emphasizes the interoperability issues that might exist 
between the NATO AJP and U.S. JP doctrine when trying to meet the uncertain 
challenges of the future.  
197 Gongora, “Scoping Missions and Tasks for CANSOFCOM in the Canadian North,” 10. 
198 Ibid. 
199 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], “Allied Joint Doctrine” (AJP-3(B)), NATO (Mons, 
Belgium: March 2011), ix. 
200 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0 [JP 3-0] (Washington, DC: March 2011), I-2. 
201 As cited in Jeremy Gray and Rickey Smith, “A Resource Constrained Environment: A Primer to 
Thinking about Force Structure Change,” Military Review 91, no. 6 (2011): 10. 
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To what degree, within the confines of this study, existing doctrine meets future 
Arctic challenges, is not yet possible to conclude. By focusing on the applicability, or 
utility of forces based on AJP-3(B), it seems possible to determine that the conventional 
land component contribution to missions in the Arctic may be limited, unless discussing 
large-scale territorial disputes. AJP-3 (B) states, “The impact of physical presence and 
intimate interaction achieved through proximity of land forces should not be 
underestimated.”202 While this is not disputed, the effect (of conventional forces) may be 
counterproductive in a politically sensitive Artic context, effectively rendering 
conventional forces less suited. It is evident, though the focus of this study is SOF, there 
are going to be a vast number of conventional missions in the Arctic, likely even a 
majority. However, as the final excerpt from AJP-3 (B) states “if they [SOF] perform 
tasks that may be conducted by other alliance forces, they do so to a unique set of 
conditions and standards.”203 The geophysical study identified prevailing, unique, and 
adverse conditions, which may result in SOF executing otherwise conventional tasks in 
the Arctic. The difficulties in employing conventional forces becomes further relevant 
when considering the “… substantial logistic supply, which normally requires sealift, 
airlift and ground transportation”204 required to sustain conventional forces. This is a fact 
that affects SOF as well as conventional forces, except that SOF typically has a much 
smaller logistic footprint associated with smaller units. Though SOF have smaller logistic 
requirements, SOF still need support and resupply. Like conventional forces relying on 
air or aviation resupply, control of the air (air superiority)205 is a requirement. While 
denied access to the airspace above the Arctic seems unlikely and associated with major 
combat operations (as discussed later), conventional air power would have to provide this 
support in order to sustain SOF; hence, SOF would rely on a conventional air component. 
202 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations 
(AJP-3(B)), section 0135. 
203 Ibid., section 0140. 
204 Ibid., section 0135. 
205 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English 
and French) (AAP-06), NATO (Brussels, Belgium: March 2013), 2-A-11. 
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This seems to highlight the joint aspect of Arctic (SOF) operations. A fact that becomes 
further obvious when discussing AJP-3.5.  
NATO206 and U.S.207 SOF are inherently joint organizations. This is important to 
keep in mind as it dictates the need to focus on the entire palette of military (SOF) 
capabilities, and not just one service. Therefore, JP 3–0 states, “SOF are most effective 
when SO are fully integrated into the overall plan and the execution of SO is through 
proper SOF C2 elements in a supporting or supported relationship with conventional 
forces” and supports this.208 SOF are strategic assets and “special operations are 
normally conducted in uncertain, hostile, or politically sensitive environments to achieve 
military objectives that can have military, diplomatic, informational, or economic effects. 
These operations often require covert, discreet, or low prominence capabilities.”209 The 
previous excerpt from AJP-3.5 effectively describes how SOF operations impact the four 
elements of national power (DIME),210 and implicitly describes how to use military 
(SOF) to obtain national interests in a hostile, uncertain environment with great political 
sensitivity. These are all traits that exist in the Arctic geopolitical environment. AJP-3.5 
continues to define 
Special operations and how they differ from conventional operations in 
degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of 
employment, independence from friendly support…. [Furthermore,] the 
successful conduct of special operations relies on individual and small unit 
proficiency in a multitude of specialized, often nonconventional 
operational skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and 
[most important in an Arctic environment] self-reliance…. These 
responses may not entail the risk of [crisis] escalation normally associated 
206 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP 
3.5), NATO Special Coordination Centre [NSCC] (Mons, Belgium: NSHQ, January 2009), 1-1. 
207 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations (Washington, DC: April 
2011), II-2. 
208 U.S. Department of Defense 3-0, Joint Operations, V-49. 
209 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP 
3.5), 1-1. 
210 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP 01(D)), NATO (Brussels, 
Belgium, December 2010), vii. 
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with employment of inherently larger or more visible conventional 
forces.211 
The previous excerpts from AJP-3.5 are in congruence with JP 3–5, thus the 
fundamental view of SOF between alliance and U.S. doctrine is consistent.212 
1. SOF Characteristics 
SOF operations span the spectrum of conflict from peacetime to war. AJP-3.5 
outlines the common attributes of five special operations: tempo, pre-emption, disruption, 
deception, and initiative. Across the spectrum of conflict, the following “common 
attributes” are essential to highlight. First, tempo enables a “rapid execution … [in order 
to] mass combat power at the critical place and time, accomplish the mission, [and] 
withdraw before the adversary can react….”213 Combat power should not merely be 
viewed as firepower, but rather as the joint tactical ability to efficiently reach mission 
objectives. Second, AJP-3.5 also describes how “SOF pre-empt an adversary by 
neutralizing capabilities before a fight. [Third,] to gain the initiative, SOF encourage, an 
ability and willingness to make independent, time-critical decisions using all available 
information and guidance….”214 It seems that to achieve and maintain these three special 
operations common attributes (tempo, pre-emption, and initiative) a high degree of force 
preparedness is required. This is further evident in the following: “the numbers of SOF 
are limited and cannot rapidly expand,”215 and when studying the section on SOF 
principles of employment, it states that the key to success lies with the [capabilities and 
understanding of the] individual special operator.216 It is imperative to consider the entire 
capability when discussing SOF preparedness, and to include intelligence access, mission 
planners, mobility assets, and political mandate. To gain an understanding of these 
211 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP 
3.5), 1-1, 1-2. 
212 U.S. Department Of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, I-1 and I-2. 
213 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP 
3.5), 1-3. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Ibid., 0105.a. 
216 Ibid., 0105. 
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aspects, further elaboration on what SOF is and how to utilize the SOF will be discussed 
in the following sections. 
Because SOF is defined as a unique capability, they can provide what 
conventional air, land, and maritime forces cannot.217 While this may seem obvious, it is 
highlighted by the previous discussion on SOF ability to operate in an environment of 
political sensitivity that requires covert or discrete presence. In a study from 2007, Robert 
Spulak discusses the definition of SOF and what it is that makes SOF unique. Spulak 
points out that this “conventional” definition of SOF is “only relative to what is 
conventional.”218 Spulak argues that the uniqueness of SOF is found in the very nature of 
war—with connotations tracing back to Clausewitz—where “everything is simple, but 
the simplest thing is difficult.”219 Spulak “explains how the qualities of SOF directly 
address the origins of friction,”220 and states, in its simplest form, friction can be said to 
be “the difference between plans and reality.”221 “Therefore, friction is the reality that 
will continue to help determine the requirements and the limitations of military forces, 
due to the enduring nature of war ….”222 Spulak uses this understanding of the enduring 
nature of war and its impact on doctrine to derive three fundamental attributes of SOF, 
which sets SOF apart from other “narrowly defined military organizations.”223 These 
attributes are elite warriors, creative, and flexible.224 
The uniqueness and qualities of SOF warriors are almost universally 
recognized. SOF are specially recruited, assessed, selected, trained, and 
equipped; have access to national-level intelligence and cutting-edge 
technology; and demonstrate boldness, intellect, and perseverance.225 
217 Ibid., section 0201. 
218 Robert G. Spulak, Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and Use of SOF. 
No. JSOU-R-07-7 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Labs, 2007), 1. 
219 Ibid., 6. 
220 Ibid., 5. 
221 Ibid., 6. 
222 Ibid., 10. 
223 Ibid., 14. 
224 Ibid., 14. 
225 Ibid., 16. 
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This is what Spulak concludes makes SOF elite warriors. “Creativity means the 
ability to immediately change the combat process, altering the way in which the tension 
is accommodated between threatening or performing destruction and avoiding it.”226 
Tension is the dynamic and conflicting balancing of attempting to destroy the enemy 
while securing own survival at the same time.227 
Ironically, flexibility means that a small SOF unit can have a much larger 
range of capabilities than even a large conventional unit as a result of the 
smaller range of more capable personnel … the lack of numbers is also 
why SOF, in general, cannot win the war by themselves…. The range of 
capabilities does, however, make SOF more independent of other military 
forces in their operations.228 
What seems to be a common denominator in how Spulak defines the unique SOF 
attributes are personnel skills. These skills enable SOF to cope with a higher degree of 
uncertainty than its conventional counterparts.   
The doctrinal discussion of SOF versus conventional forces also entails both 
increased ability, but also limitations in the application of SOF. AJP-3.5 lists four criteria 
to consider when “evaluating SOF employment:”229 appropriate, feasible, sustainable, 
and justifiable. Appropriate involves consideration toward whether the mission is a SOF 
mission. Is SOF the most efficient asset? Do other means exist that would be able to 
conduct the mission better, maybe even at a lower risk level? If so, it is not a SOF 
mission. The caution about appropriateness is further augmented in AJP-3.5 where it 
states, “There are limitations to SOF. Improper use of SOF can rapidly lead to the 
depletion of SOF capabilities. SOF cannot be easily replaced, nor can their capabilities be 
rapidly expanded.”230 This is almost verbatim supporting JP 3–05.231 While the 
difficulties in replacing SOF assets have operational relevance when assessing feasibility, 
226 Ibid., 17. 
227 Ibid., 10. 
228 Ibid., 19. 
229 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP 
3.5), sect. 0106. 
230 Ibid., section 0502. 
231 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, II-3. 
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the inherent difficulties in rapidly expanding SOF have strategic implications when 
enforcing structuring and preparedness. “SOF, therefore, should primarily be employed 
for critical or decisive objectives,”232 and “no mission should be declared feasible or 
unfeasible based solely on the time available to plan and prepare for the mission.”233 
Rather, “does the SOF element have the appropriate training, skills, planning, and 
rehearsal time, as well as the required cultural understanding.”234 This highlights the fact 
that SOF is not simply SOF, but SOF missions in any particular environment likely 
require specific preparations and qualifications. This is explicitly stated in JP 3–05, 
“Selected SOF are regionally, culturally, and linguistically oriented for employment; 
extensive language and cross-cultural training are a routine part of their development.”235  
The aspects of preparation do not just pertain to the specific SOF asset, but also to 
sustainability, the third mission criteria. “Even if the target is appropriate, feasible, and 
vulnerable to SOF, a lack of dedicated support resources may prevent the execution of a 
special operation.”236 Though the wording is different, the AJP 3.5 sustainability 
criterion corresponds to the fourth JP 3–05 criteria, which discusses insufficient support 
resources invalidating the feasibility of employing SOF.237 Once again, the lack of 
infrastructure and vast distances in combination with adverse Arctic weather conditions 
might pose logistic restrictions in the size and application of a military force. This is 
captured in JP 3–05, which states “Most SO missions require non-SOF support. SOF are 
typically not structured with robust means of logistic sustainment capabilities.”238 
232 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP 
3.5), section 0502. 
233 Ibid., section 0504. 
234 Ibid., section 0106.b. 
235 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, II-2. 
236 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP 
3.5), section 0106.c. 
237 Although the wording is different, the NATO sustainability criteria in effect corresponds to the 
fourth JP 3-05 criteria, which discusses insufficient support resources invalidating the feasibility of 
employing SOF. 
238 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, II-3. 
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Finally, the fourth AJP 3.5 criteria is, “does the expected outcome justify the risk?”239 
While this criterion should be applied to any application of military force, it is even more 
important when considering the characteristics of SOF and the geophysical environment, 
as well as the sensitive geopolitical environment in the Arctic. The overall criteria for 
employment of SOF are similar between the NATO and U.S. doctrine. However, the U.S. 
JP 3–05 does employ a fifth criterion, stating, “The mission or activities [of SOF] should 
support the JFC’s campaign or operation plan, or special activities. If not, shortfall in 
SOF capabilities should be pointed out and appropriate SOF missions recommended.”240 
This fifth U.S. criterion appears as a very important element in identifying and tasking 
SOF missions and the fact that SOF is a joint commitment, and should be integrated into 
the overall plan, as addressed earlier, to achieve unity of effort. This could be an 
indication of a stronger link between the joint operations doctrine and SOF doctrine in 
U.S. doctrine compared to NATO doctrine. 
2. SOF Principal Tasks 
NATO SOF conducts three principal tasks: Special Reconnaissance and 
Surveillance (SR&S), Direct Action (DA), and Military Assistance. Under these principal 
tasks, 
SOF offers the Alliance [NATO] an additional and unique capability to 
achieve military objectives and perform tasks the no other forces in NATO 
are able to conduct while creating strategic effects. If, however, they 
[SOF] perform tasks that may be conducted by other Alliance forces, they 
do so to a unique set of conditions and standards.241 
From the preceding paragraph, it seems safe to conclude that SOF may conduct 
conventional missions if conditions and standards warrant the use of SOF. This seems to 
be an important indicator to what extent the operational and geophysical environments 
239 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP 
3.5), section 0106.d. 
240 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, II-4. 
241 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP 
3.5), section 0201. 
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may suggest the use of SOF in certain otherwise conventional scenarios. Currently, 
NATO SOF conducts the following three principal, or “core tasks.”  
• Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance (SR&S). This is a predominately 
human intelligence (HUMINT) function that places required “eyes on 
target” in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory.242  
• Direct Action (DA). These are precise operations, focused on specific, 
well-defined targets of strategic and operational significance, normally 
limited in scope and duration.243  
• Military Assistance (MA). This is a broad spectrum of measures in support 
of friendly forces throughout the spectrum of conflict.244 
Apart from these three principal tasks, NATO distinguishes Additional Activities 
of SOF, which consist of Counter-Irregular Threat Activities like terrorism (CT) and 
insurgency (COIN), Countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 
Weapons (CBRN), Hostage Release Operations (HRO), and Faction Liaison.245  
Although the overall mission set between NATO and U.S. SOF is similar, there 
do exist several differences, especially in how the different missions are defined 
(missions, tasks, core activities, and additional activities). JP 3–05 specifies the following 
core SOF activities: DA, SR, counter proliferation of WMD, unconventional warfare 
(UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Security Force Assistance (SFA), COIN, 
Information operations, Military information support operations, and civil affairs 
operations.246 U.S. SOF is directly tied to U.S. national interests, whereas NATO SOF 
must fit a broader scope in support of not just national military strategy, but in support of 
overall alliance security strategy. This is bound to result in a compromise, reflecting the 
security threats to the alliance, and not necessarily the threat as perceived by each 
individual nation. Hence, it is important to recognize that the difference in doctrinal 
242 Ibid., section 0202.a. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid., section 0202.b. 
245 Ibid., section 0203.b, c & d. 
246 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, II-6. 
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application of SOF may affect how the forces mesh in multinational and alliance 
frameworks, with possible complications in organizational differences and C2 structure. 
The discussion of how SOF roles and missions are articulated is influenced by the 
demand for SOF. When the demand for SOF is high, military leaders are more selective 
about how they define roles and missions. When demand for SOF declines, roles and 
missions are defined more broadly.247 As an example, at times of high demand for SOF, 
missions like Humanitarian Assistance and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) have 
been undervalued. Another important discussion is the use of SOF in an interagency 
setting, to conduct domestic operations. There are many differences among the NATO 
countries on this issue. Special operations missions vary from small unilateral actions to 
large-scale activities of a combined and joint nature. Where JP 3–05 states, “SO can be 
conducted across the range of military operations at all levels of war and throughout all 
phases of a campaign or operations,”248 JP 3–05 briefly states the following: 
Military operations, to include SO, vary in scope, purpose, and combat 
intensity … with a range of military operations from recurring military 
engagement security cooperation, and deterrence activities (typically no 
conflict to low intensity conflict), to crisis response and limited 
contingency operations (low to high), and if necessary, to major operations 
and campaigns (high intensity).249 
3. Spectrum of Conflict 
Whereas AJP 3.5 states it more eloquently, SOF executes the principal tasks 
across the spectrum of conflict.250 The spectrum of conflict is generally a scale between 
low and high intensity conflict, or runs from peacetime to war. AJP 3–5 distinguishes 
between four levels of conflict: (1) Peacetime Military Engagements; (2) Peace Support 
Operations; (3) Counter Irregular Threat Operations; and (4) Major Combat Operations. 
As mentioned before, the requirements for the military—and SOF in particular—to 
247 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operation Forces (New York: 
Colombia University Press, 2007), 165. 
248 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, I-4. 
249 Ibid., I-3. 
250 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP 
3.5), 1‒2. 
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operate in the Arctic often concerns missions on the full spectrum of conflict and often in 
support of OGAs.  
a. Peacetime Military Engagement 
The main purposes of SOF would be the early identification and assessment of a 
potential crisis, training of friendly forces, and developing a military liaison.251 
Translated by the Arctic, the emphasis for SOF in this spectrum could be military liaison 
with other SOF units, including Russian, through joint training and exercises. Not only 
military units should be engaged, but equally important, the indigenous and local 
population of the Arctic region. The local population can be extremely valuable as “eyes 
and ears” in the region. Through presence, cooperation, and a focus on interagency 
operations fighting against future criminal networks in the Arctic, the ability to identify 
potential conflict will increase Additionally, the SOF must be prepared to support SAR 
operations, contribute to HA operations, and conduct MCT operations and HRO. 
b. Peace Support Operations 
Depending upon the context and the possibilities within given rules of 
engagements, SOF can contribute with all of its principal tasks (SR&S, DA, and MA).252 
In an Arctic environment, the emphasis for SOF in this spectrum of conflict will probably 
be the ability to contribute significantly to intelligence requirements. This is possible 
either directly or indirectly, through cooperation with indigenous populations, as well as 
through its ability to conduct MCT, HRO, and CSAR. 
c. Counter Irregular Threat Operations 
When preparing for counter-irregular threat operations, SOF can provide area 
assessment and early command, control, and communications (C3) capabilities.253 By 
virtue of its very nature, an irregular threat will usually involve SOF. Although the 
chance of COIN in the Arctic is arguably low, CT in the Arctic could become real. SOF 
251 Ibid., 1‒2. 
252 Ibid., 1‒2. 
253 Ibid., 1‒2. 
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can utilize all its core tasks plus additional activities in this spectrum of conflict. 
However, the emphasis will be on direct missions.254 
d. Major Combat Operations 
During major combat missions, SOF would concentrate on the principle tasks of 
SR&S and DA.255 In an Arctic context, SOF would be best utilized in contributing to the 
intelligence requirements, and its capability to conduct surgical strikes under extreme 
conditions. The ability to verify and assess intelligence on the ground using SOF 
operators instead of hardware has proven to be demanding but highly valuable. 
Furthermore, satellite coverage above 70-degree North latitude seems to be limited, 
creating problems for ISR platforms to operate. Examples of likely DA missions for SOF 
are sabotage missions on crucial C2 nodes, strategic military installations, and other high 
value targets. Key here is the ability to operate effectively in the hostile Arctic 
environment. Table 1 lays out Arctic SOF missions on the spectrum of conflict. 
Table 1.   Possible future SOF missions in the Arctic on the spectrum of 
conflict. 







HRO     
Liaison 
(M)CT 




HRO     
Liaison 
(M)CT 
(C)SAR     
SR&S  




HRO     
(M)CT 





HRO     
(M)CT 









Low intensity High Intensity 
 
By combining the roles and missions from AJP-3.5 with the spectrum of conflict 
as discussed it is possible to show future SOF missions in the Arctic. These missions can 
be executed in an independent or supporting role. Because of the geophysical properties 
254 For an explanation between direct and indirect SOF missions, see Table 5.1 in Tucker and Lamb, 
United States Special Operation Forces, 153. 
255 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP 
3.5), 1‒3. 
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in the Arctic, it is expected that most SOF missions in the Arctic, will be executed in the 
maritime domain. 
The strategic value of SOF operating in the Arctic lies in the ability to effectively 
operate in an extremely difficult and demanding environment, where conditions may 
preclude the use of conventional units, ISR platforms and precision-guided ammunitions 
(PGM) may not be as reliable and efficient as in lower latitudes. Instead, the individual 
operator skills and distinct SOF characteristics can be used to play a significant role in 
achieving mission success.  
4. Special Air Operations and Special Maritime Operations 
As previously discussed, SOF is inherently joint. This jointness goes beyond 
using enablers such as conventional support units. Within the SOF community, jointness 
is an inherent element of unit structure, mission planning and execution. Along with an 
increased need for strategic guidance, jointness may be one of the reasons why Denmark 
is establishing a joint Special Operations Command along the lines of USSOCOM.  
To capture SOF jointness, the following will discuss Special Air Operations 
(SAO) and Special Maritime Operations. Tempo was previously discussed as a critical 
attribute in SOF missions.256 While tempo is more than mere speed, tempo is also the 
ability to rapidly execute missions.257 Mode of employment affects how SOF achieves 
rapid employment. As maritime domain with vast distances and limited infrastructure, the 
Arctic requires the use of a combination of air and maritime SOF elements to enable 
timely deployment of SOF. Two elements lie behind this statement: range and response 
time. The use of ships as a means of employment usually satisfies the range requirement; 
however, depending upon the mission, response time to a certain task may not be 
satisfied if solely utilizing maritime surface-based capabilities. Typically, a combination 
of air and maritime capabilities are needed; therefore, it is necessary to include air and 
maritime SOF in the discussion.  
256 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP 
3.5), section 0104 a. 
257 Ibid. 
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Special Air Operations are activities conducted by specially organized, 
trained, and equipped air and aviation [fixed and rotary wing] forces to 
support military strategic or operational objectives by unconventional 
military means in hostile, denied, or political sensitive areas … across the 
full spectrum of conflict.258 
SAO support each of the NATO SOF tasks as previously discussed.259 
The primary special air operation is air infiltration/extraction and resupply 
via fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. Other special air activities include 
close air support (CAS), ISTAR, air-to-air refueling (AAR), and PR, 
including MEDEVAC, for special operations air, ground, and maritime 
forces.260 
Infiltration and extraction are precisely where the Arctic may introduce certain 
requirements, and to highlight the fact that just like ground SOF, SOA by default is not 
suited to Arctic operations. Because of the geophysical conditions in the Arctic, specific 
and significant capabilities are required to operate in the Arctic. As previously discussed, 
this requires a high degree of preparedness. AJP-3.5 mentions the possible role of non-
special operations aircraft in support of SOF missions “… to augment the airlift, fire 
support, and ISTAR capabilities.”261 While Denmark employs non-special operations 
aircraft in the Arctic to conduct resupply, the aircrews performing these tasks are 
specifically trained to such a high level that they  compare to SOA.262 This only serves to 
highlight the need for specifically-trained SOA capabilities for Arctic operations.  
Maritime SOF primarily conduct operations in the coastal, riverine, and 
maritime environments. They utilize small, flexible, mobile units 
operating under, on, and from the sea.263 
258 Ibid., section 0204 a. (1). 
259 Ibid., section 0204 a. (1)(a). 
260 Ibid. 
261 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP 
3.5), section 0204 a. (1)(b). 
262 Forsvarskommandoen (Defense Command, Denmark), “Vaernsfaelles Specialoperations styrker,” 
[Joint Special Operation Forces] (Copenhagen: March 2014), 9. 
263 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP 
3.5), section 0204 b. (1). 
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It seems obvious that maritime SOF are affected at least to the same degree as 
ground and air SOF, simply because of their domain. The coast and sea are severely 
affected by the geophysical conditions in the Arctic. The ability to operate under the sea 
might be non-existent, significantly reduced, or require substantial training and 
equipment adaptation. To gain full advantage of maritime SOF, the focus from littoral 
and riverine domains264 may have to be shifted toward Arctic conditions—specifically 
operating in remote areas on, among, and under the sea ice—to conduct an otherwise 
pertinent mission set, including the following:265 
• Coastal reconnaissance. 
• Covert beach reconnaissance in advance of amphibious assault. 
• Covert assault route preparation in advance of amphibious assault. 
• Recovery or protection of ships and oil installations subject to hostile or 
non-state (terrorist) action. 
• Maritime CT. 
• Support to civil authorities.  
C. DEFINING ARCTIC SOF CAPABILITIES 
This section of the study is dedicated to the analysis of each of the three countries 
represented by the thesis authors. This analysis is not comparative, as each country is 
different in size, location, and interest relative to the Arctic. Furthermore, each of the 
countries has different constitutional rules, resulting in different conditions for the 
employment of SOF. However, the analysis conducted applied the same aspects of 
analysis to each of the countries by way of a universally recognized method. The method 
can be easily replicated for other countries of similar relationship or size as the ones 
captured in this study. 
264 Ibid., section 0204 b. (4). 
265 Ibid. 
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1. Current Arctic SOF Capabilities 
Several documents and articles have been written in recent years assessing the 
military Arctic capabilities of the Arctic Five, and providing an overview of unclassified 
military and essential civilian hardware (like nuclear powered icebreakers). These 
documents have attempted to prove the point that a significant capability gap exists for a 
particular country. A U.S. GAO report from January 2012 states, “DOD has identified 
Arctic capability gaps, but lacks a comprehensive approach to addressing Arctic 
capabilities.”266 The working group, consisting of DOD and Directorate of Homeland 
Security, was established to focus on four primary capability areas.267 This report 
concludes with “addressing near-term gaps is essential for DOD to have the key enabling 
capabilities it needs to communicate, navigate, and maintain awareness of activity in the 
region.268 In this thesis, capability refers to, “the ability to achieve an objective in a 
military operation.”269 Not much seems to have been done for the United States since this 
report appeared. The few documents that describe Arctic capabilities argue that there is 
an increased requirement and a lack of capabilities or ambition to address this objective.  
2. Explaining DOTMLPFI 
DOTMLPFI stands for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and 
education, personnel, facilities, and interoperability. The DOTMLPFI method of analysis 
is a NATO-recognized method for measuring military capability. This method of analysis 
is also used extensively by the U.S. DOD, and is governed by the Chairman of the Joint 
266 John H. Pendleton, Suzanne Wren, Susan Ditto, Nicole Harms, Timothy Persons, Steven Putansu, 
Frank Rusco, Jodie Sandel, Amie Steele, and Esther Toledo, Arctic Capabilities: DOD Addressed Many 
Specified Reporting Elements in Its 2011 Arctic Report but Should Take Steps to Meet Near-and Long-term 
Needs ( GAO-12-180) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, January 2012), 12. 
267 The working group was directed by its Terms of Reference to focus on four primary capability 
areas when identifying potential collaborative efforts to enhance Arctic capabilities, including near term 
investments. Those capability areas include maritime domain awareness, communications, infrastructure, 
and presence. 
268 Pendleton et al., Arctic Capabilities: DOD Addressed Many Specified Reporting Elements in Its 
2011 Arctic Report but Should Take Steps to Meet Near-and Long-term Needs, 17. 
269 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff J-8, Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) User’s Guide, 
version 3, 7. 
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Chiefs of Staff 3170.01H (2012).270 CJSCI 3170.01H defines capability as “the ability to 
execute a specified course of action. A capability may or may not be accompanied by an 
intention.” To assess relevant military Arctic SOF capabilities of the Dutch, Danish, and 
U.S., independent capability-based assessments (CBA) of each must be conducted. 
DOTMLPF is a fundamental part of a CBA when the goal is requires more than a 
materiel solution. Since the focus of this analysis is not simply a materiel solution, but 
also analyzes current capabilities through scenario-based assessments, the DOTMLPF 
method would be best to describe the respective military’s overall arctic capabilities.271 
Interoperability of the allied operation is inherently important, and the same is true when 
responding to scenarios in the Arctic.272 Therefore, an “I” is added to the acronym, 
making it DOTMLPFI.273 This is further explained in CJCSI 3010.02D (2013),274 and 
270 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System,” 
http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3170_01.pdf. 
271 Department of the Army, “TRADOC Regulation 71-20, Force Development: Concept 
Development, Capabilities Determination, and Capabilities Integration,” 2013, 57, 
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regs/tr71-20.pdf. 
272 NATO, “Backgrounder: Interoperability for Joint Operations,” 2006, 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120116_interoperability-en.pdf. 
273 Doctrine- Joint doctrine consists of fundamental principles that guide the employment of US 
military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective; reflects best practices based on extant 
capabilities (i.e. Current force structures and field equipment). 
Organization- Describes the way in which the Joint Force organizes to accomplish missions, execute 
functions, and deliver, support or sustain joint war fighting capabilities. 
Training- Through training exercises based on approved joint doctrine, new concepts can be combined 
and observed, providing a capability response to analyzed trends, best practices, and insights derived from 
military commanders across the full range of joint functions and mission sets. 
Materiel- Joint concepts describe materiel and nonmaterial capabilities required to improve the ability 
of the Joint Force to overcome future challenges. Once a capability is identified, a risk analysis is applied. 
Capability gaps are analyzed and under certain risk levels, changes are submitted to defense acquisition 
programs. Non-material solutions are met by seeking a new capability solution to close identified gaps. 
Leadership and Education- Joint learning objectives are articulated and can provide a significant 
influence over [Joint Professional Military Education]. These objectives can be the result of force research 
developments or used for the basis of instruction, exercise, or professional military discussion. 
Personnel- The personnel component of DOTMLPF-I refers to the individuals required in either a 
military or civilian capacity to accomplish an assigned mission. Joint concepts espouse new ways of 
operating or new capabilities that directly affect the individual and collective skills required by their 
military to accomplish their mission. 
Facilities- Key facilities include command installations and industrial facilities to support the military 
operations or production programs. Joint concepts may impact or rely on a number of facilities, both within 
and outside of their respective State’s boundaries. 
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NATO publications on interoperability.275 Figure 15 displays the elements of 
DOTMLPF(I) and how Interoperability (I) is an inherent part of all the other elements. 
 
Figure 15.  DOTMLPFI in the Arctic.  
The outcome of the DOTMLPFI capability analysis is the mutual evolution of a 
joint force to create or improve a needed capability; in this case, an Arctic capability. The 
constraints, limitations, and assumptions of capability analysis are also taken into 
Interoperability- NATO describes interoperability as “the ability of different military organizations to 
conduct joint operations. These organizations can be different nationalities or different armed services 
(ground, naval, and air forces) or both. Interoperability allows forces, units or systems to operate together. 
It requires them to share common doctrine and procedures, each other’s infrastructure and bases, and to be 
able to communicate with each other. It reduces duplication in an Alliance […], allows pooling of 
resources, and even produces synergies among members.” 
274 Chairman Joint Chiefs Staff, “CJCSI 3010.02D: Guidance for Development and Implementation 
of Joint Concepts,” 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3010_02.pdf. 
275 NATO, “Backgrounder: Interoperability for Joint Operations,” 1.  
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consideration, and will affect the overall level of risk that each military’s state is willing 
to assume.276 
3. Danish SOF Arctic Capabilities 
Danish SOF consists of the Army SOF, Jægerkorpset (JGK), and Navy SOF, 
Frømandskorpset (FKP). The Royal Danish Air Force (RDAF) does not have any 
designated SOF units. However, the Air Force (along with conventional assets from other 
services) supports Danish SOF with units, which are specifically designated, trained, and 
equipped to support SOF missions.277 The Air Force will get a disproportionate amount 
of space in this analysis compared to the Navy. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the 
Danish Navy maintains a constant presence in the Arctic, and the Navy’s capability is 
undisputed, and has been further augmented through implementation of new ships such 
as the ocean patrol vessels (OPV) of the KNUD-RASMUSSEN class.278 Second, through 
discussions with Danish SOF representatives, it was soon obvious that some of the major 
concern pertaining to operating in the Arctic was strategic and tactical mobility.279 The 
Navy is able to provide both in a maritime environment. The suitability of this form of 
mobility depends upon the specific scenario. While the Air Force also has an Arctic 
legacy, this capability is less obvious and deserves further attention. 
a. Doctrine 
The foundation for Danish SOF is NATO SOF doctrine and policy.280 Although 
unsuited for this study due to classification, TTPs and unit SOPs do exist. Noteworthy is 
the fact that Danish SOF does not have or utilize an Arctic-specific doctrine, and the 
276 Department of the Army, “TRADOC Regulation 71-20, Force Development: Concept 
Development, Capabilities Determination, and Capabilities Integration,” 61. 
277 Forsvarskommandoen (Defense command, Denmark), “Vaernsfaelles Specialoperations styrker,” 
9. 
278 Danish Ministry of Defence, “Missions in the Arctic and the North Atlantic,” Copenhagen, May 
13, 2014, http://www.fmn.dk/videnom/Pages/OpgaveriArktisogNordatlanten.aspx. 
279 Commander Mogens Christens and Lieutenant-Colonel Claus Wammen, in discussion with the 
authors, May 18, 2014. 
280 Forsvarskommandoen (Defense command, Denmark), “Vaernsfaelles Specialoperations styrker,” 
11, 16. 
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TTPs and SOPs are derived from experiences in the European Arctic through years of 
training in primarily Norway and Sweden.281 “Doctrinally, the SOF approach remains 
unchanged until now,”282 and thus, it may not adequately capture the fact that the Arctic 
is primarily a maritime domain.283 The RDAF relies on NATO doctrine like the 
supported SOF units. Besides this air SOF mission, TTPs are developed in cooperation 
with Danish SOF units. The Air Force procedures have been aligned with SOF 
procedures over the past decade. The Air Force is now—from a TTP perspective—
capable of supporting SOF from desert and Arctic environments overland to maritime 
environments.  
Although part of this discussion belongs in the training and materials section, the 
doctrines and procedures are what separate these aircrews from other (conventional) 
units, and their skills that enable the aircrews to operate in the Arctic. The RDAF C-130 
(Hercules) and CL-604 (Challenger) units have operated in the Arctic (Greenland) for 
decades to include airdrop, TLZ landings on snow and ice, surveillance and 
reconnaissance in support of SAR, oil-spill detection, and fishery monitoring missions. 
This capability still exists and is used extensively. The Lynx284 has also operated on the 
North Atlantic for decades as an organic part of the Navy. The Lynx unit was only 
recently transferred from the Navy to the Air Force. This (Arctic) mission is the primary 
(and dimensioning) mission for the maritime helicopter (MARHELO). The doctrine and 
TTPs reflect this. The EH-101 and AS-550 units are also capable of operating in Arctic 
environments; however, like the SOF units, the procedural foundation is based on 
experience gathered in the Scandinavian Arctic. To what extent these procedures translate 
to Greenland and beyond is uncertain. Some of the concerns are the procedures, which 
are used in a mountainous Arctic—where vegetation provide sufficient contrast to safely 
281 Commander Mogens Christens and Lieutenant-Colonel Claus Wammen, in discussion with the 
authors, May 18, 2014. 
282 Major Bo Jantzen, in email correspondence with the authors, September 29, 2014. 
283 Pendleton, et al., Arctic Capabilities: DOD Addressed Many Specified Reporting Elements in Its 
2011 Arctic Report but Should Take Steps to Meet Near-and Long-term Needs, 7. 
284 The LYNX will be replaced by MH-60R by 2016. The MH-60R was specifically meant to 
augment the Arctic MARHELO capability. Source: Danish Ministry of Defence, “Missions in the Arctic 
and the North Atlantic.” 
 91 
                                                 
operate under visual conditions—may prove unsuited and outright dangerous in a 
maritime Arctic with dominating white-out conditions. These conditions with very 
limited visual references are usually avoided. This may not be possible in the Arctic. This 
could be an example where tactical considerations prove a doctrinal concept invalid.  
b. Organization 
Currently, Danish SOF is undergoing significant organizational changes. Though 
vastly different in size, these organizational changes are comparable in nature to what the 
U.S. DOD did when it established U.S. SOCOM. The result of this should enhance the 
future strategic focus of Danish SOF, jointly organized285 directly under the defense 
command. This is interesting viewed in the light of the Danish Prime Minister’s opening 
speech to parliament in 2013, when she explicitly stated there would be an increased 
Arctic focus, and that Denmark shall be capable of handling the future issues in the 
Arctic, specifically addressing SAR286 and environmental protection.287 The Arctic 
command is a result of this increased Arctic focus. If Danish SOF are deployed to the 
Danish Arctic, it will be through command-level coordination between the Arctic 
command and SOCOM.288 This top-level Arctic focus may result in an Arctic-specific 
reorganization where elements from Danish SOF will join with Beredskabsstyrelsen 
(Danish equivalent of the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency) and the Air 
Force to create an Arctic response force to establish an initial emergency response 
capability.289 
The JGK and the FKP are both organized—though not quite similarly—into 
platoons. This short description only serves to illustrate the naturally limited number of 
285 Forsvarskommandoen (Defense Command, Denmark), “Vaernsfaelles Specialoperations styrker,” 
7. 
286 While SAR is not typically an SOF mission, the Danish JGK does consider a SAR mission in the 
Arctic an SOF mission. Lieutenant-Colonel Claus Wammen, in discussion with authors, May 18, 2014. 
287 Danish prime minister’s opening speech to parliament (Statsministeriet, Copenhagen: October 
2013), http://www.stm.dk/_p_13927.html. 
288 Forsvarskommandoen (Defense command, Denmark), “Vaernsfaelles Specialoperations styrker,” 
35. 
289 A study is currently analyzing how to establish an Airborne initial emergency response for 
“isolated regions.” Major Bo Jantzen, in email correspondence with the authors, September 29, 2014. 
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SOF available to Denmark for Arctic operations. While the number of Danish SOF have 
affected the missions Danish SOF can contribute to, the Arctic region is vast, and the 
Danish part of the Arctic greatly exceeds any other national area of operation Danish 
SOF have ever previously been assigned to. This might prove to be a difficult task—in 
mere size—in the future. Danish SOF is not regionally aligned like U.S. SOF; however, 
within the different platoons the operators are specialized in order to sustain a response to 
recognized contingencies in various regions of the world. The Danish Air Force does not 
have units organized under SOF. How the integration will occur with the newly 
established SOCOM, is yet unknown.  
c. Training 
The JGK has maintained an arctic capability, dating back at least to 1988.290 The 
FKP launched their (cold/wet) Arctic training in 1993. “From 1997 forward, the FKP was 
a consistent participant in Norwegian winter exercises, and the training was primarily in 
SR and DA.”291 The Arctic training is primarily derived from the Scandinavian Arctic 
(northern Sweden and Cold Response in Norway), and is a result of a bottom-up 
evolution, and not Arctic strategic guidance.292 Due to operational tempo, unit-level 
Arctic exercise, participation has been reduced, while operator qualifications remain.293 
The Air Force trains for the Arctic—and have for years—to include survival training 
Pituffik (Greenland), Exercise Cold Response (Norway), and annual or semi-annual, unit-
level winter qualification training in Norway. Elements of this training have been 
integrated with Danish SOF.  
d. Materiel 
Danish SOF lack acquisition directives to develop further Arctic material 
capabilities. Current directive has been surpassed by the increased political focus and 
290 Colonel Steen Ulrich, in email correspondence with authors, September 24, 2014. 
291 Lieutenant-Commander Stefan Neubauer, in email correspondence with the authors, September 
29, 2014. 
292 Lieutenant-Colonel Poul Ebstrup, in discussion with authors, May 18, 2014. 
293 Lieutenant-Commander Stefan Neubauer, in email correspondence with the authors, September 
29, 2014. 
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reality.294 The individual operator (Arctic) equipment is very good; however, tactical 
mobility is an issue, and there is a joint working group looking at creating an Arctic 
“pool” of equipment.295 The Air Force F-16 units, which may support SOF in a 
surveillance role, are currently assessing their Arctic material capabilities.296 The ATW 
and MARHELO Arctic capabilities are considered fundamentally sound, but must be 
assessed together with future contingencies. Though the EH-101 and the AS-550 are 
winter and Arctic capable, the AS-550 must be assessed in light of a future Arctic 
mission, due to the weather in the Arctic, the somewhat limited range, no air-to-air refuel 
capability, and a lack of ship qualifications. The recent acquisition of the MH-60R 
Seahawk is Arctic specific, and will augment Danish Arctic SOF capabilities, while the 
Air Force Arctic SOF capability has increased over the past few decades.297 
e. Leadership and education 
Danish SOF and select Air Force personnel undergo NATO SOF planning and 
leadership training. Furthermore, the Air Force HW has an increased focus on developing 
leadership guidance for Air Mission Commanders in support of SOF. There is no specific 
Arctic SOF leadership training. 
f. Personnel 
There is no Arctic-specific SOF leadership guidance or education within Danish 
SOF. However, the SOF units maintain their own cadre of instructors in order to maintain 
Arctic and winter qualifications. 
294 Commander Mogens Christens, in discussion with the authors, May 18, 2014. 
295 “The JGK will need to acquire Snowmobiles and Bandvagen,” Lieutenant-Colonel Claus 
Wammen, in discussion with authors, May 18, 2014. 
296 Danish Ministry of Defence, “Press Release (Regarding Flights on the West Coast of Greenland),” 
[translated from Danish], Copenhagen: August 5, 2014, http://www.fmn.dk/nyheder/Pages/flyvning-med-
F-16-over-groenland.aspx. 
297 Colonel Steen Ulrich, in email correspondence with authors, September 24, 2014. 
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g. Facilities 
Because Denmark is small in relation to the Arctic, it will be the infrastructure in 
the Danish Arctic—in particular, Greenland—that will be important. Therefore, it 
appears that the facilities under the Danish Joint Arctic Command must be evaluated to 
see how it can support Danish SOF employment in the Arctic. Currently, Danish F-16s 
are deployed to the west coast of Greenland to achieve two objectives: 1) to test the F-16 
as a sensor platform for SAR missions, to include surveillance and picture generation, 
and 2) to test the logistic capability of the facilities in Kangerlussuaq and Thule,298 in 
relation to F-16 operations. “Apart from the headquarters in Nuuk and a liaison element 
in Tórshavn (the Faroe Islands), the Arctic Command maintains a liaison element on 
Thule Air base in North Western Greenland. Additionally, there are facilities in 
Kangarlussuaq, Station North, SIRIUS [dog sled patrol] in Danebord, Mestersvig and Air 
Base Aalborg.”299 The ATW units also maintain facilities in Greenland, Kangarlussuaq, 
to support current operations. 
h. Interoperability 
Denmark is reliant on strategic partnerships. “NATO remains the cornerstone in 
Danish security and defense policy, and sets the framework for the close transatlantic 
cooperation”300 Denmark has committed to provide a SOCC to NATO by 2018. The JGK 
has been tasked to provide a SOLTG, and the FRK is tasked to provide a SOMTG. 
Finally, Denmark has also committed to provide a SOATG (C-130J and EH-101).301 This 
is a huge challenge for Danish SOF and supporting units. It requires a large degree of 
interoperability. In order to achieve necessary strategic relations, the JGK has close 
relations with SOF units from the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Switzerland, 
Germany, Norway, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and Slovakia. To achieve 
298 Danish Ministry of Defence, “Press Release (Regarding Flights on the West Coast of Greenland).” 
299 Arktisk Kommando, [translated from Danish] Nuuk, August 6, 2014, 
http://www2.forsvaret.dk/VIDEN-OM/ORGANISATION/ARKTISK/Pages/Arktisk2.aspx. 
300 Danish Ministry of Defense, “Defence Agreement 2013‒2017,” Copenhagen, November 2012, 
http://www.fmn.dk/videnom/Documents/Aftale_paa_forsvarsomraadet_2013-2017a.pdf. 
301 Forsvarskommandoen (Defense command, Denmark), “Vaernsfaelles Specialoperations styrker,” 
8. 
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interoperability through multinational joint integration,302 the JGK has, since 1995, 
hosted an annual Exercise Night Hawk. The FKP Cooperates with Partners from the 
Unites States, Great Britain, Switzerland, Germany, Norway, and Sweden.303 Like the 
Netherlands, Denmark is represented at USSOCOM and at NSHQ. The Air Force 
primarily aligns procedures and improves interoperability through Exercise Night Hawk 
and Exercise Cold Response. Apart from achieving interoperability through exercises and 
exchange of lessons learned, communication is identified as one of the major 
challenges.304 
i. Conclusion 
Denmark maintains an Arctic SOF capability; however, due to other 
commitments, this capability has been somewhat reduced over the past decade. The 
Danish Arctic SOF capability is founded in the Scandinavian Arctic, and is not a result of 
a strategic focus, but rather a bottom-up unit level focus. This may change with the recent 
Danish political focus on the Arctic and restructuring of the Danish SOF organization. 
While Danish SOF has partaken in multiagency operations in the North Atlantic, Danish 
SOF still needs to test to what degree current capabilities will suffice in Greenland and 
beyond. Communication and mobility are issues already identified as areas of 
improvement. AAR refueling and the Danish Air Force ability to operate in the Arctic are 
also evolving. However, current directives limit the ability to acquire new materiel. 
Danish doctrine and TTPs are derived from NATO. Danish SOF have many international 
partners. For the future of SOF in the Arctic, Denmark can expect to cooperate with other 
nations and agencies, therefore, Arctic SOF capabilities must evolve to ensure 
interoperability with partner nations.   
4. NLDSOF Arctic Capabilities 
Within the NLD DOD, there are two SOF units: an Army SOF unit, Korps 
commandotroepen (KCT), and a Navy SOF unit as part of the Royal Netherlands Marine 
302 Ibid., 14. 
303 Ibid., 19. 
304 Lieutenant-Colonel Claus Wammen, in discussion with authors, May 18, 2014. 
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Corps (RNLMC), called The Netherlands Maritime Special Operation Forces 
(NLMARSOF). Unlike the United States and Denmark, the Netherlands does not have a 
formalized Special Operation Command (SOCOM), but instead a Special Operations 
Liaison element (JSO) within the DOD Operations Directorate, with a more limited role 
and responsibility. Both SOF units remain under the responsibility of their respected 
services. The Netherlands lacks an Air Force SOF unit, and is currently in the process of 
acquiring this capability. For now, ‘flight 5’ of the Royal Netherlands Airforce (RNLAF) 
298 sqn, is the designated unit to work with the NLD SOF units. This flight is equipped 
with CH47F’s and have so called ‘provisions for’ working with SOF units. More than 
their U.S. SOF counterparts, NLD SOF relies on non-SOF—or conventional support. 
This includes specialized materiel, personnel (enablers), transportation, and (mobile) 
facilities. 
a. Doctrine 
Within the NLD DOD, different services are appointed by the Chief of Defense 
(CHOD) as subject matter experts (SME) for different types of military 
operations/environments. The RNLMC, as part of the NLD Navy, is responsible for 
military operations in an arctic, mountainous and jungle environment. In order to support 
the NLD DOD units when operating in these environments, the RNLMC established a 
center of excellence (COE) in support of military operations in extreme environments and 
terrain. This center regulates all education of specialists, requirement of critical 
equipment and doctrine used in Arctic and jungle environments and mountainous terrain. 
Specifically for SOF, there is a Joint COE that deals with doctrinal development for SOF 
in general. However, this organization remains within the Army SOF organizational 
structure, and therefore does not cover NLD SOF units. This organization lacks the 
manpower and knowledge to write separate doctrine for SOF. Following is the current 
doctrine used by NLD SOF for operations in the Arctic: 
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• Dutch Joint Publication for military operations in extreme environments: 
Leidraad Militair Optreden onder Extreme Omstandigheden (2010).305  
• Dutch Manual for military operations in the Arctic, Handboek Militair 
optreden in de Arctic (2014). 
• NATO ATP-17 Naval Arctic Manual (April 2014). 
• ATP 3.2.1. (2nd study Draft, March 2008) NATO Research and 
Technology Organization, Prevention of Cold Injuries (RTO-MP-HFM-
126). STANAG 7141 EP (Edition 5). 
• U.K. Cold Weather Standing Operating Instructions (CWSOI’s), 2nd ed. 
(2005). 
• U.K. Army (2003) Field Manual Volume 2, Operations in Specific 
Environments. Part 4, Cold Weather Operations. 
• U.S. MCWP 3–35.1 Cold Weather Operations (2000). 
Neither within NLD DOD nor NATO there is a document on military doctrinal 
that only discusses military doctrine in the Arctic region. Because of similar 
environmental circumstances in high mountainous terrain, Mountain and Arctic (M&A) 
warfare are often combined on the doctrinal level. On the manual level and below (SOPs 
and SOIs), distinction is made between the two.  
b. Organizations 
The NLD DOD does not organize or align its SOF units according to different 
(environmental) regions. Within the KCT, one of the four commandotroepen 
compagnieen (COTRCIE) is dedicated for SOF operations in M&A environments. 
Within NLMARSOF, one troop is specialized in M&A warfare. Because all other teams 
are basic-Arctic-trained,306 NLMARSOF is able to task organize a unit to deal with any 
military contingency in the Arctic region.  
305 Koninklijke Marine, “Leidraad: Militair Optreden onder Extreme Omstandigheden,” [Manual for 
Military Operations in Extreme Terrain and Enviornments] 2010, http://www.kvmo.nl/pdf/id-mox.pdf.  
306 Basic M&A trained means that the individual operator successfully completed a three week 
Mountain Movement and Survival Course (MMSC), a three-week Arctic Movement and Survival Course 
(AMSC), and a two week Winter Warfare course.  
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c. Training 
Biannual M&A training on the northern flank of NATO (Northern Norway) has 
been an integral part of the training cycle of the RNLMC. Although NATO’s Northern 
flank is not threatened as in the past, RNLMC and NLMARSOF units still go there 
annually because of the belief in a basic principle, “if you can survive and fight in the 
Arctic, you are able to survive and fight anywhere else in the world.” The KCT is 
traditionally less focused on the Arctic, and has gained interest since the late 1990s. On 
an annual basis, both KCT and NLMARSOF participate in Norway as SOTG land or 
maritime in the NATO (SOF) exercises COLD RESPONSE and TUNDRA. Furthermore, 
subunits of NLMARSOF participate annually in their own Arctic Exercise SNOW 
PACK. The location of this exercise varies between Norway and Canada. In addition to 
the joint Arctic (SOF) exercises, the Air Force’s CH47F’s have their annual COLD 
BLAZE exercise in Norway, to train under Arctic ‘white out’ conditions.   
Since The Netherlands does not possess any training facilities relevant to 
mountain and arctic training, facilities in Arctic countries like Norway and Canada 
provide the required support for basic training. The concept of sea-basing using Dutch or 
Allied shipping is often used by NLMARSOF during more advanced training in the 
Arctic region. This is possible off the coast of Northern Norway but will be more difficult 
in other parts of the Arctic region because of amounts sea ice cover.  
d. Materiel 
All the operators within the Netherlands SOF units have additional M&A clothing 
and equipment to operate in the Arctic region. This is significantly different from what 
the conventional RNLMC units receive. As for mobility and over-snow capability, 
NLMARSOF has snowmobiles in their inventory. Other over-snow vehicles possibly 
utilized by SOF are the Bandvagens type BV206 and the armored BVS10 Viking. Both 
are within the inventory of the RNLMC. Similar to their USSOF counterparts, the 
CH47F’s of flight 5 have the necessary provisions for operating in the Arctic region. This 
includes skids for landing in the snow and heaters to enable mechanics to work on the 
helicopter under arduous conditions.  
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e. Leadership and Education 
There are no joint learning objectives for military operations in the Arctic 
articulated for any professional military education of NLD (SOF) officers. Other than a 
general awareness on the process of climate change and possible consequences including 
the ‘so what’ for future military operations, no arctic specific guidance exists. On the 
operational and tactical level, officers are trained in continuation courses after their initial 
Arctic training. Some RNLMC officers attend the Allied winter warfare course or the 
commanders’ winter warfare course at the Norwegian COE for cold weather 
operations.307    
f. Personnel 
Any Arctic capability relies on capable individuals to accomplish an assigned 
mission. The Netherlands SOF personnel, like their Danish and U.S. SOF counterparts, 
are selected and trained according to the highest standards. However, that does not 
qualify them automatically as effective operators in an Arctic environment. The 
Netherlands SOF relies upon Mountainleaders (ML), and to a lesser degree, on 
Heeresbergfuhrers (HBF), to train and maintain Arctic trained SOF personnel. MLs are 
an elite cadre within the British and Dutch Marine Corps who are experts in long-range 
reconnaissance, Arctic warfare, and mountain climbing. As the ML Training Cadre 
(MLTC), their primary peacetime role is to teach their techniques to other Commando 
Troops and share their expertise with other military units.308  
Between three and six NLMARSOF ML instructors are trained in the UK every 
year. The HBF are the Army mountain guides within the German and Austrian Armies. 
At least one NLMARSOF HBF instructor is trained in the German course every year. 
NLMARSOF relies on a mix of ML and HBF instructors for their Arctic capability. The 
307 Norwegian School of Winter Warfare (NSSW) as part of the NATO Centre of Excellence - Cold 
Weather Operations (COE–CWO), http://mil.no/education-training/nsww/Pages/Commanders-Winter-
Warfare-course.aspx. 
308 Elite U.K. Forces, “Mountain Leaders,” http://www.eliteukforces.info/royal-marines/mountain-
leaders/. 
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KCT trains one or two HBF instructors in the Austrian course, and relies solely on their 
HBF instructors to train their units in Arctic warfare.  
g. Facilities 
The Netherlands does not have any military facilities close to, or in, the Arctic 
region, and rely completely on the facilities of partners when deployed in the region. The 
NLD DOD, however, has strategic sealift capabilities that can also be used as a military 
facility from where to launch, command, and sustain military operations in the Arctic 
region.309 As with most navies, these ships do not have an ice-strengthened hull, and are 
only able to operate in seas with the classification “very open ice,” and when the ice is 
classified as “new/grease ice, no thicker than 10cm.310    
h. Interoperability 
For the Netherlands, a small nation from a military (SOF) perspective, 
interoperability with strategic partners is essential. Almost all deployments of SOF units 
in the past 15 years have been conducted in a multinational and joint environment, 
working closely together with other NATO SOF members. NLD SOF units have 
developed an exceptional relationship with German, Norwegian, Belgian, and British 
SOF.311 U.S. SOF remains the closest strategic partner for NLD SOF,312 working and 
training mostly with the USSOF units assigned to U.S. SOCEUR.  
During different SOF exercises in the Arctic such as COLD RESPONSE, 
TUNDRA, and SNOW PACK, the NLD SOF tries to train in a multinational setting. 
During the last COLD RESPONS evolution in Norway, NLDSOF and U.S. NSWU-2 
deployed a joint SOMTG. Another example is the last SNOW PACK evolution where 
NLD, CAN, and AUSSOF operators and teams worked together in an Arctic 
309 These are two Landing Platform Dock (LPD) ships of the Rotterdam class, and a Joint Support 
Ship (JSS) of the Karel Doorman class, within the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN).  
310 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Naval Arctic Manual (ATP 17(D)), 4-1. 
311 The U.K. Special Boat Service (SBS), the Norwegian Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK), Belgian 
Special Forces Group (SFG), and the German Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK). 
312 Colonel Jarst de Jong, in discussion with authors, May 15, 2014.  
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environment. Experience gained with partners during missions and the continuing joint 
exercises as mentioned, which greatly enhanced interoperability. Critical SOF equipment 
like radios and weapon systems are interoperable with most of the NATO SOF partners. 
Resources are pooled, and doctrine and SOPs, SOIs, and LLs are shared through the 
NSHQ. 
NLD SOF participates in the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) 
and the Global SOF Network, and has permanent liaison officers with U.S. SOCOM and 
U.S. ARSOF. An exchange program between NLMARSOF and the U.S. Navy SEALS is 
currently being coordinated. 
i. Conclusion 
It is fair to state that Dutch SOF has a reasonable Arctic capability. The units are 
well trained and equipped, and have sufficient enabling capabilities. On the tactical level, 
the Arctic capability has somewhat degraded due to other operational commitments; 
however, it has not resulted into incapability. There are important capabilities lacking for 
Dutch SOF, which could have an effect on SOF operations that are conducted unilateral 
in the Arctic region. These are strategic lift/mobility and an AAR capability. Therefore, 
to overcome these shortfalls, operating within a multilateral construct when operating in 
the Arctic region, is key for Dutch SOF.  
5. USSOF Arctic Capabilities 
As previously described, the Arctic is an ever-changing harsh environment, where 
unique infrastructure, mobility, and life-support capabilities are necessary. USSOF is not 
a service component within the U.S. military, and they do not operate SOF-pure military 
bases. USSOF units are tenant units with conventional military forces on conventional 
military bases. Additionally, USSOF units are much smaller than each of their respective 
conventional service counterparts. Therefore, a noteworthy aspect of USSOF Arctic 
capability is implied in the USSOF truth: “Most Special Operations require non-SOF 
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support.”313 USSOF organizations depend on non-SOF materiel, facilities, and 
transportation. As a result, the capability analysis of USSOF will involve frequent 
references to the Arctic capability of the U.S. conventional military. USSOCOM has 
recently initiated a program for global interoperability with allied SOF partners, called 
the Global SOF Network,314 on which an international capability for the Arctic might 
depend, as well. 
a. Doctrine 
The U.S. military uses doctrine as a guide for leaders when forming a plan. There 
are several levels of doctrine, each pertaining to the relevance of the operational 
environment, forces involved in the operation, and the nature of the mission being 
performed. Outside of the guidance of doctrine, the institutional experience, situational 
understanding, and judgment of the service members forms the rest of the military 
planning process. The U.S. DOD currently uses the following doctrinal manuals for the 
training and execution of cold weather, mountain, and maritime exercises and operations. 
• ATTP 3–97.11 and MCRP 3–35.1D, Cold Region Operations (2011).315 
• Northern Warfare Training Center: Cold weather Operations Manual 
(2000).316  
• JP 3–50, United Sates National Search and Rescue Supplement to the 
International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual 
(May 2000). 
• Several training circulars and manuals exist at the lower-unit levels for the 
individual service member operating in cold weather and mountainous 
environments. 
313 U.S. SOCOM Public Affairs, “United States Special Operations Command Fact Book: 2014,” 
2014, http://www.socom.mil/News/Documents/USSOCOM_Fact_Book_2014.pdf. 
314 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, I-1. 
315 U.S. Headquarters Department of the Army, Cold Region Operations (FM 31-70 and FM 31-71, 
C1) (Washington, DC: January 28, 2011), 
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/attp3_97x11.pdf. 
316 U.S. Army Alaska, Northern Warfare Training Center: Cold weather Operations Manual, 
October, 2000, http://www.tacsafe.net/resources/General/AlaskaColdWeatherManual.pdf. 
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The Arctic is a unique environment with a combination of sea, sea-ice, and 
constantly changing ice masses. Though there is not a significant dependence on doctrine, 
doctrinal guidelines are critical when considering military operations and the effects on 
military forces in such an unforgiving environment. Additionally, the current list of 
doctrine for cold-weather regions is more relevant to mountainous or alpine 
environments, not necessarily to such extreme temperatures over such unpredictable 
terrain as the arctic. Consequently, there is an insufficient level of doctrinal publications 
relative to operations in arctic environments available for use. 
b. Organization 
With the exception of a few capability-based units, USSOCOM, the HQ 
organization for USSOF, does not organize its forces in a specific manner to respond to 
regions based on their geophysical (atmospheric or meteorological) conditions. The 
exception being Navy SEALs, who are obviously the force of choice when responding to 
maritime-focused regions, and Special Forces units who conduct language training 
specific to their area of operations. Additionally, the majority of USSOF is not so 
specifically trained for a region based on the geophysical environment that would 
preclude a unit from being tasked for Arctic operations.  
Typically, USSOF units are aligned to a global region under the command 
relationship with a theater combatant command (COCOM). The TSOC is OPCON to the 
Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC).317 As a result of this command relationship 
and habitual engagements in a respective theater (or region), the USSOF unit adapts their 
procedures and materiel capabilities to meet the mission requirements. Therefore, the 
organization itself is similarly constructed to that of USSOF elements aligned to different 
regions of the world. Duplicate units in their respective service branch are also similarly 
manned with support functions necessary for USSOF operators to conduct their missions. 
For example, Special Forces Groups are organized with similarly manned intelligence, 
support, and enabler units. Certain units have the opportunity to train for unique 
environments by virtue of their home station location. For example, the 10th Special 
317 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, I-3.  
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Forces Group is headquartered in Colorado. Colorado provides ample opportunities to 
train in cold weather, snow, and mountainous environments. By virtue of their COCOM 
relationship, the 10th Special Forces Group, coincidentally, has the opportunity to operate 
in a similar cold-weather, mountainous environment in the European area of 
responsibility. Additionally, each Special Forces group is organized with a minimum of 
three Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA) trained for combat operations in 
mountainous and cold-weather environments; however, neither cold weather nor 
mountain training, merits an Arctic capability. 
USSOCOM may not organize their forces based on the geophysical environments 
of the world. However, the traditional COCOM alignments and areas of operation have a 
shaping effect on the unit’s capabilities. Furthermore, the current USSOCCOM initiative 
has units that remain regionally aligned and oriented in order to increase familiarity and 
success in the region.318 As a result, certain “legacy skills” become expected of the units, 
and commanders rely on these skills in the time of need. At a recent meeting of senior 
Special Operations leaders, such expectations for Arctic capabilities were expressed by 
Rear Admiral Kerry Metz, stating that he expected 1st and 10th Special Forces Groups to 
respond in the Arctic.319 However, cold-weather regions vary from mountainous to 
maritime, and proper pre-mission training could prepare other less-obvious USSOF units 
to respond in the Arctic. For example, NSWG-2 previously participated in Exercise Cold 
Response, where cold-weather specific skills were learned in an international exercise 
environment. Among the different service components—Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
Marines—each component possesses units and equipment designated specifically for 
operating in “cold-weather” regions.  
318 William H. McRaven, “Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN, Commander, 
United States Special Operations Command Before the 113th U.S. Congress House Armed Services 
Committee,” 
http://www.socom.mil/Documents/2014%20USSOCOM%20POSTURE%20STATEMENT.PDF. 
319 McLeary, “U.S. Special Ops Commanders: We need ISR in Africa, Comms in Arctic.” 
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c. Training 
Closely tied to interoperability, training is the most essential aspect of 
DOTMLPFI, as it is where a capability will degrade the most if not conducted regularly. 
Training is where the combination of all other components of DOTMLPF-I must come 
together to develop a capability. As with any non-traditional skill, the old adage “use it or 
lose it” would best describe the region-specific skills needed for operating in the Arctic. 
Additionally, basic skills learned through training must be established before more 
advanced skills can be introduced to an individual and a unit. For reasons varying from 
classification to operational requirements, USSOF have not traditionally participated in 
international training exercises that revolve around Arctic climates. The large majority of 
SOF elements spend what training time they have available preparing for the upcoming 
operational deployment, or pre-mission training (PMT). Based on their assigned COCOM 
area of responsibility, USSOF pre-mission training often replicates the environment of 
their mission. Further, as stated previously, the U.S. military has limited engagements in 
the Arctic, and thereby, does not focus much training on arctic environments. 
Based on research and interviews during this study, it has been concluded that no 
habitual training has been conducted by USSOF for operations in an arctic environment. 
The decentralized nature of SOCOM allows the component Commanders to focus their 
training needs to meet operational requirements. No training requirements exist for 
mountaineering units within SOCOM to maintain their proficiency through structured 
training at regular time increments. However, the historically low demand for USSOF, 
specifically in the Arctic, combined with budgetary constraints and an increase in 
emerging requirements in other regions of the world, has resulted in little-to-no focus on 
training for operations in the High North.  
When training is conducted, it is closely tied to facilities, as facilities provide the 
infrastructure and personnel support needed to replicate the most realistic conditions for 
mission preparation. Several training venues exist where cold weather tactics can be 
trained and exercised. Although USSOF can conduct training for cold weather operations 
in non-standard regions, the following locations are standardized training facilities that 
formal instruction and dedicated sites for such training can be conducted. 
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• NSWC Det-Kodiak, Kodiak Island, AK. 
• The Special Operations Forces Cold Weather Maritime Training Facility, 
Naval Special Warfare Center Detachment-Kodiak located at Kodiak 
Island, AK, would be an optimal location for the training of USSOF 
elements in an arctic-replicated environment. Currently, the site is used for 
short periods of cold weather training and familiarization of NSW 
candidates as they conduct their training pipeline.320 
• Northern Warfare Training Center, Fort Wainwright, AK. 
• The Northern Warfare Training Center, located at Fort Wainwright in 
Alaska, is where service members and SOF from all branches can attend 
school and training on tactics in arctic and mountainous environments.321 
• U.S. Army Mountain Warfare School, Camp Ethan Allen (CEAT), 
Vermont 
• While the Army Mountain Warfare School primarily focuses its training 
on combat operations in mountainous environments, the majority of 
training is conducted in cold weather environments, while the course 
provides education of considerations in cold weather environments.322  
• Special Forces Advanced Mountain Operations School (SFAMOS). 
• The Special Forces Advanced Mountain Operations School is located at 
Fort Carson, Colorado. Previously a unit-operated course taught by and for 
members of the 10th Special Forces Group, SFAMOS became a part of 
the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School in 
2012. Since this time, the course has instructed USSOF units and 
personnel from all branches of the U.S. military. Although the course is 
not specifically taught for cold-weather operations, the SFAMOS cadre 
members maintain their proficiency in military operations over snow 
320 Specialist 2nd Class Erika Manzano, Naval Special Warfare Public Affairs, “SEAL Candidates 
Prove Survival Techniques in Alaska,” Navy.mil, April 14, 2009, 
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=44255. 
321 The mission statement of the Northern Warfare Training Center is “to provide relevant training to 
the leaders of USARAK units so that they can fight and win in demanding cold weather and mountain 
environments,” http://www.wainwright.army.mil/nwtc/index.html. 
322 U.S. Army Mountain Warfare School: “Mission and Purpose,” 
http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/amws/mission.htm. 
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through unit-assisted training with the 10th Special Forces Group between 
classes.323 
As mentioned earlier, several international exercises exist in cold-weather 
regions. One way to capitalize on the relationships within the international SOF 
community and reinforce the interoperability of the Global SOF Network is to participate 
in annual and bi-annual international training exercises, specifically oriented to an Arctic 
environment. Such exercises already exist and have significant international participation. 
They include: 
• Cold Response: a Norwegian-led winter exercise held six times since 2006 
in Norway. More than 15,000 soldiers from 15 different nations have 
participated in at once in previous exercises.324 The most recent exercise 
rotation was held in March of 2014. 
• Nanook- an annual exercise hosted by Canada that takes place in several 
locations along the north and north-west regions of the Canadian 
territories. The most recent exercise took place in the Baffin Island region 
from August 20 to 29, 2014. The exercise focused on SAR operations in 
conjunction with some 800 international and intergovernmental 
participants.325 
• Jackal Stone (by exception, if relocated to a more Arctic-like location). 
d. Materiel 
Currently, a small number of USSOF units possess SOF-peculiar equipment 
designed for cold-weather regions. For example, some USSOF units possess 
snowmobiles within their inventories; however, there are a large portion of terrain in the 
Arctic that is not traversable by snowmobiles or any land-based transportation. 
Reportedly, USSOCOM has purchased a cargo ship to transform it into a SOF-specific 
naval platform from which special operations could be conducted and supported, called 
323 Dave Chace, “Special Forces Advance Mountain Operations School announces dates,” May 21, 
2012, The Official Homepage of the United States Army, 
http://www.army.mil/article/80111/Special_Forces_Advanced_Mountain_Operations_School_announces_c
ourse_dates/. 
324 Tom O. Ovind, Chief Editor: Chief of Norwegian Armed Forces Media Centre, “Norwegian 
Armed Forces: Cold Response,” http://mil.no/excercises/coldresponse/Pages/about.aspx. 
325 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Operation Nanook,” August 29, 2014, 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-canada-north-america-recurring/op-nanook.page.  
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sea-basing.326 The idea of sea-basing is a concept where all of the functions provided by 
a land base are located on a naval ship and can be strategically located for mission 
requirements.327 To overcome the lack of suitable land from which to conduct or launch 
operations, the concept of sea-basing is one of several solutions. Another strategic lift 
capability exists in the 109th Airlift Wing, located in New York. The 109th possesses six 
LC-130 air platforms that have ski-equipped landing gear designed for landing on and 
taking off from snow and ice covered surfaces. 
Based on the Arctic’s reduction in sea ice and projected increase of waterways, 
any mobility in the region will undoubtedly involve ships with ice-hardened hulls. As the 
ice continues to melt, the need for ice-hardened hulls will decrease, increasing the 
viability for more conventional surface ships. In years past, the United States has never 
had a sizable fleet of ice-capable ships, at its height of six from 1942–1945. Currently, 
the U.S. has five ice-capable surface ships, of which one is unavailable for service, and 
two are government owned. The Coast Guard maintains the two available surface ships, 
which are the minimum numbers for an operational rotation. 
Located in Alaska, Fort Wainwright is home to the Stryker brigade, which is 
equipped with the Stryker fighting vehicles, making an infantry brigade not only highly 
mobile, but also easily transportable. The aviation battalion on Fort Wainwright is 
equipped with UH-60A Blackhawks and CH-47 Chinooks, which are used to increase the 
mobility of infantry and combat support units.  
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER) is also located in Alaska. JBER is the 
largest installation in Alaska. Between the two Air Force units that compose the 
preponderance of forces at JBER, they possess several airframes and technical systems to 
not only mobilize the infantry units located at JBER, but to also provide airborne 
reconnaissance and intelligence requirements to military forces committed to the 
326 David Axe, “The Navy’s Getting a Big, Secretive Special Operations Mothership,” 2014, 
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-navys-getting-a-big-secretive-special-operations-mothership-
12801da6f353. 
327 Sam Tangredi, “Sea Basing: Concept, Issues and Recommendations,” Naval War College Review 
64, no. 4 (Autumn 2011), Strategic Insight, https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/d49d4281-7790-435d-
9b3f-c7df59fb1544/Sea-Basing--Concept,-Issues,-and-Recommendations.aspx. 
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PACOM AOR.328 Additionally, the Air Force maintains two fighter squadrons, two 
engineer squadrons, and several combat and mission support units. The Army units 
located at JBER are mostly light infantry and combat support to infantry. Although the 
infantry and support units conduct training regularly in the cold-weather regions of 
Alaska, the equipment used is the same equipment traditionally used by military forces in 
other regions of the world. Currently, there are no significant materiel capabilities within 
the Alaska-based units that would differentiate them from units stationed in other regions 
of the world. 
USSOF are no more equipped with “special” equipment for missions than 
conventional U.S. military forces. Most SOF-peculiar equipment is conventional military 
equipment with modifications. In past years, USSOCOM has made an effort to prevent 
the redundancy of equipment procurement under limited budgets.329 For example, the 
radios, weapons, and vehicles that USSOF personnel use are typically the same items that 
conventional forces use, with minor modifications for the mission. For this reason, the 
evolution of USSOF materiel is moderately tied to conventional military force 
modernization initiatives. The more optimal the conventional U.S. forces materiel and 
equipment are suited for the Arctic, the more optimally USSOF will be suited for the 
Arctic. Where mission requirement exceeds conventional equipment capabilities, 
procurement of SOF-peculiar equipment would be necessary. Additionally, USSOCOM 
has the ability to procure or purchase specialty equipment to meet operational 
requirements. As the requirement for operations in the Arctic evolve, so too must the 
materiel to support and protect the SOF operator. As described in this section, the U.S. 
DOD possesses only a few materiel resources that are suited for the Arctic; however, the 
incorporation and familiarization by the SOF community has not happened to constitute a 
capability. 
328 Mission Statement of the 3rd Wing, located at JBER: “provide the Commander, U.S. Pacific 
Command, trained and equipped low observable air dominance assets, airborne command and control 
platforms and global airlift resources for theater-wide contingency operations and also provide the 
Commander, U.S. Northern Command, immediate early airborne detection, warning, surveillance and 
interception of hostile forces within the Alaska North American Aerospace Defense Command Region.” 
http://www.jber.af.mil/3wg/index.asp. 
329 U.S. SOCOM, “FY 2015 Budget Highlights,” 2014, 2‒5, 
http://www.socom.mil/News/Documents/FY%202015%20USSOCOM%20Budget%20Highlights.pdf. 
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e. Leadership and Education 
The educating of military leaders on matters of the Arctic will likely be developed 
similarly to the education base for areas where the military was previously uninvolved, 
through the combination of training, evaluation, and archiving the best practices and 
techniques. The USSOF community has recognized the importance of lesson learned over 
the last decade of war and has developed a relatively effective system for the training and 
integration of information for the use of professional education. Based on the lack of 
operational requirements in the Arctic and minimal participation in arctic-specific 
training exercises, there stands to be somewhat of a deficit of leadership and educational 
material related to this region. With the recent realignment of COCOMS, under which 
NORTHCOM is assigned responsibility of the U.S. Arctic, the leadership deficit that has 
existed in years past will begin to decrease and operational experience will build a 
foundation for regional education. 
f. Personnel 
USSOF personnel are often chosen through rigorous selection programs that test 
operator’s physical fitness and more importantly, their decision making. The combination 
of politically sensitive situations and harsh, unforgiving terrain demands the warrior 
diplomacy that USSOF have institutionalized over the years. USSOF are often called 
upon to perform functions that require personnel numbers and equipment restrictions that 
are often smaller than conventional forces can effectively respond to. Though most would 
describe this type of response as “ad-hoc,” the personnel of whom these units consist are 
mature, seasoned, and intuitive. These characteristics can often offset the need for 
additional personnel or increased equipment to accomplish the tasks. Most USSOF units 
are organized to facilitate split-team or single-operator missions, often in different 
geographic regions. Most importantly, the parent SOF unit understands the importance of 
the demands for tailored responses and has built in mechanisms that can deploy USSOF 
operators in different size units in a timely manner, without compromising the integrity of 
the remaining parent unit. As a result, SOCOM’s ability to construct a dynamic response 
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of small units tailored to the crisis is a critical capability when operating in the 
unpredictable Arctic. 
g. Facilities 
Though not critical to merit as Arctic capability, facilities are relative to the 
strategic movement capability of a given military force. Given it is improbable that a 
facility will be constructed in the Arctic, the proximity of facilities to support strategic 
movement and operational support decreases the strain on logistic support for mission. 
Lack of infrastructure can be offset by a strategic movement capability to sustain similar 
levels of operational success. The U.S. DOD has several military installations located in 
Alaska, which has a coastline within the Arctic Circle, north of the 66-degree latitude 
line. The geographic proximity of Alaska to the Arctic Circle implies that the military 
installations in Alaska would be a critical infrastructure for military capabilities in the 
Arctic and the neighboring regions from which USSOF would be able to conduct 
operations. The three most developed installations in Alaska (in order of size) are Fort 
Greely (smallest), Fort Wainwright (next largest), and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson 
(JBER), which is the largest base of the three.  
Fort Greely is located in a remote part of Alaska, about 350 miles north of 
Anchorage. Within this installation reside the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Army 
Space and Missile Defense Command, and the U.S. Army Cold Regions Test Center 
(CRTC). Additionally, Fort Greely is home to the Alaska Air National Guard, an active 
duty Army missile defense battalion, and a small garrison unit responsible for the 
cantonment areas and security of the base. Responsible for the ballistic missile defense of 
the United States and Alaska, this installation is smallest of the three bases, but shoulders 
the defense of the U.S. northern boundaries. 
Next in order of size is Fort Wainwright. This installation is home to three active-
duty infantry battalions, an aviation battalion, a Stryker infantry brigade, and several 
combat supporting units. According to the DOD, Fort Wainwright hosts approximately 
7,500 soldiers and airmen.330  
330 Installation Overview: Fort Wainwright, Alaska, http://www.militaryinstallations.dod.mil. 
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Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, or JBER, is the largest military installation in 
Alaska. JBER hosts just over 16,000 active duty soldiers and airmen, as well as civilian 
staff needed to maintain administration and maintenance of the installation. Overseeing 
all of the military units located in Alaska is the Alaska Command (ALCOM) 
Headquartered at JBER. ALCOM is a joint headquarters consisting of Air Force and 
Army personnel. Also located on JBER is an Army brigade combat team consisting of 
two parachute infantry battalions, a reconnaissance squadron, a parachute field artillery 
battalion and other combat support units.331 Furthermore, JBER is home station to two 
Air Force units whose purpose is to focus on homeland defense of the United States and 
threats emanating from the Pacific regions, as well as the Alaskan NORAD Region who 
are responsible for aerospace control of the Arctic and Pacific regions. 
Several other installations located in Alaska are home to Army National Guard 
and Reserve units, Air Force units, and U.S. Coast Guard bases (see Figure 16). 
331 According to the USARAK list of only Army units provided on their website, 
http://www.usarak.army.mil/main/units.asp. 
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Figure 16.  Current U.S. installations; stars are DOD bases (Army and Air 
Force) and circles are USCG bases.332 
As illustrated in Figure 16, the U.S. military and interagency partners have a 
significant amount of infrastructure positioned throughout Alaska. Although most of the 
installations have been configured to focus their efforts to the Pacific region,333 their 
proximity to the Arctic region is a strength that could easily be refocused to the High 
North. 
332 Pendleton, et al, Arctic Capabilities: DOD Addressed Many Specified Reporting Elements in Its 
2011 Arctic Report but Should Take Steps to Meet Near-and Long-term Needs, 8. 
333 The Missile Defense Agency at Fort Greely, 1-25 SBCT and USARAK Aviation at Fort 
Wainwright, as well as the 4-25 BCT at JBER all answer to the PACOM Commander. “The brigade, along 
with 1st Brigade Combat Team (Stryker), 25th Infantry Division, which is also home-stationed in Alaska, 
share in the history of the 25th Infantry Division, but are not subordinate to the division; the chain of 
command goes direct from United States Army Alaska to United States Army Pacific,” 
http://www.usarak.army.mil/4bde25th/. 
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h. Interoperability 
The predominant theme of the Arctic is “diplomatic resolution of disputes.”334 
Nevertheless, as the geophysical environment changes and resources become more 
accessible than ever before, international conflict over boundaries and sovereignty are 
bound to arise. Ad-hoc groups of decision makers from within the military who can 
command and control multiple agencies and units to react to crisis will play a critical role 
in the Arctic security Regardless of the manner in which the disputes are negotiated, the 
pure inaccessibility and nature of the climate will demand small, well-trained units with 
unique mobility platforms. For the reasons mentioned here, the SOF from each of the 
countries involved would be the unit that is best suited to meet these requirements. 
i. Conclusion 
In summary, USSOF do not currently possess an arctic capability, or one that can 
be claimed based on the specific nature of the arctic. There are disjointed capabilities 
spread throughout the DOD with differing strengths in an Arctic environment. However, 
when examined using the DOTMLPFI method of analysis, the gaps become apparent. 
The doctrine for operations in this type of region is relatively shallow and more suited for 
mountainous or alpine environments. As an organization, SOCOM may possess units 
with legacy skills closely suited for the arctic. However, research and interviews with 
TSOC and SOCOM staffs indicate that there is no regularly held training exercise or 
location used to develop a dedicated capability. As mentioned previously, training is the 
most important aspect of developing and maintaining a capability, and the lack thereof 
will just as effectively degrade a capability. This is where the analysis shows the most 
critical component of the capability gap. The current state of SOCOM equipment 
inventory finds that moderate climates of operational requirements have had an influence 
on materiel inventories, leaving USSOF ill prepared for arctic operations. USSOF 
personnel appear to be a strong and well trained aspect of this analysis; yet without 
materiel, they are vulnerable to the elements. Facilities are conveniently located and 
suited to support training and basing requirements. Finally, interoperability remains one 
334 U.S. Department of Defense, “Arctic Strategy,” 10. 
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of the USSSOF cornerstones, but does not transcend matters of the Arctic region at a 
level robust enough to constitute a capability. 
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IV. STRATEGIC RAMIFICATIONS OF THE CHANGING 
ARCTIC 
This chapter conducts a weighted analysis of the strategic ramifications, distilled 
from the first three chapters of this thesis. This will help shape the vignettes used in the 
Chapter V. In the first section, the strategic ramifications are spelled out for the Arctic 
littoral nations by using the four elements of national power: Diplomatic, Informational, 
Military, and Economical. Although there are other ways of analyzing strategic 
ramifications, this thesis uses the DIME model since it is widely recognized and utilized 
in both NATO and U.S. doctrine. The second part of the chapter covers specific strategic 
conclusions for observer nations and other organizations like multinationals and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).   
A. ARCTIC NATIONS 
The geophysical environment in the Arctic region is changing. The data in 
Appendix A shows that this is happening at an unprecedented rate. The Arctic 
transformation is unique. What follows is an increasingly sensitive—and equally 
unique—geopolitical landscape driven mostly by economic incentives, with a growing 
list of stakeholders. Conflicting territorial claims and new avenues of approach into and 
through the Arctic region make security for the Arctic states a growing concern. At the 
same time, Arctic security issues are barely addressed in any formal setting. This leaves a 
vacuum for individual countries and other stakeholders to assess security issues in the 
region without discussing this with potential partners. Another significant observation, 
especially given the current crisis in the Ukraine, is the spillover effect of political and 
security issues in theatres outside of the Arctic region into the Arctic. Recent examples 
show that this affects how matters are dealt with in the Arctic, further complicating 
Arctic governance and security cooperation. As Kraska states, “the transformation now 
occurring in the Arctic is a tightening of the links between global forces and regional 
 117 
processes … the Arctic is on the receiving end of a combination of forces whose origins 
lie far beyond the borders of the region itself.”335 
Given these observations it is fair to state that the Arctic is becoming an 
increasingly sensitive environment politically and militarily. This, in combination with 
the environmental challenges, will more than likely increase the demand for small, well 
equipped, specialized self-sustaining units able to conduct operations with a wide variety 
of OGAs in the full spectrum of conflict. Unfortunately and in sharp contrast, the current 
capabilities show that the ability for—especially U.S. SOF—to operate effectively in the 
region has significantly decreased over the last decade. This is a trend that must be 
rectified. 
1. Diplomatic Power 
Diplomacy is a vital element in the spectrum of national security tools, 
which states use to achieve acceptable relations and mutual understanding. 
Diplomacy and military power can be combined to form a powerful tool of 
grand strategy.  
USMC Command and Staff College 
 
Only two ways exist for one nation to make another comply with its 
wishes. It can either convince the other nation through dialogue and 
reward (positive reinforcement) or coerce it through threat or use of 
minimal power projection (negative reinforcement).  
Alan J. Stephenson 
 
The analysis of the A5 strategies and governing documents in Chapter II shows 
the current foundation for Arctic governance and diplomatic relations between nation-
states in the Arctic region. Valid questions to ask here are what degree have the 
established governing bodies served their purpose and will they continue to do so with 
the massive increase of new Arctic stakeholders (nation-states, OGAs, and non-state 
actors)? The answer is most likely that they have not and will not. Current institutions 
will have to change in order to serve the increasing interest of new stakeholders. Or, as 
335 Kraska, Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change, xxxiii. 
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Kraska states, the Arctic states “are grappling with an emerging security paradigm.”336 It 
serves to remember that these institutions will be greatly dependent on the perceptions 
and relations of those actors that partake in their creation. Keeping in mind that there is 
still no venue for dealing with Arctic security matters, ASFR is an obvious choice; but 
Russia, the biggest Arctic nation, is currently excluded from this venue.   
The different Arctic strategies reflect the volume of national interests at stake 
here. Some of the strategies also express the willingness to utilize military means to 
safeguard their national interests in the region. This is specifically mentioned in the 
Canadian, Russian, and Norwegian strategies.337 Other Arctic stakeholders, like the new 
observer member China, are getting increasingly involved using their diplomatic power 
to increase their influence in, for example, Iceland and Greenland.338  
What happens when the United States takes over the chairmanship of the Arctic 
council in 2015 is uncertain. However, it is clear that the issues outside the Arctic have 
great effect on the level and quality of cooperation in the different governing bodies in 
the Arctic. The current crisis in the Ukraine has sparked a Cold War sentiment between 
NATO and Russia that will have great consequences for matters of security in the Arctic 
region. This “return of geopolitics,” as mentioned by Stephen F. Larrabee, and “the 
emergence of Russia as a more confident and assertive actor both globally and 
regionally,”339 show there is a potential for future disputes to involve any form of 
military power as well. The vignettes in Chapter V will illustrate this and give insights on 
how SOF could be involved.  
2. Informational Power 
National governments develop information strategies to support national policy. 
For the United States—which appears as representative—it is defined as follows:  
336 Ibid., preface. 
337 For further information see Appendix B. “Strategies of the Arctic Five.” 
338 O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, 55. 
339 Stephen F. Larrabee, “Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics,” Journal 
of International Affairs 63, no. 2 (2010): 33. 
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Use of information content and technology as strategic instruments to 
shape fundamental political, economic, military, and cultural forces on a 
long-term basis to affect the global behavior of governments, supra-
governmental organizations, and societies to support national security.340 
From this view, it looks as if the information element is the face of the other three 
elements in DIME. To the degree this is true, it is important to remember that there is 
more than face value to strategic communication and information strategy. In 
international strategic communication, verbal as well as non-verbal aspects must be 
recognized; actions speak louder than words, and actually constitute the majority of the 
message. As such, it is in the actions, as mentioned previously, the real intentions are to 
be found.341 Recent behavior inside the Arctic, but to an even higher degree outside of 
the Arctic, has showed glimpses of what could be a grand (information) strategy of 
Russia.  
The institutions established within an Arctic context such as the Arctic Council 
represent venues for states to communicate national interest within a cooperative tone.342 
Putin’s latest communication efforts regarding the Russian stance in Arctic matters are a 
clear indication of Russian policy, and information strategy, focused on national self-
interest. The current crisis in Ukraine and the alleged use of Russian SOF inside of 
Ukraine shows how SOF can be employed in a sensitive environment. National self-
interest is not merely a Russian phenomenon. Rather, every nation is expected to 
ultimately act out of national interest and not Arctic relations or the concerns of others.343 
This does not necessarily determine an anarchic path to crisis or conflict since “peace 
promotes prosperity,”344 and thus peace is a matter of national interest as well. However, 
it does reinforce the importance of framing Arctic cooperation in order to create a basis 
340 USMC Command and Staff College, class 8902 AY13, lesson 2: 2-3. 
341 Dennis M. Murphy, “Strategic Communication: Wielding the Information Element of Power,” 
U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues 1 (2008), 180. 
342 The Arctic council, “The Ottawa Declaration of 1996 formally established the Arctic Council as a 
high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and 
interaction among the Arctic States…,” http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-
council/about-arctic-council. 
343 USMC Command and Staff College, course 8902 AY13, lesson 7: 7-1. 
344 Ibid., lesson 2: 2-4. 
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for security cooperation “in an age of climate change,” repeating Kraska’s emphasis on 
“how we choose to frame the issues will have profound effect on how we define the 
range of policy options available.”345 The Russian information strategy and the recent 
communication, in actuality, seems somewhat more reliable considering Russian actions 
outside of the Arctic region, where Russian activities inside Ukraine show the guiding 
principles of Russian security policy. This goes back to the “spill-over” effect from 
political matters outside of the Arctic possibly affecting policy inside the Arctic region.  
The Canadian stance on Artic matters is perhaps at first glance more surprising; 
Canada, too, has claimed the North Pole, and Denmark is expected for follow suit. 
Canada is reluctant regarding NATO involvement in Arctic security matters,346 a fact 
that creates a dilemma within NATO, where smaller nations like Denmark and Norway 
may seek strategic balancing through NATO in order to counter a rising Russia. It is 
within this paradox of cooperation and associated non-escalation (or military presence) 
versus preparation that SOF may be a useful tool as an extension of policy and 
diplomacy. It is also with this in mind that the stakeholder’s information strategy must be 
interpreted.  
3. Military Power 
During the Cold War the Arctic region had significant military value for the 
hosting of ICBM. Furthermore, the Arctic region was important because it hosted an 
important part of the second strike capabilities of both world powers. With the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, military importance or value of the Arctic reduced to an all-time low.  
This began to change when it became clear that the Arctic and the changing 
geophysical environment would expose significant economic incentives. Unfortunately, 
before re-investing of the military in the Arctic occurred, the Global War on Terror 
gained momentum and the Arctic remained a secondary theatre for most nations. SOF 
units that would normally maintain currency in Arctic warfare now had to refocus their 
efforts; consequently, Arctic capabilities were lost. 
345 Kraska, Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change, xxcii. 
346 O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, 60. 
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Experts on the Arctic, however, know that Arctic strategic military significance 
has increased in the last decade. Recent renewed military activity of most Arctic nations 
in the region, confirms this statement. Especially Russia has increased its military 
presence in the region by stepping up its military exercises, strengthening its Northern 
Fleet, opening new military bases, and building more nuclear icebreakers. While this 
emphasis on Russia does not indicate that Russia is to blame for possibly reducing the 
cooperation element in the Arctic region, it is necessary to keep in mind that the Russian 
side of the Arctic is changing; the sea ice is melting faster than on the European and 
North American side. Also, Russia is, as mentioned previously, highly reliant on the 
natural resources to be exposed in the Arctic. Thus, Russian Arctic behavior is not 
surprising, nor unfounded. It is, however, necessary to prepare for and deal with this 
behavior. In a recent interview with students at a university, Putin stated, “the Arctic 
plays an important role in terms of Russia’s security because of the fact that the United 
States has concentrated nuclear attack submarines of the coast of Norway, able to hit 
Moscow in 15 to 16 minutes.”347 In a recent speech by the NATO secretary general, he 
stated, in relation to the Arctic, that “a firm and determined deterrence is the best way to 
facilitate peaceful, diplomatic and political processes.”348 Together with the spillover 
effect of present conflicts in other regions in the world, it seems that the classic Cold War 
paradigm is looming at the horizon. In fact, currently “Russia views NATO as an 
opposition not a partner.”349  
All this shows how military power, as a consequence of increased economic 
interest, may follow suit in a traditional fashion. With increasing and conflicting national 
interests in the Arctic the elements of national power will follow. However, there are no 
indications that a large conflict involving the military is waiting to happen in the future 
Arctic region. The takeaway is that SOF must be able to cover operations on the full 
347 Mia Bennett, “Putin’s Territories: From Crimea to Chukotka,” Cryopolitics, Arctic News and 
Analysis, September 5, 2014, http://cryopolitics.com/2014/09/05/putins-territories-from-crimea-to-
chukotka/. 
348 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary General, “America, Europe and the Pacific.” 
349 Keld Vrå Andersen, “Fogh: Russia Views Us as an Opponent,” TV-2 Nyhedscenter, September 1, 
2014, http://nyhederne.tv2.dk/udland/2014-09-01-fogh-rusland-betragter-os-som-en-modstander. 
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spectrum of conflict. When in the beginning of 2014 the thought of any significant 
conflict between Russia and NATO was unthinkable, reality has once again surpassed 
wishful thinking and shown how we must prepare for probable contingencies.  
The previous chapters also point out that, although four out of five Arctic littoral 
states are NATO members, there seems to be no consensus on how the alliance should 
play a role in the region. This has a hampering effect on joint training and exercises as an 
alliance in the Arctic region. This also sends a signal to Russia, giving Russia more 
“room to maneuver” in the Arctic. If the role of NATO remains uncertain in the Arctic 
Region, individual nations will have to establish separate military bilateral agreements. 
There is only one nation that will benefit from this, and that is Russia. Furthermore, 
Russia is augmenting its Arctic capabilities and infrastructure by, among others, 
reactivating 12 Cold War era airbases.350 “Russia got more land, coastline, and waters 
than any other nation,”351 and—along with the previously mentioned SOF—can “through 
the infrastructure improvement, … project … a combined arms operation to an extent that 
the other Arctic nations cannot.”352 So what does this mean for SOF? It depends on how 
the Russian actions are perceived by the other Arctic stakeholders within, but also 
outside, of the Arctic. And, while the Russian application of military SOF—and other 
military force—may or may not affect U.S. focus on Arctic strategy, it is equally 
interesting to consider the place this puts Norway and Denmark in, where the Russian 
stance and overwhelming Arctic force might be perceived as going beyond merely 
protecting economic interests and dominating the perspective of these bordering small 
states. This, in turn, will call for NATO support in the Arctic, leading back to Cold War 
structures in security policy. Norway and Denmark are indeed adapting their Arctic 
capabilities with an increased strategic focus—in pursuit of own economic interest 
according to their Arctic strategies—by reorganizing and building ice-strengthened 
ships.353 
350 Dr. Dylan Lehrke, “The Cold Thaw,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 14, 2014, 28. 
351 Ibid., 27. 
352 Ibid., 28. 
353 Lehrke, “The Cold Thaw,” 28‒29. 
 123 
                                                 
Arctic military collaboration and integration is still in its infancy. Because of this, 
SOF has to rely on national C2 in order to be effective. There is much to harvest and gain 
from partner nations, which have maintained Arctic SOF capabilities because of 
geopolitical obligations remaining after the Cold War and throughout the Global War on 
Terror. Why do most scenarios used in the Arctic Exercises still have a very conventional 
focus especially when knowing that future Arctic conflict is likely to have an irregular 
focus—involving a large number of stakeholders?  
There is an important consideration when discussing military employment in the 
Arctic region and that is the issue of presence versus preparedness; if it is not politically 
or economically feasible to maintain a constant military presence in the Arctic as a 
contingency force—due to political sensitivity, but also because of limited resources and 
associated strategic balancing—then the ability to deploy to the Arctic becomes an issue 
on its own. A large conventional force is less adept at responding quickly to case-by-case 
contingencies compared to SOF. Furthermore, SOF are also easier to sustain compared to 
their conventional counterpart. In short, SOF are distinguished by the ability to respond 
quickly. SOF can maintain a “small foot print” in respect to strategic deployment and 
tactical employment under strict and direct political guidance. SOF’s responsiveness and 
relative ease of sustainment are two of the most important features seen from an Arctic 
perspective. As such, SOF is particularly suited to responding to security issues in the full 
spectrum of conflict within the complex and hazardous Arctic environment.  
As described in Chapter III, especially the current Arctic SOF capabilities of the 
United States fall short of the current increasing requirements. It is fair to say that, in 
general, SOF have become less capable to operate in an area that is becoming 
increasingly important. However, Denmark and also the Netherlands have been able to 
maintain a level of proficiency for operating in the Arctic. This highlights the importance 
of collaboration—where the United States can harvest experience from smaller 
stakeholders, such as Denmark and the Netherlands—towards establishing a robust 
Arctic SOF capability enabling A4 and NATO security cooperation in the Arctic. 
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4. Economic Power 
Most of the strategic ramifications directly result from the economic incentives of 
the changing Arctic environment. First and foremost, what follows is that new lucrative 
avenues open up and there will be an increase in commercial traffic. The sea ice is 
melting faster at the Russian side of the Arctic than anywhere else. As a consequence, the 
NSR will open before the NWP. Where legal trade goes, illicit trade and contraband are 
likely to follow. Given the remoteness and lack of governance and infrastructure, “Arctic 
Piracy” could be a lucrative business model. This may result in utilizing SOF assets, in 
combination with OGAs, to counter these illegal activities. As said before, the tyranny of 
distance in combination with the limited infrastructure and governance will most likely 
exacerbate this problem of countering these threats. Second, where trade routes open, 
tourism in general will also increase; an increase of cruise liners is already a reality in the 
Arctic.  
What logically follows is that, however small the threat of a cruise ship being 
hijacked, this risk goes up, as well. Given the fact that an HRO is always an extremely 
difficult operation to execute, the tyranny of distance and environmental issues will also 
exacerbate the problem. Third, the number of oilrigs north of Norway, Russia, and 
around Alaska goes up. These platforms could be lucrative targets for either criminals or 
terrorists. Recently Putin addressed how Russia will employ SOF354 to protect their 
Arctic offshore oilrigs against terrorists and other security threats. Although doctrinally 
SOF are not the force of choice for a static point defense of oilrigs as proposed by Putin, 
responding to an MCT threat in the Arctic is a probable contingency and should be 
exercised accordingly. As a final point, more economic activity overall in the Arctic 
region will automatically increase the physical involvement of different environmental 
354 Atle Staalesen, “Putin Arms Arctic Drillers,” Barentsobserver, April 23, 2014, 
http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2014/04/putin-arms-arctic-drillers-23-04.  
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groups. The best recent examples are the confrontation between Greenpeace and Russia, 
and the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and Denmark (Faroe Islands).355  
B. OBSERVER NATIONS 
Earlier in the chapter the strategic ramifications for the Arctic nations were 
summarized using DIME. This section describes the strategic ramifications for the 
observer nations and “other” organizations.  
The Arctic region is gaining importance to both upcoming and established 
economies in Asia, North America, and Europe. Most of these economies are non-arctic 
nations with observer status in the Arctic Council. In 2013, the Arctic council had the 
most new observer nations join, since it has been established in 1996.356 This by itself is 
a clear signal of the increased political importance of the Arctic region. In 2014, nine of 
the top ten world economies are either Arctic Council members or observers. Of the top 
20 economies, only five are neither member nor observer nations. From this it appears the 
Arctic is becoming an important region receiving significant attention from the majority 
of the world’s greatest economies.  
Non-Arctic states are motivated to a considerable degree by the attractions of 
exploiting the Arctic’s natural resources and of taking advantage of opportunities for 
commercial shipping in the region.357 Three things calls for further attention towards this 
growing interest: (1) under the terms of UNCLOS, non-Arctic states have a right to 
engage in a range of activities in the Arctic basin, referred to as “The Area.” With the 
geophysical change, the melting sea ice, those activities will increase; (2) incentives of 
Arctic states to enter into cooperative engagements with non-arctic states, such as 
Chinese investments in Iceland and Greenland, are good examples;358 and (3) the shifts 
355 Seashepherd.org, “Sea Shepherd Crewmembers Arrested for Intervening against Brutal Faroese 
Pilot Whale ‘Grind’ Hunt,” August 30, 2014, http://www.seashepherd.org/news-and-
media/2014/08/30/sea-shepherd-crewmembers-arrested-for-intervening-against-brutal-faroese-pilot-whale-
grind-hunt-1617. 
356 In May 2013 six new observer nations joined the Arctic Council: China, India, Italy, Japan, 
Singapore, and South Korea. 
357 Kraska, Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change, xxiv. 
358 Ibid.. 
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and posture changes that are taking place in the broader landscape of global politics with 
claims such as The United States is no longer the undisputed hegemon in world 
affairs.359 
C. OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 
The distribution of power in global politics seems to be contested. With 
international relations still dominated by the nation states involved, nations will continue 
to look after national interests.360 Nation-states will do so by utilizing their national 
elements of power. However, a sizable number of future arctic stakeholders will be 
“other organizations” as well. Examples of such organizations are non-governmental 
organizations including environmental organizations like Greenpeace, and multinational 
corporations such as BP, ExxonMobil and Shell, as well as major shipping companies. 
Especially multinational corporations have emerged as major players in the landscape of 
the Arctic region, and have economies that rival those of all but the largest states.361  
As discussed before, the geophysical and political changes are indicating an 
increase in the number of these other organizations. New Arctic specific alliances will 
possibly be formed between states, non-states, and other stakeholders. Multinational 
corporations are already investing in critical Arctic infrastructure of several Arctic 
nations thereby becoming an integral and essential part of the Arctic future by creating 
dependence. These same corporations, forward positioned in the Arctic with critical 
capabilities like rotary and fixed wing assets, are helping out during time of crises. A last 
consequence worth mentioning is the increase in conflicts between NGOs and states, 
such as the 2013 incident involving Russia and Greenpeace. The boarding by Russian 
military personnel of the Dutch flagged Greenpeace ship Arctic sunrise outside Russian 
territorial waters was a clear signal to the rest of the world that Russia will defend its 
territory using military means, and is prepared to challenge international law in doing so.  
359 Ibid. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid., xxv. 
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It seems that the evolution in the Arctic may foster dependence on non-state 
Arctic stakeholders. Cooperation between nation-states and non-state Arctic stakeholders 
as well as possible problems where interests conflict also seems likely. The military 
element of DIME should prepare to work with and through these other organizations in 
pursuit of national interests and secure Arctic Governance. 
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V. SECURITY THREATS 
The previous chapters described the current geophysical, political, and military 
environment. The conclusions up to this point explain to the reader that there is a likely 
increased requirement in the Arctic region for military in general, and SOF, in particular.  
In this chapter three historical analogies show how a lack of specific capabilities, 
skills and binding agreements such as aAAR, SOF airmobile preparedness, and bi- or 
multinational agreements could influence an operation. Parallels can be drawn from these 
historical analogies to possible future contingencies in the Arctic region. A selection of 
future contingencies, form the basis for the six vignettes in the second part of this chapter 
and will “paint the picture” of what could be a future situation for SOF involvement in 
the Arctic. These vignettes show a probable future for SOF on the whole spectrum of 
conflict, ranging from CP to SAR/DR missions.  
A. HISTORICAL ANALOGIES 
This segment describes three historical cases where various types of capability 
shortfalls (ranging from tactical skills to strategic coalitions) had significant influence on 
mission success. In the case of the SAR scenario, a lack of an AAR capability resulted in 
the rescue force not being able to execute the mission as a result of insufficient range. In 
the Achille Lauro incident, a political sensitivity and conflicting national interests left the 
United States alone on the mission. In the Eagle Claw mission, a complex mix of a lack 
of skills, training, jointness, and equipment malfunction led to failure. There is no reason 
to believe the Arctic environment will be more forgiving of these shortfalls in future SOF 
missions. 
The geophysical environment in the Arctic does pose unique challenges and 
simply overlaying current SOF capabilities is indeed not a viable approach; the weather 
in the Arctic requires specific skills, training, and equipment to include mobility assets 
(strategic through tactical level). Cooperation in a multinational and multiagency context 
will also be crucial in the future in the Arctic. While the selected vignettes in this study 
are not predictions, they are merely probable and vetted through these historical events. 
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Therefore, they provide empirical knowledge on how to prepare, and equally important, 
how not to. In other words, the historic analogies serve as historically educated 
guesswork, thereby maximizing their value in shaping the future for SOF in the Arctic.362 
There are several other historical analogies to choose from other than the ones laid out in 
the following subsections, e.g., the recent counter-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden, 
where a multinational effort protects commercial shipping. 
1. Canadian Search and Rescue in the North Atlantic 
Canada possesses an elite SAR capability, The Canadian Armed Forces Search 
and Rescue (CAFSAR). In spite of this,  
In December of 1994, a nor’easter sank the 450 foot motor vessel 
Salvador Allende in the North Atlantic. Onboard the Ukrainian registered 
freighter were 31 crewmembers who were left stranded, battling for 
survival against 30 foot seas and 60 mile per hour winds. The crew 
members were hundreds of miles away from land and the magnitude of the 
storm that sank the Salvador Allende prevented other ships from reaching 
the scene. Although Canadian and American search and rescue planes had 
been able to locate survivors in the water and drop life rafts, a rescue 
would only have been possible by helicopter. Due to the distance from 
land, this mission was outside the boundaries of conventional search and 
rescue and would require a special type of helicopter, one that was capable 
of aerial refueling.363 
This is not the only incident where SAR missions went wrong.364 However, the 
incident points out an essential capability gap, and there are several aspects of this rescue 
attempt that are interesting to analyze. Most obvious is the explicit mention that the lack 
of AAR capability was critical, and prevented the conventional SAR mission from 
overcoming the tyranny of distance prevalent in the Arctic. AAR is a typical SOF 
362 Colin S. Gray, “How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?” Parameters 35, no 1 
(2005): 16. 
363 Brad McNally, “Helicopter In-Flight Refueling,” justhelicopters.com, March 29, 2013, 
http://www.justhelicopters.com/ArticlesNews/CommunityArticles/tabid/433/Article/67520/Helicopter-In-
Flight-Refueling.aspx. 
364 While the Salvador Allende incident shows how inadequate range resulted in mission failure, a 
more recent SAR mission shows how inadequate helicopter response time resulted in the death of a SAR 
tech. Source: Bruce Campion Smith, “How Did a Search-and-Rescue Mission to Igloolik Go Wrong?” 
Toronto Star, April 20, 2012. 
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airmobile characteristic because of the often-extended range required for SOF, compared 
to conventional forces. A second incidental, but even more interesting aspect, is the fact 
that the vessel was Ukrainian registered. Russia and Ukraine are amidst the biggest crisis 
in Europe since the height of the Cold War. Previous comments in the study address the 
negative effect this has on NATO and Russian cooperation, which is non-existent. Thus, 
the question remains, to what extent will Russia offer support in rescuing a Ukrainian 
vessel if it is not clearly within well-defined Russian boundaries? And, to what degree 
will Russia seek to exploit such a mission in support of other goals in other theaters? To 
what degree will Russia be willing to cooperate? Finally, how will a lack of cooperation 
affect the ability to conduct SAR, or other mission types, in a multinational context 
between Russia and the other Arctic nations? While it is uncertain what the answers to 
those questions are, that uncertainty precisely underscores the necessity of establishing 
frameworks for more secure cooperation—and binding agreements—with established 
partners. 
The important takeaway from the previous SAR scenario, shows how mobility, 
range, and response time are crucial in an Arctic environment when responding to time-
critical tasks, which unlike the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden, or 
even the cooler Pacific, does not accommodate humans exposed to the elements very 
well. These concerns do not relate only to SAR. What if a ship instead of capsizing was 
attacked by terrorists, and held in the Arctic sea within Danish or Norwegian territory? 
What if a vessel was captured by alleged Russian-supported Ukrainian rebels, claiming 
they have seized an illicit arms transport? Some of the hostages might even be Dutch like 
in the recent Russian raid on the Dutch-registered Greenpeace vessel in international 
Arctic waters. The combination of the Arctic geophysical and geopolitical environment 
may preclude Russian involvement in an HRO on a Ukrainian vessel, or another vessel 
where either country of origin, corporation/NGO, or purpose of presence will conflict 
with Russian national interests. Though such a scenario is hypothetical, it is probable and 
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historically founded through the Achille Lauro HRO on a cruise ship in the 
Mediterranean.365  
2. Achille Lauro Hostage Rescue Operation 
Just like in the Arctic where political issues and relations inside and outside of the 
Arctic are intertwined, the Achille Lauro was incidental and a result of a dispute between 
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Front,366 and as such had nothing to do with the 
passengers, the cruise ship, or its country of origin. The response and lack of coalition 
support in the HRO was a result of affairs and politics not directly related to the event 
either. Just as the Ukraine-Russia crisis has nothing to do with the Arctic, yet it still 
impacts Arctic cooperation. Furthermore, established international relations were 
severely tested by the Achille Lauro incident, as national interest took precedence over 
willingness to partake in freeing the hostages and capturing the perpetrators. Though the 
ad hoc response was successful, two issues are relevant to point out. First, “the mission 
made innovative use of available conventional force capabilities to perform a type of task 
normally handled by Special operations units.”367 The Arctic geophysical environment 
and limited force availability in the region might possibly preclude such an approach. 
Second, “the Achille Lauro incident underscored once more that even the best 
international friends have unique interests and constraints.”368 The Arctic geopolitical 
environment is also very sensitive with arguably even greater stakes at play among global 
and regional powers intertwined amid small states and trusted partners trying to navigate 
between national interests and Arctic security politics. Again highlighting the fact the 
Arctic environment, in its broadest sense, calls for preparation and application of SOF. 
When the Arctic sea, by definition, reaches the status of ice-free, there will still be 
1,000,000 square kilometers or less of sea ice remaining. This area corresponds to an area 
365 For further information regarding this incident, see: Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War, 
1975‒1986: An Era of Violent Peace (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988), 360‒381. 
366 Bolger, Americans at War, 1975‒1986: An Era of Violent Peace, 362. 
367 Ibid., 377. 
368 Ibid., 379. 
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roughly the size of France and Germany combined.369 This not only shows the size of the 
Arctic, which is slightly less than 1.5 times the size of the U.S.,”370 but more important, 
how it relates to other maritime areas where SOF has previously conducted operations, 
such as in the Mediterranean or the Persian Gulf. Therefore, it is not possible simply to 
apply overlays from historical events and expect the experience gained from previous 
successes will suffice. The description of the next historical event shows how—even 
provided time to prepare371—ad hoc forces when sufficiently challenged by the theater of 
operations, e.g., large distances, hazardous and unfamiliar terrain, and weather—in 
combination with a lack of joint training and exercise as well as equipment failure—can 
result in disaster. Furthermore, aircrew personnel lack of a sense of purpose, skills, and 
confidence in the mission may also have critical impact on the outcome. “The pilots were 
being asked to do things they had never tried.”372  
3. Operation Eagle Claw 
In 1980, operation Eagle Claw failed and several of the involved personnel died. 
Eagle Claw has been studied in great detail. The following is not an elaborate study of 
that mission; it is merely a highlight of some of the key points, which are not merely 
relevant and able to be transposed into the Arctic region, but might likely be exaggerated 
when doing so. Therefore, the lessons learned from Eagle Claw must be observed when 
preparing SOF to operate in the Arctic. The objective in operation Eagle Claw was to free 
the hostages held at the U.S. embassy in Tehran. After a few weeks of preparation, “Delta 
was basically ready to storm the compound, but the problem of delivering them and 
getting them out remained.”373 These issues were apparently never resolved; when the 
369 France is 643,801 km2, Germany is 357,022 km2, totaling 1,000,823 km2 in combination. Source: 
Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, “The World Factbook,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/. 
370 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/xq.html. 
371 The rescue force had been preparing for the mission since early November to late April. Source: 
Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Hostage Crisis: The First Battle in America’s War with 
Militant Islam (New York: Grove Press, 2007). 
372 Ibid., 343. 
373 Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Hostage Crisis: The First Battle in America's War with 
Militant Islam, 226. 
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force infiltrated towards the refueling and staging area, Desert One—as part of an 850 nm 
penetration into Iranian territory374—things went awry.  
The rescue force never reached the objective in Tehran. The eight Sea Stallions 
soon became six. “Two of the helicopters had problems with their navigation equipment, 
but flying that close [200 feet] to the ground they could steer by landmarks.”375 As it 
turned out, later in the flight that was a risky technique at night, using night vision 
goggles in the desert. Soon the helicopters found themselves in a dust storm, a Haboob, 
eliminating the ability to fly using visual cues. The helicopter crews did not have any 
information about these weather conditions, and hence, did not alter their flight profile. 
Only the C-130 crews had spotted the storms when flying over them, but radio silence 
requirements prevented the C-130 crews’ effort to relay this information to the 
helicopters. These same conditions with reduced visual cues are prevalent in the Arctic 
desert as well, as discussed previously. Solely relying on visual cues under these 
conditions is not a safe option, setting forth requirements towards increased redundancy 
in navigation capability. The pilots’ attempt, with some success, to out-climb the dust 
storms in order to ensure separation from the mountains in the desert visually, as they did 
not trust the machine or their map.376 The failure of a hydraulic system in one of the 
helicopters eventually caused the mission to be aborted. Later the inability to maneuver 
safely in Desert One, because of brownout conditions, resulted in a disaster where a Sea 
Stallion crashed into a C-130, killing several U.S. troops.  
The study on the meteorological conditions in the Arctic shows that challenges of 
the same character exist in the Arctic. Clouds and whiteout conditions are more a rule 
than an exception in the Arctic. Out-climbing clouds to regain visual conditions may not 
be possible due to icing, and certainly will not be possible in those areas of the Arctic 
region where Nimbus stratus clouds prevail. While maneuvering close to the ground, 
drifting or blowing snow along with moderate or poor visibility in fog creates conditions 
similar to those experienced in Desert One; except in the Arctic it is such a widespread 
374 Ibid., 230. 
375 Ibid., 447. 
376 Ibid., 449. 
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phenomenon, it is referred to as Arctic whiteout. The Artic also poses challenges to 
communication; maintaining situational awareness and command and control may also be 
challenging not just because of operational security, but also because of Arctic 
geophysical conditions degrading conventional means of communication. The 
uncertainty of the Arctic weather, like in the Iranian desert, also sets forth increased 
requirements towards equipment, training, skills and not least a mindset, which ensures 
an understanding of the mission.377 One final comment, which has not been mentioned 
yet is jointness. Though the different services were all represented in operation Eagle 
Claw, the mission was not joint. There are several indications that Delta Force “was the 
mission,”378 and that the other elements were just supporting, and doing a poor job at it. 
This might have been true, but the best way to overcome this would have been through 
training, ensuring interoperability and a true sense of jointness. This is also a key 
takeaway in the Arctic region where multinational SOF may have to collaborate. In order 
to do this effectively requires interoperability and acceptance of all the elements of the 
force. This recognition is only achieved through training and networking. 
Eagle Claw did not fail because of incompetent aircrews; it failed because a SOF 
mission was attempted using a force that was not prepared to do it. The ad hoc force did 
the not have the readiness, which is an inherent part of SOF as laid out in the discussion 
on SOF doctrine. The Geophysical environment in the Arctic almost certainly dictates 
that the same lack of readiness will also result in failure there. Another important reason 
why Eagle Claw failed was the lack of jointness, the lack of understanding of the 
different roles of the various players. Though speculative, this understanding may have 
enabled identifying the biggest hurdles in the mission, getting there and getting out again, 
which in turn may have resulted in a completely different concept of operation. The 
geopolitical environment in the Arctic shows how vastly different units may have to 
cooperate as was the case—with the different U.S. services—in Eagle Claw, however, 
this time in a multinational context. Only by creating a solid foundation, a network, of 
377 One of the helicopters turned back, not knowing that decision would “…fatally compromise the 
mission.” Source: Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Hostage Crisis: The First Battle in 
America's War with Militant Islam, 450. 
378 Ibid., 451, 453. 
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interoperability through understanding, acceptance, and training will success be within 
reach in future Arctic SOF missions. 
B. ARCTIC VIGNETTES 
As already mentioned in Chapter I, this thesis uses vignettes—derived from the 
geophysical and geopolitical analysis—instead of scenarios. Scenarios are typically 
viewed as official higher-level storylines at the strategic level, serving as contingencies 
for defense planning. Vignettes, on the other hand, are not officially approved, and allow 
some more flexibility, yet are nested within a higher-level scenario.379   
When considering what to prepare for in the future Arctic region, it is interesting 
to see what contingencies a country like Russia is preparing its military forces for in the 
Arctic region. Open source information reveals three possible scenarios: (1) U.S. attack 
submarine threat in the Arctic region,380 (2) countering incoming (cruise) missiles 
traveling through the Arctic region;381 and (3) protecting its oilrigs against a potential 
terrorist threat.382 It seems that Russia is focused on a more conventional threat, or at 
least uses this “threat” to justify its military buildup in the region.  
For this thesis six vignettes are developed, covering the full spectrum of conflict 
and ranging from peacetime to war. These vignettes include operations that are likely to 
require SOF resources, although this is slightly different among the three countries 
studied here. Every vignette can be viewed as a specific military problem from which a 
379 Gongora, “Scoping Missions and Tasks for CANSOFCOM in the Canadian North,” 10. 
380 In an interview with Russian president Putin, he highlighted the need for enhanced national 
security engagements in the Arctic region. Putin stated that U.S. attack submarines are concentrated there, 
not far from the Norwegian coast, with missiles which can reach Moscow in 15‒16 minutes.” Source: Atle 
Staalesen, “Missiles and Manpower for a New Artic Base,” Barentsobserver, September 1, 2014, 
http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2014/09/missiles-and-manpower-new-arctic-base-01-09. 
381 The First large live-fire exercise as North as 76°N in Post-Soviet times with vessels from Russia’s 
Northern fleet involved downing of a cruise missile. “According to the scenario of the exercises, units of 
the tactical group, acting in coordination with the ship unit, fought to repel aerial attacks by an imaginary 
adversary and fired at simulated targets. Source: Thomas Nilsen, “Itar-Tass posts Arctic war games video,” 
Barentsobserver, September 23, 2014, http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2014/09/itar-tass-posts-arctic-
war-games-video-23-09.  
382 Atle Staalesen, “Putin Arms Arctic Drillers,” April 23, 2014, Barentsobserver, 
http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2014/04/putin-arms-arctic-drillers-23-04. 
 136 
                                                 
staff can start a CBA in order to go from scenarios to capabilities.383 The vignettes can 
also be utilized as a starting point for a mission analysis or a war game. Regardless of 
how the vignettes are used, they will inevitably lead to shortfalls and additional 
requirements for SOF units, in order to be able to achieve future mission success. A 
summary of analysis is given in Table 2. 
1. Vignette 1 – Counter Proliferation (CP) 
Open-source intelligence suggests the smuggling of a nuclear device into North 
America through the Canadian North is a recognized threat.384 The specific vignette 
involves smuggling of a small nuclear device into North America through Churchill, 
Manitoba, Canada’s only inland seaport with access to the Arctic Ocean.385 First and 
foremost, this threat poses significant danger to both Canada and the United States, 
making it a national and continental defense concern. Additionally, this vignette depends 
greatly on when the nuclear device is detected. In Gary Rice’s account, the bomb is 
accidentally detonated in Churchill, Manitoba, creating a crisis response scenario with a 
nuclear nexus.386 The presence of non-state actors will be of increasing concern as the 
Arctic Ocean continues to open to increased maritime traffic. M. Bunn and A. Wier, in 
“The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism,” argue that it is highly plausible for a terrorist 
group to either steal a nuclear bomb, or acquire the necessary materials and directions to 
make one.387 The nuclear device smuggling vignette is therefore a relevant threat that 
offers unique challenges to Special Operations Forces.   
In this vignette, intelligence indicates that there is a nuclear device on a fishing 
trawler in transit during late spring through the Canadian Arctic. It is sailing into and out 
of international and domestic Canadian waters, probably heading for Churchill, 
383 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff J-8, Capabilities-Based Assessment User’s Guide, version 3, 
38. 
384 Gary Rice, “Four Selected Intrusion Scenarios,” Chapter 5 in Defence Requirements for Canada’s 
Arctic, Brian MacDonald, ed. (Ottawa: The Conference of Defence Associations Institute), 65‒78.  
385 Ibid. 
386 Ibid. 
387 M. Bunn and A. Wier, The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism. Current History 104, no. 681 
(2005): 153‒161, http://search.proquest.com/docview/60705360?accountid=12702. 
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Manitoba. The challenge here is to keep tracking the trawler and coordinate the 
interception, given the environmental and infrastructural challenges.  
2. Vignette 2 – Hostage Rescue Operation (HRO) 
Another hypothetical but probable vignette in the future Arctic, likely involving 
SOF, is a hostage situation on a ship or cruise liner. The retreating ice is already 
triggering an increase in the number of ships in the Arctic.388 Although “Somalia-like” 
Arctic piracy seems unlikely, the stealing of cargo as is done currently by criminals in the 
Gulf of Guinea could very well be a future business model for organized crime along the 
Arctic sea routes (NWP, North Pole Route, and especially the NSR). For the same 
obvious reasons, polar tourism is likely to continue in the near future. A hostage rescue 
vignette, involving a cruise ship, could become reality not only for Arctic littoral states, 
but also for non-Arctic states like the Netherlands. Who and how to respond to such a 
scenario depends on the geographic position of the ship and its flag state, but will 
undoubtedly involve specific military hardware and capabilities.  
In this vignette, a cruise ship in transit on the high seas from Svalbard to Scoresby 
Sund, Greenland, is hijacked by a radical environmental terrorist group. Their demand to 
the governments of Norway and Denmark is to stop Arctic exploration immediately and 
to free three group members who are imprisoned in Norway. They threaten to sink the 
ship with a total of more than 200 passengers and crewmembers on board if their 
demands are not met. The ship, with a 1A ice-rated hull, is sailing through an area with 
lots of floating sea ice. The ship is flagged in the Bahamas and the passengers on board 
are mostly British and Dutch. The challenge here is to coordinate a complex HRO again 
given the floating sea ice environment and limited infrastructure in the area. Also, the 
multinational and governmental character and involvement of this vignette plays a role 
here.  
388 In 2013 there has been a 54 percent increase in the number of ships that used the NSR. “New 
Advisory for Navigating the Northern Sea Route,” Barentsobserver, January 31, 2014, 
www.barentsobserver.com. 
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3. Vignette 3 – Maritime Counter Terrorism (MCT) 
Another potential vignette for the future Arctic region is the likelihood of 
MCT.389 With an increase of oil platforms in the Arctic region in the years to come MCT 
is one of the contingencies to be prepared for. Because of their isolation and distance 
from shore/infrastructure, offshore platforms are extremely vulnerable to attack,390 and 
when occupied by potential terrorists, can be used as a powerful bargaining tool. 
Currently, a lot of oilrigs are being developed; therefore, the number of platforms is 
likely to increase drastically in the years to come. This raises concerns in terms of 
security. Acknowledging this potential threat, Russia recently announced that it will 
allow its oilrigs to use armed guards for protection, and in addition will use its SOF to 
increase security.391  
For this specific vignette, an oilrig of Royal Dutch Shell in the Chukchi Sea has 
been captured by an unknown terrorist organization. An incoming relief helicopter took 
small arms fire from the oilrig and observed armed men on the platform. Although no 
contact has been established so far, intelligence claims the aim of this terrorist 
organization is to make the United States “pay” for their recent military intervention in a 
Middle East country. It is believed this group will try to blow up the oilrig, thereby 
causing an environmental disaster in this part of the Arctic.  
4. Vignette 4 – Search And Rescue (SAR) 
Because of the increase of activities in the Arctic region, the demand on SAR is 
likely to increase as well in the near future. Since 2011, a SAR agreement has been in 
389 Maritime terrorism refers to the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities (1) within the maritime 
environment, (2) using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their 
passengers or personnel, (3) against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourists resorts, port area’s 
port towns or cities. Source: Peter Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, 
Piracy, and Challenges for the United States, Vol. 697 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), 3. 
390 Assaf Harel, “Preventing Terrorist Attacks on Offshore Platforms: Do States Have Sufficient 
Legal Tools?” Harvard National Security Journal 4 (January 2013): 132.  
391 Staalese, “Putin Arms Arctic Drillers.” 
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place between the Arctic states.392 This agreement assigns each member an area for 
which it is responsible for SAR. This increased responsibility places greater demands on 
the individual nation’s SAR capability, while also calling for more cooperation among 
the Arctic states.393 Furthermore, SAR is a very complex operation and requires special 
equipment and specially trained personnel, especially when conducted in the Arctic 
region, where conventional SAR previously has failed. Though SAR is not a typical SOF 
mission, smaller Arctic nations like Denmark may seek to use their scarce resources and 
established Arctic SOF capabilities to execute this type of mission. A SAR operation in 
the Arctic will be a challenge regardless if it is a sinking ship, a vessel lodged in the ice, 
or a crashed airplane on land or ice. 
In this vignette a Chinese submarine ten miles off the coast of Greenland has 
sustained serious damage from floating ice and is unable to reach the nearest port of 
Upernavik, Greenland. Local fishermen have reported the submarine, and a distress 
signal has been intercepted by RCC as well. Although embarrassed by this incident, the 
Chinese authorities asked Denmark and Canada to help rescue the 85 Chinese 
submariners. This vignette offers several unique challenges, to include interagency and 
multinational coordination, command and control, and SAR specific training and 
equipment. It is therefore relevant to all states with territory in the High North. 
5. Vignette 5 – Strategic Reconnaissance & Surveillance (SR&S) 
This thesis argues that, although chances are small, future state-on-state conflict 
in the Arctic cannot be ruled out for two reasons: first, because of the spillover effect 
from other conflicts or theatres in the world into the Arctic region; second, because of the 
increasing accessibility to the vast amount of resources in the region. SR&S is one of the 
principal SOF tasks. 
392 The “Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic” 
was signed by the eight Arctic States (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden) 
on May 12, 2011, in Nuuk, Greenland. 
393 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, “Agreement on Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic.”  
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This vignette takes place on Svalbard, a unique Archipelago in the Arctic Ocean. 
Part of what makes Svalbard unique is the Svalbard Treaty,394 signed in 1920, allowing 
signees specific privileges on the Islands. Local HUMINT indicates Russia is using its 
research center in Svalbard as a Forward Operating Base to conduct clandestine military 
activities. Since other ISR assets are not able to provide confirmation on the HUMINT, 
Norwegian SOF is tasked to conduct an SR mission and get eyes on the research center. 
This vignette offers a “classic” SOF operation in a demanding environment, including the 
political sensitivity and strategic importance as part of the Arctic geopolitical 
environment.  
6. Vignette 6 – Arctic Security Force Assistance (SFA) 
It is 2050, and Greenland is enjoying an increasing foreign interest of 
predominant Asian countries due to the increasing scarce natural resources found on its 
territory. As a result, for many years there has been a large influx of foreign workers.395 
There is, however, a lack of integration of these workers with the local—predominant—
Inuit population and the weak local and national government. As seen throughout history, 
“often countries with weak governance and abundant natural resources are prone to 
armed violence”396 possibly compromising human rights, law enforcement, and 
394 The Svalbard Treaty has been signed by 39 countries and recognizes the sovereignty of Norway 
over the Arctic Archipelago, at the time called Spitsbergen. The exercise of sovereignty is, however, 
subject to certain stipulations, and not all Norwegian law applies. The treaty regulates the demilitarization 
of the archipelago. Article 9 prohibits naval bases and fortifications to be build, and also the use of 
Svalbard for war-like purposes. The signatories were given equal rights to engage in commercial activities 
on the island. As of 2012 Russia is making use of this right and as of 2013, they have established a research 
center. Source: Governor of Svalbard: The Svalbard Treaty, last updated April 9, 2008, 
http://oldweb.sysselmannen.no/hovedEnkel.aspx?m=45301. 
395 Kraska, Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change, 134. 
396 The future for the Greenlandic Arctic appears to have similar trades to Africa in terms of natural 
resource exploitation, and the African resource curse may appear as an Arctic resource curse in the future. 
For further see, Terra Lawson-Remer and Joshua Greenstein, “Beating the Resource Curse in Africa: A 
Global Effort,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 2012, http://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-saharan/beating-
resource-curse-africa-global-effort/p28780. 
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population control, border security, executive authority, and protection of the political 
process.397  
In this vignette intelligence indicates that the immigrants are building their own 
enclaves and are supported by Asian state actors support; they even have set up their own 
legal system, including a paramilitary guard. The total estimated foreign workers in 2050 
already equals the total local Greenland population of 70,000398 and threatens to 
destabilize Greenland society. In order to prevent current developments to evolve into an 
insurgency, the Greenlandic-Danish government requests security assistance from NATO 
partners.  
This vignette describes a potential future SFA399 or MA mission to support the 
local security forces of Greenland. Given the developments in the Arctic region, an 
SFA/MA mission seems plausible and could be relevant in the future. Given the type of 
mission it is likely that SOF will be involved.  
C. ANALYSIS OF VIGNETTES 
The final part of this chapter provides an analysis of the six vignettes. In Table 2 
each vignette is analyzed by looking at considerations or attributes that could be 
insightful when predicting a future employment of SOF in the Arctic region.  
397 These elements are taken from “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency.” This article provides a 
concise description of key elements required to succeed in counterinsurgency, thus they are important to 
focus on in this hypothetical vignette. For further information, see: Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in 
Counterinsurgency,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Department of National Security Affairs, 
2005. 
398 The 70,000 is a hypothetical number based on the Greenland population of about 58,000 people, 
89 percent Inuit and 11 percent Danish, in 2014. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, “The World 
Factbook: Greenland.” 
399 SFA is terminology used in U.S. SOF doctrine that would translate into Military Assistance (MA) 
according to NATO doctrine. 
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Table 2.   Overview of vignette analysis. 
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First, the vignettes are compared to the SOF missions and tasks as described in 
NATO and U.S. SOF doctrine. This shows the variety and legitimacy of possible SOF 
tasks in the future Arctic region. NATO doctrine differentiates between principle SOF 
tasks (PT) and additional activities (AA). The data shows that two of the SR and 
SFA/MA vignettes are characterized as PTs, and the CP, HRO, and MCT vignettes are 
listed as AAs. The SAR vignette is neither of the two; however, it is considered to be an 
SOF mission for Denmark. As for U.S. SOF doctrine, all except the SAR vignette are 
considered to be SOF core activities (CA). This means that all but the SAR vignette 
would qualify as an SOF mission, and are listed as such in SOF doctrine. As for the SAR 
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vignette, this would only involve SOF when the mission would be conducted by 
Denmark.  
Second, the data shows in what season the vignette is likely to take place. For the 
CP and HRO vignettes, this is currently the “summer season” (June–September). 
However, in the future this may change to “all seasons” for all vignettes. This would not 
only increase the probability of these vignettes as the Arctic opens up and activity goes 
up as well, but would also increase the area in which these vignettes might happen. 
Third, the environment is depicted with only two options, maritime or land. The 
CP vignette is a part maritime, part land problem, but in the future, it could take place in 
both environments. However, it is important to note that the maritime environment will 
become more accessible over time because of the ice melt, where the land environment 
will become less accessible because of the ice and permafrost melt. The HRO and SAR 
vignettes are now set up in a maritime environment; however, they could also take place 
in a land environment. The MCT vignette can only take place in a maritime environment, 
and the SR and SFA/MA vignettes are land environment only scenarios. Although the 
Arctic region is considered to be a maritime environment, the likelihood of future 
missions occurring in a land environment is not significantly smaller. Also, there is a 
considerable amount of land, covered with ice and snow, above the Arctic Circle. 
Furthermore, vast areas of the Arctic Ocean will be covered with solid sea ice for a 
considerable amount of time even when the Arctic Ocean is considered ice-free. 
Therefore, both Army SOF and Navy SOF should prepare accordingly.  
Fourth, the mobility aspect is divided up into land, sea, and air mobility 
depending on the relevance to the vignette. The analysis shows that regardless of the 
vignette, air assets have “range” as the key challenge. This is due to the vastness of the 
Arctic, the lack of military infrastructure or, as mentioned previously, because of the 
prevailing tyranny of distance. Furthermore, as a result of a lack of resources or 
capabilities, or a combination of the two, four of the vignettes require some form of sea 
mobility. There are two challenges with sea mobility. First, there is the current lack of 
accessibility due to a lack of adequate resources and training. This is depicted as “access” 
in the table. The second is depicted as “response time,” and depends on the distance to 
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the nearest military or coast guard installation. Three of the vignettes require land 
mobility. The challenges with land mobility are very similar to those of sea mobility and, 
to a lesser extent, to that of air mobility as well. Accessibility will become an increasing 
challenge due to the melting of the permafrost. Furthermore, the current infrastructure is 
still poorly developed in the Arctic. As stated before in this thesis and shown in the 
analysis of the vignettes as well, overall mobility is a major challenge for anyone 
operating in the Arctic. However, it seems adequate resources to potentially overcome 
these problems exist and should be looked at as part of Arctic SOF preparations. 
Fifth, what level of cooperation is required or likely to take place in the depicted 
vignettes in order to achieve mission success? The table shows three levels of 
cooperation. First, the state level requires national, bi-national, or multi-national 
cooperation. Whatever is considered likely given the situation in the specific vignette is 
what is shown in the table. For example, the CP vignette could be dealt with exclusively 
by the United States; however, in this vignette, it is likely that bi-national cooperation and 
collaboration will take place between the United States and Canada. What the vignettes 
also show is that for every vignette it will be likely to have multiple states involved. The 
second level is the interdepartmental cooperation (IDC), which is also described as 
working with OGAs, where different ministries, departments, or agencies are working 
together. Also for this level it is clear that in every vignette, interoperability between SOF 
and other agencies or departments is required. The third level of cooperation is the 
cooperation between SOF units of different nation states. It is depicted in the table as 
GSN, something that has gained momentum over the last few years, and has proven 
useful in other theatres of operation. For all but one vignette, it is considered likely that 
cooperation between different SOF will take place. If this cooperation does not involve a 
direct approach on the ground, face-to-face, then indirectly through ISR support or 
support of scarce resources. All three levels of cooperation will be crucial in order to be 
successful in a future contingency in the Arctic.  
What are the critical capabilities for every vignette? Although the list is not 
exhaustive, this study has exposed SOF capability issues related to the vignettes in the 
future Arctic region. As stated in Chapter III, a capability is the ability to achieve an 
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objective in a military operation. For every vignette, except the SFA/MA vignette, 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) is assessed to be 
critical in order to achieve mission success. Also, there are known issues with 
communications north of the 70-degree North latitude.400 Furthermore, Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA) is critical, especially for the vignettes focusing on the maritime 
environment, and will be a continuous challenge, given the poor infrastructure. Another 
critical capability in two vignettes is the AAR capability needed to cover the required 
range and overcome the tyranny of distance in the Arctic. A last capability requirement 
mentioned in one of the vignettes is the availability of ice-strengthened ships, whether 
this is an icebreaker or a warship with an ice strengthened hull. For example, most cruise 
ships that sail the Arctic waters have an ice-strengthened hull. When a contingency 
occurs, chances are any (military, coast guard, or both) ships want to get close in order to 
assist. Although the critical capabilities seem to focus on the equipment like ice-
strengthened vessels, a coastal radar station for MDA, or an AAR capability, training is 
another essential element of providing a capability. In fact, training is the basis in every 
vignette in order to be successful.  
On a final note, what all of the vignettes point out in this analysis is that current 
and future challenges in the Arctic can be overcome by a combination of realistic 
training, the right equipment, and cooperation on a national and international level with a 
wide variety of agencies and stakeholders. In Chapter VI, these points will be further 
explained. 
 
400 Due to the unclassified status of this thesis, it is not possible to go further into detail about the 
exact issues and possible solutions. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Arctic is a region where the growing accessibility of natural resources and 
opening sea routes will result in increasing security implications. There are neither supra-
state institutions nor sufficient bi- or multilateral agreements in place yet to deal with 
future security issues. Historically, the Arctic was viewed as a peripheral relevant area 
where other regions merged. The geophysical change in the Arctic will not only have 
regional but global implications. The future of the Arctic will be significantly affected by 
the changing geophysical characteristics. However, the Arctic political landscape will 
depend on how the various stakeholders choose to view the changes taking place. 
International relations and events outside of the Arctic influence and affect the 
relationships and cooperation inside the Arctic. The increased Arctic focus from Arctic 
and non-Arctic states alike, coupled with these spillover effects of global politics, require 
a focus on mutual support and capability developments to ensure a sufficient framework 
for promoting and governing Arctic security cooperation. In this final chapter four main 
conclusions and four recommendations for improvements are discussed. The chapter 
concludes with recommendations for further study.  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This study makes four primary conclusions. First, the current and future Arctic 
physical and political environment demands specially trained and equipped military 
personnel and units. Therefore, it seems likely that there is a future for SOF in the Arctic. 
The geophysical environment sets forth requirements towards specially trained personnel 
in order to operate and survive in Arctic conditions. The geopolitical environment—the 
political sensitivity—in the Arctic speaks to doctrinal application of SOF. Thus, the 
strategic ramifications not only indicate possible doctrinal SOF missions, but also point 
to SOF executing otherwise conventional missions because of the extreme and unique 
character of the Arctic. 
Second, the Arctic capabilities of the countries analyzed in this study have 
declined while the requirement for such capabilities in the Arctic has increased. The most 
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significant decline is found within United States SOF, followed by the Danish and Dutch 
SOF. Each has reduced the level of Arctic training due to commitments and priorities in 
other theatres of operations. For both the Netherlands and Denmark, their Arctic 
experience is mainly gained from the Scandinavian Arctic and may need to be tested in 
conditions reflecting what is found further inside this region. Denmark has conducted 
joint multiagency SOF operations in the North Atlantic, and the Netherlands possesses a 
relatively elaborate Arctic capability including mobility assets. It seems that the United 
States is able to harvest knowledge from smaller countries like Denmark and the 
Netherlands to rebuild their ability to meet future contingencies. However, this calls for 
formalized and strategically focused multinational Arctic training and cooperation in 
contrast to today’s grassroots or bottom-up Arctic SOF focus.  
Third, future operations in the Arctic will depend on JIIM relationships and 
cooperation. As the vignettes show, cooperation on different levels will become 
increasingly important when conducting operations in the Arctic region. The Arctic 
already hosts an impressive and growing list of stakeholders. The Arctic merges five 
nation-states and joins east and west, exposing conflicting interests and redrawing 
demarcation lines from the Cold War. Future contingencies involving the military will 
span the entire spectrum of conflict, and will not merely be joint, but will require a JIIM 
approach.  
Fourth, an increase of JIIM operations highlights the need for interoperability. 
The Arctic poses significant challenges regarding lines of communication to include 
satellite and navigation limitations. These issues exacerbate possible problems regarding 
command and control, especially amidst the vast distances associated with Arctic 
mobility. The entire range of mobility, strategic through tactical, deserves special 
attention. The historical analogy in Operation Eagle Claw shows how mobility issues can 
compromise a mission. The Arctic is equally challenging and more unique than deserts of 
the Middle East. AAR capability is crucial in order to ensure sufficient range to 
overcome the tyranny of distance in the Arctic, and enable a timely response in missions 
where land or naval assets are simply too slow. In certain areas of the Arctic, land 
mobility may be impossible in the summertime, resulting in a higher dependence on air 
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and naval assets. For naval assets, the Arctic Ocean requires ice-capable vessels. 
Unpredictability of sea-ice movement—even in “ice-free” conditions—makes navigating 
the Arctic waters hazardous. 
B. CRUCIAL AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
This study recommends three crucial areas for improvement in order to meet the 
future for Special Operations in the Arctic. First, current and future Arctic exercises 
should reflect Arctic-specific military challenges and possible future contingencies. 
These exercises do not currently reflect the potential Arctic-specific challenges identified 
in this study. Furthermore, Arctic exercises should be held in different geographic 
locations in the Arctic, exposing future Arctic SOF to weather and terrain more 
accurately representing Arctic conditions. This study, by using the vignettes, shows how 
to focus the scarce resources toward what may be the future for SOF in the Arctic. 
Annually, several international training exercises are held where SOF can interface and 
cooperate with partner-nations and other agencies in order to overcome the challenges 
associated with JIIM organizations and task forces. 
Second, networks, such as the Global SOF Network, should be further utilized in 
order to deal with Arctic challenges. The existing bottom-up Arctic SOF capabilities 
should be further integrated with national and partner-nation strategic focus to create 
Arctic SOF networks empowered to solve Arctic challenges while being responsible for 
maintaining sufficient multinational Arctic SOF capabilities. This networking will 
facilitate burden sharing and interoperability.  
Third, national SOF should participate regularly in joint and international Arctic 
training exercises. Habitual international meetings at SOF-specific training and exercise 
venues must be officially recognized in order to continue in perpetuity. Small scale, 
informally organized training exercises are only successful in developing a capability to 
the extent that those personnel remain within the organization. Without regularly 
ingraining training and partnerships into the unit, the experience and capability leave with 
the people. Regular participation in such exercises will increase the size of the knowledge 
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base, while providing overlapping knowledge to accommodate the loss and gain of 
personnel into a SOF unit. 
Fourth, unit commands and mission planners should transpose current problems 
of other littoral regions of the world onto the Arctic and prepare accordingly. Although 
the Arctic is currently characterized by ice and decreased mobility when compared to 
other littoral regions of the world, the geophysical studies are showing a trend of melting 
ice and opening of sea-lanes of communication. As indicated in Chapter IV, the opening 
of sea-lanes will bring with it a growing presence of commerce, tourism, and the potential 
for threats to follow. More mature littoral regions of the world, such as the Pacific, 
Atlantic, and Indonesian Archipelago will translate for what security concerns the Arctic 
region can expect in the future. 
C. RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY  
The following are recommended topics for future study in areas that would 
enhance preparations for operating in the Arctic. These topics have been excluded from 
this thesis, as each would require in-depth research that cannot be justifiably captured 
here. The importance of these topics is complementary to developing an Arctic capability 
and consideration would greatly enhance mission and exercise planners. They include: 
• Arctic littoral operations and equipment. By transposing current and 
historic issues from other littoral regions of the world it is possible to see 
probable scenarios, which might arise in the Arctic. Combining these 
scenarios with the Arctic geophysical environment will show what 
preparations must be done to meet future littoral challenges in the Arctic. 
• Unresolved issues with navigation and communication capabilities in the 
Arctic. 
• Arctic-specific SOF war gaming. A tabletop exercise or war game—using 
the vignettes in this thesis—could be valuable in retrieving additional 
information on military (SOF) operations in the Arctic. The vignettes and 
scenarios from this thesis could be used by any military command that is 
involved in the Arctic.  
This study only explores a fragment of the changing Arctic. This study shows that 
the Artic is truly unique; not only in its geophysical character, but also in the rate the 
Arctic environment is changing, both physically and politically. While projecting current 
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capabilities into the Arctic is not a viable approach, this study suggests that by combining 
prognoses for the Arctic with lessons learned—also outside of the Arctic—allows the 
future military, to include SOF, to meet this changing and uncertain Arctic future. 
Therefore, this study is mostly an initial attempt to focus on the Arctic in all its vastness 
and set the stage for security cooperation in this important region. 
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APPENDIX A.  FUTURE ARCTIC WEATHER 
A. GEOPHYSICAL CHANGE 
This is a meta-study, creating an independent foundation for one of the pillars in 
this study, geophysical change, which together with the segment on the geopolitical 
environment delineates the strategic ramifications while trying to avoid biased 
conclusions and “climate governance.”401 This section also elaborates on certain 
meteorological conditions and metrics emphasizing the importance of preparing to 
operate in the Arctic environment. 
1. Climate Change 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the Arctic has received increased and significant 
political attention the last few years. The reason for this unprecedented devotion is the 
likelihood that climate change will expose abundant natural resources. It is, however, not 
merely a question of the Arctic nations securing their rights to underground resources; 
rather, it is also about opening sea routes and maintaining homeland security. These 
issues are geographically tied to the Arctic and the littoral nations; however, this is a 
problem of global significance that cannot be restricted to any one region. There are 
prognoses predicting flooding of low-lying coastal regions with disastrous consequences 
for the people living in these areas; causing millions of people to flee and seek higher 
ground.402 Bangladesh is considered one of the areas most sensitive to global warming. 
There is, however, no need to look that far to find other “climate refugees.” The 
Guardian announced, in a recent report, that citizens in the Alaskan village of Newtok as 
“America’s first climate refugees.”403 However, it is not only the citizens of Newtok that 
401 Louise van Schaijk, Transnational Governance and Democratic Legitimacy: The Case of Climate 
Change (The Hague, Netherlands: Clingendael, July 2014), 23. 
402 The World Bank, “Warming Climate to Hit Bangladesh Hard with Sea Level Rise, More Floods 
and Cyclones, World Bank Report Says,” Press Release, June 19, 2013, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/06/19/warming-climate-to-hit-bangladesh-hard-
with-sea-level-rise-more-floods-and-cyclones-world-bank-report-says.  




                                                 
fear losing their homes to erosion. In March 2009, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
released a study on the effects of erosion in Alaska.  
178 Alaska communities were found to have reported erosion problems. 
After subsequent investigation, the Corps designated 26 communities 
“Priority Action Communities”—indicating that they should be considered 
for immediate action by either initiating an evaluation of potential 
solutions or continuing with ongoing efforts to manage erosion.404 
The consequences of climate change are many and have global significance.  
Military planners need reliable information about the weather. History shows that 
weather can mean the difference between mission launch, cancellation, or delay and 
ultimately the difference between failure and success. Knowledge about the weather is an 
integral part of military mission planning. The current research focuses exclusively on 
climate change, and does not answer the question: “What will the future weather be like 
in the Arctic?” This analysis on Arctic climate change is a meta-study providing insight 
to that question. Furthermore, existing studies and international panels contributing to 
research on climate change have previously been under investigation for legitimacy and 
reliability. “International governance of climate change has been referred to as a wicked 
problem.… The legitimacy of key institutions governing different aspects of climate 
change policy has been contested.”405 Experts still disagree on when sea routes will be 
“ice-free.” This is a “moot point. What is important is the lanes [and Arctic resource 
exploitation] will be of great economic significance.”406 Not only is the science of 
climate change complex and contested, the assessments may be politically negotiated, 
possibly undermining their credibility.407 This requires an independent study as the 
foundation for the analysis of SOF in the Arctic. While realizing a specific forecast is not 
possible this study points out characteristics of cloud ceiling and meteorological 
404 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Alaska Baseline Erosion Assessment,” Alaska District, U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, March 2009, ES1, 
http://www.climatechange.alaska.gov/docs/iaw_USACE_erosion_rpt.pdf.   
405 Van Schaijk, Transnational Governance and Democratic Legitimacy: The Case of Climate 
Change, 23. 
406 Kraska, Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change, 138. 
407 Van Schaijk, Transnational Governance and Democratic Legitimacy, 26. 
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visibility. The outset of the weather study is based on data from 2007 and 2012. These 
two years represent low points in recent Arctic ice concentration. The back wall of the 
study is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC-AR5) climate model, 
which predicts an ice-free Arctic Ocean by 2050. By using these anchor points, and 
applying quantitative data analysis, the study lays out seasonal probabilities for various 
meteorological metrics. In other words, this study provides insight to the question: “What 
will the future weather be like in the Arctic?” Before attempting to predict the future, it is 
necessary to establish a historical foundation.  
a. Climatic Background 
The Arctic is highly sensitive to temperature fluctuations,408 and changes in 
climate manifest quickly in Polar Regions. As a result, the poles are good predictors as to 
what will happen in other regions of the world and have been the focal points for 
scientists attempting to forecast what is likely to happen globally.  
b. Paleo-Climatic Studies 
Two things are primarily connected to changes in sea level: melting of ice and the 
temperature of the ocean.409 A historical study, using paleo-reconstruction, provides 
quantitative measures, which give an indication of how the climate once was. By using 
historical data, it is possible to conclude if recent events are indeed a significant change 
compared to previous centuries (Figure 17).  
408 Haiyan Teng, Gerald M. Warren, A. Meehl, Lawrence Buja, and Gary Strand, “Twenty-first 
Century Arctic Climate Change in the CCSM3 IPCC, Scenario Simulations,” Climate Dynamics (January 
2006): 601.  
409 Aslak Grinsted, J. C. Moore, and S. Jevrejeva, “Reconstructing Sea Level from Paleo and 





                                                 
 
Figure 17.  Sea level from 200‒2000 AD.410 
Aslak Grinsted, J.C. Moore, and S. Jevrejeva continue to conclude that the rise in 
sea level is associated with the melting of the continental ice sheets. Furthermore, the 
likely future rise in sea level far exceeds anything experienced in the past 2000 years (see 
Figure 17). John E. Walsh, James E. Overland, Pavel Groisman, and Bruno Rudolf411 
conducted a similar study, also focusing on paleo-climatic data samples from lake 
sediment, pollen records, diatoms, and tree rings, in order to reconstruct pan-arctic 
summer temperatures for the past 2000 years.  
As Figure 18 shows, over the past approximately 2000 years, the Arctic 
experienced a relatively stable temperature with a modest cooling trend of approximately 
410 Grinsted, Moore, and Jevrejeva, “Reconstructing Sea Level from Paleo and Projected 
Temperatures 200 to 2100 AD.” 
411 John E. Walsh, James E. Overland, Pavel Y. Groisman, and Bruno Rudolf, “Ongoing Climate 
Change in the Arctic,” Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (2012), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3357778/pdf/13280_2011_Article_211.pdf. 
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0.3 degrees Celsius. This changed in the twentieth century, with the appearance of a 
significant warming trend. 
 
Figure 18.  Cooling trend in the Arctic reversed in recent decades.412 
From these rather large-scale studies at sea level, a shift in focus to the vertical 
layers of the lower atmosphere above the Arctic shows how temperature has changed in 
the past 100 years. In a study,413 published in January 2012, Stefan Bronniman et al. 
encounter some anomalies in the early twentieth century data sets, particularly at the 700-
hPa isobar (approximately 10,000 feet above sea level, ASL) and above in winter periods. 
However, their analysis does clearly indicate a smaller lapse rate414 in the early part of 
the previous century, and Bronniman et al. are able to conclude that the lower 
troposphere did see significant warming in the past two decades. Figure 19 shows the 
data sets from the conclusion of the study. The graphs in the four figures represent 20-
year windows for different data sets for different seasonal, regional averages: a) 
European Arctic in winter; b) Western Siberian Arctic in spring; c) Pacific Arctic in 
summer; d) eastern Canadian Arctic in autumn. 
412 Grinsted, Moore, and Jevrejeva, “Reconstructing Sea Level from Paleo and Projected 
Temperatures 200 to 2100 AD,” 470. 
413 Stefan Bronniman, Andrea N. Gant, Gilbert P. Compo, Tracy Ewen, Thomas Greisser, Andreas M. 
Fischer, Martin Schraner, and Alexander Stickler, “A Multi-data Set Comparison of the Vertical Structure 
of Temperature Variability and Change over the Arctic during the Past 100 Years,” Climate Dynamics 39, 
no. 7 (January 2012). 
414 Standard lapse rate is a decrease in temperature of 2 degrees Celsius per 1000 feet. 
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 Figure 19.  Seasonal regional averages.415 
The conclusion from the data sets is that the last 20-year period (magenta) is 
notably warmer than the previous 100 years, and the warming occurs in the lower 
troposphere. In fact, the graphs not only indicate a smaller lapse rate above 10,000 feet 
ASL in the earlier years, there actually seems to be a temperature inversion in the higher 
layers in the early part of the century. This seems unlikely and may be attributed to the 
uncertainty of the earliest data as mentioned above. It is also worth noting that—as the 
study concludes—because warming only takes place in the lower levels, it increases 
atmospheric instability,416 possibly causing more adverse weather with larger amounts of 
precipitation in the Arctic.  
So far, the reviewed studies provide clear indications that the latest temperature 
changes are unique. Not just in modern times, but also from a 2000-year perspective. 
This conclusion creates a foundation for the next section in this appendix, which reviews 
more current observations and prognoses.  
415 Bronniman, et al., “A Multi-data Set Comparison of the Vertical Structure of Temperature 
Variability and Change over the Arctic during the Past 100 Years,” 43  
416 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Naval Arctic Manual (ATP 17(D)), 2-1. 
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Up to now, surface melting has been the topic of discussion; however, this is not 
the only aspect worth considering. Changes in Arctic geophysical properties have caused 
intrusion of warm Pacific and Atlantic seawater. J. S. Turner studied “the advance of an 
anomalously warm tongue of Atlantic water intruding across the Arctic below the 
halocline417 over the past few decades,”418 analyzing melting of the Arctic ice from 
below. Calculations in the study show that the heat in the Atlantic layer alone could melt 
1 meter of sea ice in 12 to 18 months, or all ice with a thickness of 2.5 meters in 4 years, 
if this heat was able to reach the surface in said periods.419 This conclusion is another 
indication that the Arctic is an intricate and balanced system of many mechanisms. Some 
of these mechanisms are changing, however, to what degree is not yet fully understood.   
Simulation is used to gain additional understanding of how the various 
mechanisms of the Arctic climate interact. The Community Climate System Model 3 
(CCSM3) integrates four components: the atmosphere, ocean, sea ice, and land surface, 
“linked through a coupler that exchanges fluxes and state information among these 
components.”420 Haiyan Teng et al.421 use the CCSM3 to analyze the arctic climate 
change through scenario simulations. Using full spatial patterns, they create a variance of 
models to understand what dominating factors prevail. Though not the primary focus of 
this paper, it is worth mentioning that this study involves the specific impact of changes 
in sea level pressure, greenhouse gases, and temperature change. The outcomes of the 
different scenarios vary greatly. The chosen model predicts a decline in sea-ice in winter 
of 1.4 percent to 3.9 percent, and 4.8 percent to 22.2 percent in the summer per decade. 
This leads to two conclusions. First, though using state-of-the-art simulation software (at 
417 The vertical zone in the oceanic water column in which salinity changes rapidly with depth. 
418 J. S. Turner, “The Melting of Ice in the Arctic Ocean: The Influence of Double-Diffusive 
Transport of Heat from Below,” Journal of Physical Oceanography 40, no. 1 (January 2010): 249‒256.  
419 Ibid. 
420 “The Community Climate System Model version 3 (CCSM3),” Journal of Climate 19 (2005), 
www.Journals.ametsoc.org.  
421 Teng, et al., “Twenty-first Century Arctic Climate Change in the CCSM3 IPCC Scenario 
Simulations,” 604. 
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the time), there is still a great deal of variance between the models applied.422 Second, it 
is also clear that the greatest changes occur in the summer. A speculation from this would 
be if the winter decay were less than summer decay, the remaining ice in the arctic would 
have become younger and younger. In the conclusion of their study, Teng et al. settle on 
the “A2-model.” This model predicts the Arctic to become ice-free by the end of the 
twenty-first century.  
In a study from winter 2008, Mark Serreze re-evaluates the IPCC423 report, 
focusing on the human impact on climate change. The conclusion is that reality seems to 
be 30 years ahead of previous prognoses.424 This would move the ice-free Arctic forward 
to approximately 2070. In 2009, Muyin Wang and James Overland conducted an analysis 
based on six IPCC models. By applying observational constraints into the IPCC models, 
it results in a prediction of a nearly sea-ice-free Arctic in September by 2037.425 This is a 
dramatic prediction compared to previous models. In 2011, CCSM released its latest 
report,426 CCSM4. In the selected model, the authors discuss the aforementioned values 
presented by Wang and Overland. However, the CCSM4 estimate is an ice-free Arctic in 
2070.427 Also worth noting, is the fact that the Arctic—based on the previously applied 
metric—will be reduced in size by 44 percent between 2005‒2100.  
Finally, a review of the conclusions regarding melting of the Arctic sea-ice from 
the latest IPCC report, released September 2013.428 It contains elements from several of 
422 Using exponential decay, 4.8 percent only results in a 35 percent overall reduction of the Arctic 
sea-ice at the end of the twenty-first century, whereas a 22.2 percent reduction per decade results in the 
Arctic being ice-free in 2080. These are significantly different prognoses. 
423 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report in 2007 (IPCC AR-4). 
424 Mark C. Serreze, “Arctic Climate Change: Where Reality Exceeds Expectations,” Witness the 
Arctic 13, no. 1, (Winter 2008/2009). 
425 Muyin Wang and James E. Overland, “A Sea Ice Free Summer Arctic within 30 Years?” Geophysical 
Research Letters 36 (2009): 200, doi:10.1029/2009GL037820. 
426 “Twenty-first-Century Arctic Climate Change in CCSM4,” 25. 
427 Ibid., 27. 
428 IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. T. F.D. Stocker et al. 
(Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, in press). 
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the sources used in this paper and is considered the most elaborate study in this review. 
The report settles on a more pessimistic trend compared to the previous IPCC models.  
Among the five selected models, four project nearly ice-free Arctic Ocean 
in September (sea ice extent less than 1*10^6 km^2 for at least five years) 
before 2050 … the earliest and latest years of near disappearance of the 
sea ice pack being ~2040 and ~2060, respectively.429 
c. Summary and Conclusion on Climatic Background 
The section on climatic background provides a review of select and representative 
research on the Arctic. The resources for this are plentiful and far from exhausted. There 
are more mechanisms, or contributing factors, to consider when discussing the 
geophysical future for the Arctic than presented in this paper. However, the research 
unanimously indicated an obvious trend for the Arctic climate. Furthermore, identifying 
the individual mechanisms which contribute to melting of the ice is beyond the scope of 
this analysis. Moreover, how these mechanisms interact and contribute to melting of the 
Arctic ice is still a major challenge for scientists to understand. This review only creates 
an understanding of some of the variables that are at play in order to answer two 
questions: Will the Arctic sea become ice-free? If so, when will it happen? No matter 
what the specific reasons are going to be, the research shows—from a 2000-year 
perspective—that the ongoing events in the Arctic are unique. The future trend is equally 
clear: the ice in the Arctic Sea will seasonally melt. “The unresolved question regard[ing] 
when this new arctic state will be realized, how rapid the transition will be, and what will 
be the impact of this new state on the Arctic and the rest of the globe.”430 The latest IPCC 
report comprises elements from several of the other studies in this paper and answers 
some of Serreze’s questions.  
429B. Kirtman, et al., “Near-term Climate Change: Projections and Predictability,” in Climate Change 
2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  ed. T. F.D. Stocker et al. (Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, in press), 11‒37. 
430 Mark C. Serreze, Marika M. Holland, and Julienne Stroeve, “Perspectives on the Arctic’s 
Shrinking Sea-Ice,” Science, New Series 315, no. 5818 (March 2007): 1533‒1536. 
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Predictions of an ice-free Arctic range from 2037431 to 2100.432 The CCSM 
predictions changed with the advent of the CCSM4 report in 2011, where the ice-free 
summer Arctic was set to arrive in 2070. The latest IPCC report (September 2013) 
predicts an Arctic Ocean where the ice has nearly disappeared by 2050. Considering that 
this is the most recent and elaborate report, and the fact that it also represents an 
approximate mean value of the various prognoses, 2050 is the adopted prediction for this 
study.  
2. Future Arctic Weather 
By looking at the correlation between Arctic sea ice and the weather, in particular 
cloud cover and cloud type, and examining historical records, several factors were 
eliminated that would otherwise influence this analysis and complicate the model.  
a. Assumptions 
Models are systematic simplifications of real-world intricacies that allow a 
problem to be more easily solved. In order to create a useful model, it is necessary to base 
the model on assumptions and account for the effects of these assumptions when drawing 
conclusions from the analysis. It is thus necessary to adopt the following simplifying 
assumptions to make the model mathematically tractable: 
1. Based on the section about climatic background it is safe to assume that 
the Arctic sea ice will continue to melt. Hence, this trend, as identified in 
the climate studies, can be used to predict a future ‘ground truth,’ and 
make predictions how the weather will influence tactical mobility in the 
Arctic.  
2. A correlation exists between wind, cloud type distribution and ceiling, 
temperature, humidity, and atmospheric pressure in the Arctic as well as 
most other places on earth. 
431 Wang and Overland, “A Sea Ice Free Summer Arctic within 30 Years?”  
432 “The Community Climate System Model version 3 (CCSM3).”  
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b. Sea Ice versus Cloud Analysis 
Scientists analyze how various aspects of climate change affect the changing 
Arctic SIC. By studying the correlation between several climatic particulars, scientists 
attempt to establish prognoses that predict what the Arctic SIC will be in the future. 
These geophysical climate studies have strategic impact on the evolving geopolitical 
environment in the Arctic. Table 3 is an example of a quite comprehensive regression 
analysis from a study on how to make long-range SIC forecasts. 
Table 3.   R and R2 obtained when performing linear regression between our 
prediction (SIC in October in the Beaufort Sea) and the August values 
of the listed variables (two-month lead time). The variables are 
ranked by their R2 values (highest R2 listed first).433 
 
 
Noting that Megan Stone is trying to predict SIC in October, it seems logical that 
the closer the data (in this case August) is to the desired timeframe, the stronger the 
correlation will be. However, it is not that simple, and not completely linear, as many 
variables are in play. For instance, the equivalent September SIC Beaufort Sea (BS) R2 is 
433 Table description and values are from Megan Stone, “Long-Range Forecasting of Arctic Sea Ice” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 57. 
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lower (0.5486) than the August value in the Table 3.434 The R2 SIC BS spans from 
0.2523 in May to 0.5678 in August. Although inconsistent, the table gives an indication 
of the variables that are considered when trying to forecast SIC and to what extent these 
variables correlate with SIC. 
Scientists have also researched the impact of clouds (Eastman435 and Sato436) on 
the Arctic SIC. By reversing this approach and trying to predict what the clouds and the 
meteorological conditions will be depending on the SIC, it is possible to use the sea ice 
forecast, or even a satellite picture of SIC, to provide near-future operational insight into 
what the weather will be in the Arctic.  
By using a simple linear regression model, it is possible to describe the correlation 
between selected variables. By calculating the correlation coefficient (R), the coefficient 
of determination (R2), and the p-value, it is possible to test the strength of the regression. 
In other words, this provides an indication as to what extent the model explains the 
meteorological conditions relating to the chosen variables, cloud cover versus SIC. 
In his study from 2009, Ryan Eastman concludes that:  
This shrinking ice cover has been accompanied by an increase in surface 
temperature of almost 0.5 degrees C per decade from 1979 through 2003 
as observed by the International Arctic Buoy Program (Rigor et al. 2000) 
… ~40 % of the Arctic warming was due to cloud changes resulting from 
warming….437 The Arctic region is shown to be a very cloudy region with 
an average around 70%438 cloud cover. Clouds are more prevalent over 
oceanic regions of the Arctic. A pronounced yearly cycle of cloud cover 
exist over the ‘High Arctic.’… This pattern is not entirely latitude-
dependent, but instead appears to be geographically based upon the sea ice 
and the colder, continental regions within the Arctic…. Overall, 
434 Ibid., 58. 
435 Ryan Eastman, “Inter-annual Variations of Arctic Cloud Types in Relation to Sea Ice” (master’s 
thesis, University of Washington, 2009). 
436 Sato et al., “Impact of Arctic Sea-Ice Retreat on the Recent Change in Cloud-Base Height during 
Autumn.” 
437 Eastman, “Inter-annual Variations of Arctic Cloud Types in Relation to Sea Ice,” 1. 
438 For aviation purposes a cloud ceiling is a cloud cover equal or greater than five octas (5/8) = 
62.6% cloud cover. For more information on meteorological practices see International Civil Aviation 
Organization, Manual of Aeronautical Meteorological Practice (Doc 8898 AN/893) (Quebec: ICAO, 9th 
edition, 2011), 2‒17. 
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relationships between ice, temperature and clouds indicate that cloud 
trends may enhance the warming of the Arctic and may be acting to 
accelerate the decline of Arctic sea ice.439 
From Eastman’s aforementioned conclusion, the following is extracted: The 
Arctic is a cloudy region with very a pronounced yearly cycle of cloud cover (Figure 20). 
Clouds are more prevalent over oceanic regions of the Arctic. This pattern is not entirely 
latitude dependent, but instead appears to be geographically based upon the sea ice; 
therefore, studying SIC should provide insight pertaining to clouds in the Arctic as well. 
Finally, relationships between ice, temperature, and clouds may affect the melting of the 
sea ice. It is the correlation between the variables (sea ice and clouds), as laid out by 
Eastman, which will be the subject of the regression analysis. This is a very simple task, 
but if it is possible to prove a strong correlation between the independent variables, it will 
be a very powerful tool for operational planning. For illustrative purposes, comparing 
Stone,440 the seasonal cycle of SIC BS to the cloud cover seasonal cycle, and 
Eastman,441 in Figure 20 and Figure 21, a negative correlation appears to exist between 
SIC and cloud cover. 
439 Eastman, “Inter-annual Variations of Arctic Cloud Types in Relation to Sea Ice,” 70‒71. 
440 Stone, “Long-range Forecasting of Arctic Sea Ice,” 2010. 
441 Eastman, “Inter-annual Variations of Arctic Cloud Types in Relation to Sea Ice. 
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Figure 20.  LTM seasonal cycle of SIC in the Beaufort Sea based on data from 
January 1979 to December 2007. SIC is at a minimum in 
August‒October as the Beaufort Sea transitions from conditions 
favorable for melting to conditions favorable for freezing.442 
442 Stone, “Long-range Forecasting of Arctic Sea Ice,” 30. 
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Figure 21.  Annual cycles of cloud cover by latitude band. a) Annual cycles of 
total cloud cover within 10˚ latitude bands in the Arctic; b) Annual 
cycles of stratiform cloud cover within the same latitude bands.443  
It is also evident that by comparing the percent “Low stratiform cloud cover 
amount percent” in Figure 21 (b) to the total cloud cover (a), the majority of the total 
clouds are low stratiform clouds.444 Hence, calculating the August 800 ‒900 N, which 
corresponds to a total cloud amount 87 percent, yield the following: 
August stratiform cloud amount: 66 percent 
Total Cloud amount: 87 percent 
Therefore: 
 
Approximately 76 percent of the total cloud cover is low stratiform clouds. 
443 Eastman, “Inter-annual Variations of Arctic Cloud Types in Relation to Sea Ice,” 22. 
444 A stratiform cloud is in the category of low clouds (see Figure 25) and often has great impact on the 
ability to conduct airmobile operations because of low ceiling and poor visibility. 
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September 2007 and 2012 were low points in Arctic SIC. Realizing the Arctic sea 
ice is melting, the geophysical conditions in September may be good indictors of what 
the weather in the Arctic will be like to an increasing extent in the future. The graphs in 
Figures 20 and 21 may widen as the weather conditions change towards the “nearly ice 
free” predictions in the IPCC (AR5) report previously mentioned, bringing weather 
conditions from the lower Arctic up to higher latitudes in the future. This results in 
relatively greater cloud cover in the high Arctic, particularly from January to April and 
October through December. Based on the hypothesis that there is in fact a correlation 
between sea ice and cloud cover, the impact on cloud cover from receding sea ice should 
be greatest in September. Calculating a single regression—between annual total cloud 
cover using data extracted from Figure 21 and SIC seasonal cycle using data from Figure 
20—provides operational insight into the tactical (geophysical) conditions in the Arctic. 
Figure 22 shows the plots from the regression data. In short, by performing a simple 
meta-analysis on existing climate studies (in this case, those done by Stone and Eastman), 
insight is obtained that defines tactical requirements towards applications of military 
assets in the Arctic. This in turn affects the means available for a viable Arctic security 
strategy. The regression statistics are derived from Table 4 and included in Table 5. From 
the tables, it is clear that there is a strong relationship between cloud cover and sea ice. In 
fact, the change in SIC explains 78 percent of the change in total cloud cover (Table 6).  
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Table 4.   Regression data. 
 
 






Figure 22.   Regression data and plots. 
Thus, by looking at the satellite imagery in Figure 23, it should not only be 
possible to get an idea how clouds and the weather in the Arctic has changed since the 
beginning of these observations in 1979, it should also be possible to make a prediction 
how cloud distribution will be when the ice continues to melt. 
 




Example (year 2015): hypothetical SIC of 0.2 in September 
Total cloud cover (percent) will be in the range of: 
 
445 The Cryosphere Today, “Compare Daily Sea Ice,” http://igloo.atmos.uiuc.edu/cgi-
bin/test/print.sh?fm=09&fd=15&fy=1979&sm=09&sd=15&sy=2012.  
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Table 6.   Total cloud cover, Lower (L) and Upper (U) in percent as a 
function of SIC. 
Model Lower Upper 
SIC 
fraction 
Cloud cover in  
percent (L) 
Cloud cover in % 
(U) 
1 40.93 75.39 
0.9 45.941 78.461 
0.8 50.952 81.532 
0.7 55.963 84.603 
0.6 60.974 87.674 
0.5 65.985 90.745 
0.4 70.996 93.816 
0.3 76.007 96.887 
0.2 81.018 99.958 
0.1 86.029 103.029 
0 91.04 106.1 
 
It is worth noting that he upper limit of the model predicts a total cloud amount of 
(U) 106.1 percent. Although Eastman does discuss a cloud cover totaling more than 100 
percent because of different types of layered clouds,446 this simple model does not 
incorporate that element, and the (U) model should be limited at 100 percent (Figure 24).  
 
Figure 24.   Total U and L cloud cover. 
446  Eastman, “Inter-annual Variations of Arctic Cloud Types in Relation to Sea Ice,” 21. 
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c. Application of Findings 
After analyzing significant elements of the geophysical environment in the Arctic, 
it is time to interpret the results. In other words, what does it mean when the majority of 
the sky is covered in stratus clouds? How does sea ice affect the military’s ability to 
operate in the region? There is more to the weather in the Arctic than clouds. Clouds are, 
however, a good indicator of some of the other relevant meteorological metrics. Eastman 
explains how stratiform clouds are the dominant type of cloud in the Arctic (76 percent of 
the total cloud cover, of about 87 percent, are stratus clouds),447 sometimes with a ceiling 
tapering down to the ground or surface in which case it becomes fog with a visibility 
below 1000 meters (or 5/8 statute mile).448 Another important cloud type Eastman 
discusses is Nimbus stratus (Ns). Ns is typically a widespread precipitating cloud with a 
large vertical extent.449 Eastman shows that Ns cloud amounts peak in spring and fall at 
approximately 20 percent.450 Given that Ns clouds are inherently widespread, this 
indicates that certain Arctic regions may experience poor weather conditions in the spring 
and fall, severely hampering military mobility. To get complete insight on the prevailing 
ceiling and visibility—along with other important metrics such as sea state and mobility 
over land (in the event that previously frozen tundra thaws)—in the Arctic region 
requires further analysis of meteorological data. This discussion is, however, sufficient to 
illustrate that the weather in the Arctic sets forth special requirements for tactical 
mobility in the Arctic region. Clouds will inevitably make it difficult for aviation 
operations due to low ceilings with poor visibility. Furthermore, there is a likely risk of 
encountering ice in the clouds if trying to mitigate adverse weather by attempting to 
447  Ibid., 20. 
448 NOAA, “Aviation Weather Center,” June 9, 2011, https://aviationweather.gov/static/help/taf-
decode.php.  
449 For more information on cloud classification, see American Meteorological Society, “Meteorology 
Glossary,” http://glossary.ametsoc.org/wiki/Nimbostratus.  
450 Eastman, “Inter-annual Variations of Arctic Cloud Types in Relation to Sea Ice,” 25. 
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climb above the lower cloud layers,451 which in itself could be difficult or impossible to 
accomplish due to Ns clouds and equipment limitations (Figure 25). 
 
Figure 25.  Cloud classification.452 
The Arctic is considered a hostile environment from a civilian aviation 
perspective.453 Commercial air traffic is driven to the Arctic for the same reasons behind 
current geopolitical changes in the Arctic—economic incentive; it is the shortest route 
across the Atlantic. There are specific regulations and manuals pertaining to North 
Atlantic operations, e.g., North Atlantic International General Aviation Operations 
Manual.454 Although the military does not always follow the same safety requirements as 
its civilian counterparts, specific training, planning, rehearsal, and equipment is 
paramount in order to prepare for the adverse and changing Arctic environment discussed 
451 This is a common contingency if encountering weather conditions unsuitable for flight under 
Visual Meteorological Conditions in aviation mission planning. See Headquarters of the Department of the 
Army, Army Regulation 95-1, 39 paragraph 5‒6. 
452 NOAA, “National Weather Service: Jetstream – Online School for Weather,” 
http://www.srh.noaa.gov/jetstream/clouds/images/cloudposter.jpg.   
453 JAA, “JAR-OPS 4 Subpart F, section 1,” 
http://www.jaa.nl/secured/Operations/Helicopters%20Archives/03HSC_Documents/Jan-
Feb02/Comparison%20between%20HELO%20HAGO%20and%20HSO%20(HSC%20Orlando).pdf.   
454 FAA, North Atlantic International General Aviation Operations Manual.  
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in the previous analysis. Once again, this is particularly important if attempting to 
successfully conduct missions operating in, and not just above, the Arctic. 
NATO ATP-17(D) Naval Arctic Manual was published during the time of writing 
this study. ATP-17(D) supports the findings in this study concerning the weather in the 
Arctic.  
The general character of cloud cover over the Arctic differs considerably 
from that considered typical foremost [sic] temperate regions…. The 
uniform and contourless stratus clouds … give to the Arctic its reputation 
of a dull and monotonous appearance ... the low stratus-type cloud 
constitutes from 70‒80 percent of all clouds observed.455  
Further, ATP-17(D) elaborates on some of the other meteorological metrics 
beyond this study and shows the importance of preparing to operate in the Arctic 
environment. ATP-17(D) also states how melting “in some cases, completely inhibits 
summer ground mobility…Less than five percent of the Arctic lands are covered with 
permanent ice….456 
The Arctic littoral have “distinctive processes at break-up or freeze of 
ice…. On coasts where the tidal range is considerable, boulder barricades 
are the most conspicuous sign of the action of sea ice. Typically there is a 
narrow string of boulders parallel to the shore and several hundred feet 
out. They represent navigational danger on the approach to many open 
beaches…. Thermal erosion may also produce glacier-like mud 
streams.457  
These conditions may inhibit conventional littoral operations. ATP-17 also states 
that “precipitation over most of the Arctic is very light and the annual amounts are so 
small that the region is classified as a desert based on annual precipitation.”458 Lack of 
precipitation is not the only commonalty between Arctic and desert environments; “the 
lack of contrast, particularly where all surface objects are covered with new snow, results 
in the inability to distinguish objects close at hand.”459 This seems relevant to all 
455 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Naval Arctic Manual (ATP 17(D)), 2‒10. 
456 Ibid., 1‒5. 
457 Ibid., 1‒8. 
458 Ibid., 2‒10. 
459 Ibid., 2‒9. 
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mobility assets, whether air, ground or naval. These white-out conditions are augmented 
by the uniformity460 of the Arctic; the lack of trees and other significant vegetation,461 
reducing visual cues, in turn hampering the ability to operate based on visual references 
in the same manner as in more temperate regions. This condition is referred to as “Arctic 
white-out.”462 In the summer months, at which time the Arctic is most accessible, 
precipitation may fall as freezing rain or freezing drizzle. While this may inhibit 
airmobile operations, this is reported as less than ten hours per year.463 Therefore, the 
primary concern for mobility seems to be the low clouds, with possibly associated icing, 
and poor visibility in fog along with periods where ground mobility is impossible on the 
tundra.  
Not only is the Arctic a unique and hazardous ice desert, the Arctic is primarily a 
maritime environment. “The single feature that makes the Arctic Ocean markedly 
different from most of the world’s oceans is the presence of a perennial sea ice.”464 The 
sea ice imposes restrictions on ships operating in the Arctic. This will affect what type of 
ships can be used for staging or basing of SOF or as mobility assets. “In the Arctic there 
are no generalizations that can be made about the occurrence of sea ice in relation to 
latitude … one of the most important forecasting problems is ice motion.”465 This is not 
only important for ships in the Arctic, remembering the correlations between sea ice and 
cloud cover, the uncertainty of sea ice conditions will affect forecasting of Arctic 
weather, in turn affecting ground, air, as well as naval forces, illustrating the uncertainty 
and hostility associated with operating in an Arctic environment. 
d. Conclusions and Recommendations: 
The single regression between annual total cloud cover and SIC seasonal cycle 
provides insight towards the weather in a future Arctic environment. This may shed light 
460 Ibid., 1‒5, 2‒9. 
461 Ibid., 1‒2. 
462 Ibid., 2‒10. 
463 Ibid., 2‒11. 
464 Ibid., 4‒1. 
465 Ibid., 4‒5. 
 175 
                                                 
on some of the uncertainty in forecasting Arctic weather. As shown in the model, the 
change in SIC explains 78 percent of the change in total cloud cover in the Arctic. 
Although there is more to the weather in the Arctic than just cloud cover and visibility—
as NATO ATP 17(D) outlines—it is a good indicator for other meteorological metrics. In 
order to avoid disaster in future Arctic military operations, planners, aviators and other 
mobility assets operating in a future Arctic environment should be aware of the specifics 
of the unique, hostile, and changing Arctic weather patterns. In short, ground mobility is 
likely inhibited in spring and summer months. Low clouds with reduced visibility and 
Arctic white-out conditions, as well as icing impose restrictions on air mobility. The 
unpredictability of sea ice forecasting influences how naval forces can operate in an 
Arctic environment, which is by all measures primarily maritime. However, as history 
has shown before, detailed knowledge of the weather and regional specifics can mean the 
difference between success and failure. Therefore, the forces going to operate in the 
Arctic must prepare accordingly. The Arctic is unique, whether it is viewed from a 
ground, air, or naval forces perspective. 
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APPENDIX B.  STRATEGIES OF THE ARCTIC FIVE (A5) 
This appendix will offer a summary of the Arctic strategies of the five Arctic 
littoral nations. The biggest takeaways of the individual strategies of the A5 are described 
in Chapter IV of the thesis. 
A. CANADA 
In 2009, Canada produced a specific Northern strategy titled “Our North, Our 
Heritage, Our Future,” aimed at promoting a prosperous and stable Arctic region.466 The 
Northern strategy clearly identifies the following four key pillars: 
1. Exercising our Arctic Sovereignty. 
2. Promoting Social and Economic Development. 
3. Protecting our Environmental Heritage. 
4. Improving and Devolving Northern Governance.467  
The strategy states that these four priorities are equally important and mutually 
reinforcing; however, there is a strong undertone of sovereignty throughout the entire 
document. The strategy calls for the continuation and expansion of the ability to protect 
and patrol the land, sea, and sky. Furthermore, Canada is pledging more “boots on the 
Arctic Tundra, more ships in the icy water, and a better eye-in-the-sky.”468 This is 
exemplified by ongoing efforts to procure new polar icebreakers and construct deep water 
berthing and fueling facilities.469 
In addition to military modernization focused on the Arctic, the Canadian strategy 
is also serious about social and economic development; specifically, Inuit and other 
Northern inhabitants, resource development, and stewardship. Canada is ensuring that the 
466 Department of National Defence, “Canada’s Northern Strategy,” Ottawa, 2009, 
http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns-eng.asp.  
467 Ibid., 2. 
468 Ibid., 9. 
469 Ibid., 10. 
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international drive for Arctic resources does not undermine improvements in quality of 
life for people of the North. Government resources are being strategically allocated to 
ensure Northern residents are poised to seize these unprecedented opportunities, while 
facilitating self-government agreements aimed at self-sufficiency.470   
Outside of its borders, Canada is eager to lead on the international Arctic stage, 
with a statement on Northern foreign policy focused on cooperation, diplomacy, and 
international law. Canada also plays a leading role in the Arctic Council, has ratified the 
UNCLOS, and is committed to the goals of the IMO. The published foreign policy lists 
four key efforts that are yet to be resolved and involve the International community: 
1. Engaging with neighbors to seek to resolve boundary issues. 
2. Securing international recognition for the full extent of our extended 
continental shelf. 
3. Addressing Arctic governance and related emerging issues, such as public 
safety. 
4. Creating the appropriate international conditions for sustainable 
development.471   
These directly relate to the primary potential friction points in the Arctic from a 
Canadian point of view. First, there is a dispute with the United States with respect to the 
NWP and Beaufort Sea boundary. Second, there is a dispute with Denmark in reference 
to the ownership of Hans Island (within the NWP). Finally, Canada has submitted a 
UNCLOS claim for an ECS, which conflicts with Russia’s ECS claim, and will likely 
overlap with future claims from Denmark and the United States. An ECS claim—
processed through the UNCLOS—potentially extends a state’s sovereign territory past 
the standard 200 nautical mile EEZ.472 Such claims are clearly tied to lucrative Arctic 
natural resources, and are therefore potential points of conflict. Canada intends to resolve 
470 Ibid., 4. 
471 Department of National Defence, “Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising 
Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad,” 2010, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/arctic-arctique/arctic_policy-canada-politique_arctique.aspx?lang=eng.  
472 Kathryn Isted, “Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes and Environmental 
Policy Considerations,” Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 18, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 343, 350. 
 178 
                                                 
these disputes with cooperation and diplomacy, always in line with international law. 
That being said, the foreign policy directive is quick to point out that Canada will “never 
waver in our commitment to protect our North,”473 providing a very clear strategic 
message to the International community on Canadian intentions.   
B. DENMARK 
The Kingdom of Denmark has produced a detailed Arctic strategy that is focused 
on its three realms: Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands.474 In order to prepare for 
the opportunities that are quickly opening in the Arctic, the strategy aims to reinforce the 
foundation for appropriate cooperation; specifically, it focuses on the 2011‒2020 time 
period. The Danish Arctic strategy explicitly outlines the following four key objectives: 
1. A peaceful, secure, and safe Arctic. 
2. Self-sustaining growth and development. 
3. Development with respect for the Arctic’s vulnerable climate, 
environment and nature. 
4. Close cooperation with our international partners.475 
These objectives speak to the overall tone of the strategy, which is one of peaceful 
cooperation and development. While similar to the Canadian strategy, there is notably 
less stress on sovereignty. Furthermore, it is void of the homeland security concerns that 
are central to the United States strategy.   
The first objective, a peaceful, secure, and safe Arctic, is central to the Danish 
strategy. Similar to Canada, Denmark views the UNCLOS as the international legal 
instrument that defines a state’s rights and responsibilities in the Arctic Ocean. Along 
with the other four Arctic littoral states, Denmark is planning to submit a claim for an 
ECS. This will likely conflict with claims from Canada, Norway, and Russia, creating 
473 Department of National Defence, Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising 
Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad. 
474 Kingdom of Denmark, "Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020,” http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-
site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomacy/Arktis_Rapport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.ashx.   
475 Ibid., 11. 
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potential friction points with each of these nations. The Danish strategy also mentions the 
disputed Hans Island, stressing the continued effort to arbitrate a peaceful outcome with 
Canada. As a testament to the Danish commitment towards Arctic cooperation, there is 
significant reference to the Ilulissat Declaration, the only nation to include this in its 
strategy. This is a landmark political declaration among the A5, stating that disputes will 
be handled responsibly and peacefully through negotiations.476   
While the Danish strategy does mention Arctic sovereignty, it focuses on NATO 
and cooperation with Arctic partners. With respect to military capabilities, the strategy 
identifies the need for an Arctic risk analysis, an initiative that will help Denmark shape 
their armed forces for Northern operations.477 The current military role in the Danish 
North is one of surveillance and presence, a posture that resembles that of Canada and 
Norway. There is no mention of potential Arctic military conflict in the strategy. 
Self-sustaining growth and development is the second theme in the Denmark 
Arctic Strategy. It stresses the necessity to fully realize the immense economic 
opportunities in the North, while ensuring the highest levels of accountability with 
respect to the environment and Northern communities. Furthermore, the Ilulissat 
Declaration pledges responsible cooperation and stewardship among the five littoral 
nations, ensuring that resource exploitation is conducted with high standards and 
sustainability. As part of the development initiative, the Danish strategy is the only one to 
discuss international trade and investment.478 Denmark considers Greenland a key node 
between the EU and U.S. economies, stating their intent to invest in additional Arctic 
infrastructure to facilitate increased trade. 
In summary, the Danish Arctic strategy is focused on a peaceful and secure North, 
self-sustainable development, and cooperation with Arctic partners. Potential friction 
points exist with Canada in terms of Hans Island. Further disputes are possible with 
Canada, Norway, and Russia, due to overlapping ECS claims. Finally, there is a potential 
476 Kingdom of Denmark, “Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020,” 14.  
477 Ibid., 20. 
478 Ibid., 34. 
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territorial claim in the Norwegian Sea, referred to as the “Banana Hole,” that may conflict 
with claims already submitted by Norway and possibly Iceland.479 However, “Denmark 
and Iceland submitted official statements to the United Nations stating that they did not 
object to Norway’s claim regarding the Banana Hole region. Unfortunately, the 
cooperative relations between these nations were not shared by Russia. In response to the 
Norwegian submission, Russia declared the region of the Barents Sea claimed by 
Norway, including the Loop Hole, to be a “maritime dispute pursuant to the 
Commission’s Rules of Procedure.”480 What this declared Russian dispute might result in 
is yet uncertain. “It is uncertain whether the Commission’s forthcoming decision [once 
Denmark and Iceland also files its claims] will bring finality to the disputed area between 
Norway and Russia [and maybe Denmark and Iceland] or if it will only add fuel to the 
fire.”481 
C. NORWAY 
The Norwegian Government’s “High North Strategy” was founded in the white 
paper Opportunities and Challenges in the North (Report No. 30 to the sorting 
(2004‒2005)).482 The strategic importance placed on the Arctic is evident in the 
extremely detailed Norwegian High North Strategy. The Norwegian government openly 
considers the “High North to be Norway’s most important strategic priority area in the 
years ahead.”483 There are seven key objectives identified by Norway: 
1. Exercise authority in the North in a credible, consistent, and predictable 
way. 
2. Be at the forefront of international efforts to develop knowledge in and 
about the High North. 
479 Isted, Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes and Environmental Policy 
Considerations, 362. 
480 Isted, Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes and Environmental Policy 
Considerations, 361. 
481 Ibid. 
482 Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Strategy for the High North,” December 1, 2006, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-action-and-plans/Action-plans-
and-programmes/2006/strategy-for-the-high-north.html?id=448697. 
483 Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Strategy for the High North,” 7.  
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3. Be the best steward of the environment and natural resources in the High 
North. 
4. Provide a suitable framework for further development of petroleum 
activities in the Barents Sea. 
5. Ensure High North Policy to play a role in safeguarding the livelihoods, 
traditions, and cultures of indigenous peoples in the High North. 
6. Continue to develop people-to-people cooperation in the High North. 
7. Strengthen cooperation with Russia. 
Of note, the document recognizes Norway’s relationship with Russia as strategic 
for success in Arctic issues. The document details consideration for an “economic and 
industrial cooperation zone” shared with Russia as a “laboratory for practical Norwegian-
Russian business cooperation in the north.”484 
The core tenet of the Norwegian strategy is to maintain an Arctic presence by 
exercising its sovereignty and authority in the High North.485 A whole-of-government 
approach is directed in the strategy, synchronizing efforts of the armed forces, police, the 
prosecuting authority, and the Coast Guard. Furthermore, Norway has already shifted a 
majority of its Army activities to the North, taking a leading role in Northern military 
operations and serving as a training area for allied forces.486 Not only is the overall 
strategic messaging of the strategy ambitious, Norway has quickly put their words into 
actions with a significant Northern presence. When compared to the rest of the A5, 
Norway has developed and implemented their High North strategy to the greatest degree. 
Norway further affirmed its sovereignty aspirations through a 250,000 square kilometer 
ECS claim under the authority of the UNCLOS, an action that is expected to overlap with 
claims from Denmark, Russia, and Iceland.487   
484 Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Strategy for the High North,” 6.  
485 Ibid., 7.  
486 Ibid., 20.  
487 Isted, Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes and Environmental Policy 
Considerations, 362. 
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The Norwegian Strategy speaks to cooperation; however, within its core 
objectives there is only mention of Russia. The strategy states that, “it is vital to maintain 
close bilateral relations with Russia, which is both a neighbor and the country with which 
we share the Barents Sea.”488 Norway is understandably taking a pragmatic view toward 
Russia, and recognizes that a number of its Norwegian challenges can only be rectified 
with strong cooperation. Surprisingly, there is little mention of the Arctic Council or 
other members of the A5. 
A testament to their High North leadership role, Norway’s strategy has a 
significant focus on knowledge generation and competence building. As a world leader in 
Polar research, Norway is actively pursuing to remain at the forefront of international 
efforts in Arctic research and development.489 This aspiration carries directly over to 
their motivation regarding natural resources and environmental stewardship. Norway is 
eager to open the potential of the High North and has a clear vision to ensure the 
prosperity of the population and protection of the environment in the process.  
In summary, Norway’s Arctic strategy is extensive, well defined, and aggressive. 
Norway has already extended a significant whole of government presence in the High 
North and is eagerly striving to be the leading nation in the Arctic. The Norwegians are 
actively protecting their sovereignty and will continue to cooperate—primarily with 
Russia—to solve remaining disputes.     
D. RUSSIA 
The Russian Federation has extensive interest in the Arctic and continues to 
aggressively posture itself for an increased presence. The following six objectives 
represent Russia’s key strategic priorities in the High North: 
1. Expansion of the resource base of the Arctic zone. 
2. Protection of the state border, and maintenance of a favorable operative 
regime, including the necessary fighting potential of the armed forces. 
488 Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Strategy for the High North,” 9. 
489 Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Strategy for the High North,” 9, 24. 
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3. Preservation and maintenance of environmental protection of the Arctic. 
4. Formation of a uniform information area in the Arctic zone. 
5. Maintenance of fundamental and applied scientific research and 
accumulation of knowledge. 
6. Maintenance of mutually advantageous bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation.490 
The Russian strategy is aggressive in terms of sovereignty, stating an “expansion” 
of its resource base as a key tenet. Russia was actually the first nation to submit an ECS 
claim through the UNCLOS, boldly claiming half the Arctic Ocean; roughly 1.2 million 
square kilometers, which is about the size of Texas California and Indiana combined.491 
While the remaining A5 members contested the claim—which is with the UN for 
review—this intrepid move sent a clear strategic message to the International community. 
First, Russia is serious about its Arctic sovereignty. Second, Russia is displaying a 
willingness to cooperate under the rule of international law, a testament to their pledge to 
the Ilulissat Declaration.   
Russia’s strategy is also focused on military capability and homeland security. It 
stresses combating terrorism, suppressing illicit activity, preventing illegal migration, and 
protecting the state borders.492 Russia already has a fleet of 18 Arctic capable 
icebreakers, and is actively pursuing means to further increase its stake in the High 
North.493 
Finally, similar to the other four littoral nations, Russia is striving to exploit the 
potential of Arctic resources, while strengthening its position as a leader in all forms of 
490 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the 
Period Till 2020 and for a further Perspective, 2009, http://www.arctic-
lio.com/docs/nsr/legislation/Policy_of_the_RF_in_the_Arctic.pdf. 
491 Isted, Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes and Environmental Policy 
Considerations, 359. 
492 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the 
Period Till 2020 and for a Further Perspective. 
493 Isted, Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes and Environmental Policy 
Considerations, 360. 
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Polar research. The Russians are seeking a reliable High North means of communication, 
and are setting the conditions for effective and safe navigation—both maritime and air. 
In summary, Russia has a huge stake in the Arctic and is aggressively attempting 
to increase its sovereign rights. It has a broad Arctic strategy that includes homeland 
security, resources, environmental protection, research and development, and a strong 
Northern military presence as described in Chapter III. Main points of potential conflict 
will likely refer to their extensive ECS claims and race for Arctic resources. 
E. THE UNITED STATES 
Until the 2013 U.S. “National Strategy for the Arctic Region, the United States 
had not made a statement relevant to the speed of geophysical changes taking place in the 
Arctic.494 However, all within one year, the United States produced a national strategy, a 
Department of Defense Strategy, as well as a U.S. Navy strategy, and a plan for 
implementation of each of the strategies. The U.S. national Arctic strategy is titled 
“National Strategy for the Arctic Region.” The U.S. Arctic strategy simply identifies the 
following three lines of effort: 
1. Advance United States’ Security Interests. 
2. Pursue Responsible Arctic Stewardship. 
3. Strengthen International Cooperation.495 
The strategy explains that the lines of effort will be approached by four guiding 
principles: 
• Safeguard Peace and Stability. 
• Make Decisions Using the Best Available Information. 
• Pursue Innovative Arrangements. 
• Consult and Coordinate with Alaska Natives.496  
494 The most official document for US involvement in the Arctic prior to the 2013 National Arctic 
Strategy was the Ilulissat Declaration, 2008.  
495 The White House, United States National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 2013, 2, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf.  
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The strategy places emphasis on environmental preservation and protection of 
resources; however, U.S. security and interests are the overarching goals. Intentions for 
employment of vessels and aircraft are expressed, with strong adherence to the UNCLOS 
and universally recognized laws of the seas. The strategy calls for the continued 
cooperation with international partnerships for enhanced security, which distributes 
responsibility across the members of the region. The newly accessible areas of the Arctic 
are recognized as an opportunity to chart areas previously inaccessible to science. The 
strategy articulates that such opportunities require consultation with local and indigenous 
organizations in the interest of proper stewardship. For a strategy pertaining to such a 
demanding environment as the Arctic, little reference is made to the U.S. materiel 
requirements for accomplishing its goals. However, the subsequent DOD, and Navy plan 
for implementation go into further detail on materiel necessary for accomplishing their 
goals, which are nested with the national strategy.  
The U.S. DOD published its strategy for the Arctic, nested with the National 
Strategy for the Arctic Region. This is noteworthy as it is the first time that the DOD has 
published a strategy for the High North. The Arctic strategy lists four elements through 
which the DOD “will help the United States achieve its objectives as outlined in the 
National Strategy for the Arctic Region …”497 
1. U.S. Interests in the Arctic. 
2. Department of Defense Supporting Objectives. 
• Ensure security, support safety, promote defense cooperation. 
• Prepare for a wide range of challenges and contingencies. 
3. Strategic Approach. 
4. Challenges and Risks to the Strategic Approach.498 
The means and ways described in the strategy imply that the role of security and 
defense forces is to collaborate for the protection of the ecosystem and reasonable 
496 Ibid., 2‒3.  
497 U.S. Department of Defense, “Arctic Strategy,” 14.  
498 Ibid. 
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strategic objectives of interested countries. The exercise of sovereignty and security of 
borders in the interest of resource refinement summarizes the tone of the DOD strategy. 
While remaining somewhat general, this strategy implies that under the urgency 
impressed upon Arctic states by newly accessible resources, the potential for conflict 
exists. However, the goal of the Department of Defense is to maintain the cooperation of 
the states involved and avoid militarization of the Arctic.499 The strategic approach 
mentioned is the combination of joint exercises to improve capability, as well as 
exercising sovereignty and protecting the freedom of the seas. International exercises, 
such as The NATO Exercise Cold Response in Norway, and Canada’s Operation 
Nanook, are international venues through which partnerships in security and defense are 
improved. Challenges and risks to the strategic approach include premature defense 
spending on material to negotiate the changing environment. As stated specifically, in the 
document, fiscal constraints do not allow room for unnecessary spending when 
capabilities can be borrowed from international partners. The possibility of 
unintentionally isolating allies through unilateral pursuit of capability is potential risk 
highlighted in the strategic approach. As a result, increased cooperation by way of 
sharing capabilities in order to maintain security in the Arctic is the aim of the U.S. DOD 
Arctic strategy. 
As the Department of Defense’s primary maritime component, the U.S. Navy has 
also published an Arctic strategy.500 Titled “U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap, 2013‒2014,” 
the document is more specific in nature, describing the guidelines that the Navy must 
abide in the DOD and national strategies, then its own specific goals with time frames for 
each. The time frames are given as near-term (present to 2020), mid-term (2020‒2030), 
and far-term (beyond 2030). Within each of the timeframes, navigability of the Arctic 
Ocean is the defining factor for the Navy’s required level of response.501 Additionally, 
this is the first official document that gives the strong economic incentives from 
499 Ibid., 1. 
500 United States Department of the Navy. U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap, 2013-2014. U.S. Navy, Task 
Force Climate Change, February 2014. http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/USN-Arctic-Roadmap-
2014.pdf 
501 Ibid., 12. 
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resources as a reason for defense and security involvement, not for the protection of 
resources, but for the reinforcement of laws on traffic and commerce in the region.502 
The Navy’s strategic objectives for the Arctic Region are listed as: 
1. Ensure the United States Arctic sovereignty and provide homeland 
defense. 
2. Provide ready naval forces to respond to crisis and contingencies. 
3. Preserve freedom of the seas. 
4. Promote partnerships within the [U.S.] Government and with international 
allies. 
The Navy Arctic Roadmap emphasizes the requirement for strong cooperative 
partnerships with interagency and international Arctic Region stakeholders.503 By 2030 
the Navy will be able to respond to “contingencies and emergencies” affecting national 
security.504 The Navy strategy explains that an increased reliability on U.S. Coast Guard, 
interagency, and international partners is essential for the continued levels of peace that 
currently characterize the Arctic. This reliability on other organizations is likely to 
compensate for the shortage of ice-capable vessels in the Navy’s inventory, as outlined in 
previous assessments.505 Overall, the Navy conveys a tone of capability that is correlated 
with the need for response. Currently, the need for response seems low; therefore, a 
combined effort shared with international partners is sufficient for security of U.S. 
interests in the Arctic. 
The most recent document created by the United States is the “Implementation 
Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region” (2014). The plan does not include 
drastically different objectives from the national strategy, as much as it embodies its 
namesake: a plan by which the United States can achieve its goals for the Arctic. This is a 
502 Ibid., 13. 
503 Ibid., 19. 
504 Ibid., 18. 
505 Theme of the primary findings states that the U.S. Navy is characterized by an inability to operate 




                                                 
very specific document that identifies objectives, steps to take in order to reach those 
objectives, timelines for completion, and metrics by which to measure progress with the 
lead Agency for each objective.506 Just as the other strategic documents do, the plan 
follows the national strategy’s three lines of effort: 
1. Advance U.S. Security Interests. 
2. Pursue Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship. 
3. Strengthen International Cooperation.507 
The plan begins with the steps for advancing U.S. security interests, focusing on 
maritime, aviation, and communication. The underlying reason for the advancement of 
these fields is the increased activity anticipated in response to increased resource 
availability.508 Interestingly, several of the agencies placed in the lead for these 
objectives are not traditionally associated with the defense and security industry. For 
example, the U.S. Department of Transportation is the lead agency charged with 
sustaining aviation requirements for the Arctic, with the DOD in support. This is 
interesting because the Department of Transportation is not usually associated with a 
capability to develop infrastructure in extreme environments, nor has it been known to 
undertake such an ambitious project. Several Agencies are named with responsibilities in 
the implementation plan, including the Department of State, DOD, Department of 
Transportation, and Department of Homeland Security, among others.509 This document 
illustrates the interagency approach that the United States is taking to accomplish its 
goals among multiple agencies for the Arctic. 
The geographic relationship between the United States and Canada is significant 
when it comes to challenges in the Arctic. Alaska is the only landmass of the United 
States that exists within the Arctic Circle, and is separated from the United States by 
506 United States, “Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/implementation_plan_for_the_national_strategy_for_th
e_arctic_region_-_fi....pdf. 
507 Ibid., 1. 
508 Ibid., 5  
509 Ibid. 
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Canada. Canada is situated between the Arctic, Alaska, and the lower 48 U.S. states. As 
such, the United States shares interests and responsibilities with Canada for security and 
stewardship of the High North. However, the virtue of proximity to the Arctic Circle 
places a strategic importance on the U.S.-Canadian relationship to work together in the 
interest of defense and security of North America.510 
In summary, the United States has compiled a comprehensive list of strategic 
documents regarding U.S. interests and security concerns in the Arctic, each with detailed 
language and considerations for the region. However, the inclusion of USSOF and 
planning considerations for the employment of USSOF in the Arctic are not mentioned. 
This is likely an effort to avoid the stigma that comes with USSOF affiliation and 
politically sensitive regions. Additionally, for classification and security reasons, 
USSOCOM does not publish the operational strategies of its force. As a leading unit for 
national security and defense operations, it is assumed that the USSOCOM strategies are 
succinctly nested within the U.S. National and Department of Defense Arctic strategies, 
and most likely coincides with the U.S. Navy Strategy in the Arctic. 
510 Donna Miles, “U.S., Canada Expand Arctic Cooperation, Military Training,” American Forces 
Press Services, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118768. 
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APPENDIX C.  USE OF GAME THEORY ON THREE CURRENT 
ARCTIC CONFLICTS 
Although the likelihood of armed conflict in the Arctic is considered very low, 
there are numerous unsettled issues such as unresolved boundary disputes and lingering 
sovereignty questions regarding key Arctic waterways. The most prominent conflicts in 
this perspective are: (1) Canada versus the United States with respect to the NWP and 
Beaufort Sea boundary; (2) Canada versus Denmark reference the ownership of Hans 
Island; (3) Denmark, Norway, and Iceland over a territorial claim in the Norwegian Sea; 
and (4) Russia and the other Arctic littoral states concerning their overlapping ECS 
claims.  
B. THE CONFLICTS 
This study applies game theory to ongoing disputes in the Arctic in order to gain 
insight into the conflicts and predict future likely outcomes. Several disputes in the Arctic 
seem interesting from a game theory perspective. First by examining the overlapping 
ECS claims between Russia, Denmark, and Canada, a game between Russia and NATO 
emerges. The second possible game analyzes Canada versus the United States, where the 
classification of the NWP is under dispute. The third and final game presents an analysis 
of Hans Island, which is claimed by both Canada and Denmark.  
In order to limit the extent of this study, only the complete study of the Russia-
NATO game is included. For the other games only a background description, a 
description of the game, and the conclusion are provided in order to show the premises 
and relevance of the game. The structure of the full analysis is as follows: each analysis 
begins with a brief background, explaining the strategic security environment and the 
core assumptions used in the game. Next, the game is presented using ordinal rankings, 
with four possible outcomes and explanations of what these outcomes mean to each 
player. The strategic moves available to each player are then discussed, outlining the 
difference in the game with and without communications. Interval scaling will then be 
applied to gain insight into the values of the different outcomes, and the strategic position 
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for each player. The final step involves determining the Nash fair point, which is then 
used to explain the real-world possibilities that are concluded from the game. The aim is 
to offer a quantitative analysis that can be used to assess the three aforementioned 
disputes, providing a perspective that contributes to a comprehensive multi-disciplinary 
approach. 
C. GAME 1: RUSSIA/NATO 
Another ongoing Arctic dispute is the claim of the Lomonosov Ridge. This 
underwater ridge of continental crust in the Arctic Ocean spans 1800 km from the New 
Siberian Islands, over the central part of the Arctic Ocean, to Ellesmere Island of the 
Canadian Arctic Archipelago. The geological structure of the ridge attracted international 
attention due to a December 20, 2001, official submission by the Russian Federation to 
the UNCLCS, in accordance with the UNCLOS. The document proposed establishing 
new outer limits for the Russian continental shelf, beyond the previous 200-mile EEZ, 
but within the Russian Arctic sector. The territory claimed by Russia in the submission is 
a large portion of the Arctic, extending all the way to the North Pole. The Russians 
contend that both the underwater Lomonosov Ridge and the Mendeleev Ridge are 
extensions of the Eurasian continent. In 2002, the UN Commission neither rejected nor 
accepted the Russian proposal, recommending additional research. There is much at 
stake, as the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources has stated that the Russian region of 
the Arctic contains approximately 80 billion tons of hydrocarbons. If the Lomonosov 
Ridge claim is successful, the Russian share will increase by at least 10 billion tons. 
Both Denmark and Canada are claimants of these same ridges. Danish scientists 
hope to prove that the ridge is an extension of Greenland, and Canada asserts that the 
ridge is an extension of its continental shelf. If the UN is unable to solve this claim 
through UNCLOS, with Denmark and Canada both part of NATO, this could potentially 
end up in a conflict between Russia and NATO. 
1. The Game 
The setup of this game starts with the identification of the two parties involved. 
For this conflict there is Russia as the column player and NATO as the row player 
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(Figure 26). As four out of the five Arctic council members are also members of NATO, 
potential armed conflicts will likely involve the alliance, with Russia as a possible 
aggressor. Conflict in this game is defined as, ‘the willingness to use military force versus 
the preference for other options to solve the conflict.’ 
 
Figure 26.  NATO versus Russia. 
There are four possible results: 
AC – NATO and Russia are both willing to fight over this issue. 
AD – NATO is willing to fight over this issue and Russia is not. 
BC – NATO is not willing to fight over this issue; however, Russia is. 
BD – Neither NATO nor Russia is willing to fight over this issue, and they both look for 
a diplomatic solution. 
In order to understand this ‘game’ between Russia and NATO, and to be able to 
utilize this for further strategic analysis, a rank order with a 1‒4 scale is created (Table7). 
The different descriptions of best, next best, least best, and worst options, are based on 
five core assumptions: (1) both NATO and Russia are rational players; (2) both players 
try to maximize their outcomes; (3) Russia prefers to use military force rather than 
solving through other means; (4) Russia values its reputation as most important and is 
willing to fight over it; and (5) this is a partial conflict game. Table 7 outlines the four 
















Table 7.   Options for NATO and Russia ranked from best to worst (4 to 1). 
 NATO options Russia options 
4- Best option NATO is willing to fight over this 
conflict and Russia is not. 
Russia is prepared to fight over this 
conflict, and NATO, for various 
reasons, is not. This would be the 
ultimate victory for Russia. 
3– Next Best option NATO is not willing to fight over 
this conflict and neither is Russia. A 
diplomatic solution will be sought. 
Russia is not prepared to fight over 
this conflict, and neither is NATO. A 
diplomatic solution will be sought. 
2– Least Best option NATO is not prepared to fight over 
this conflict and will push for a 
diplomatic solution. However, 
Russia is prepared to fight. 
Russia is prepared to fight over this 
conflict and so is NATO. Costly in 
terms of resources but no loss of 
face.  
1– Worst option 
 
NATO is willing to fight over this 
conflict and so is Russia. 
Russia is not prepared to fight over 
this conflict; however, NATO is. 
This will result in loss of face for the 
Russians. 
 
What automatically follows from this ranking, and made visible in Figure 27, is 
the Nash equilibrium. This is the position from where both players cannot unilaterally 
improve.511 In this game, (2,4) is the Nash equilibrium, which is an interesting 
observation. Figure 27 also shows that Russia has a dominant strategy, and NATO does 
not. An analysis of the strategic moves available to each player is required to determine if 
a mutually preferred outcome is possible. 
511 Avinash K. Dixit, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and 
Everyday Life (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), 74. 
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Figure 27.  NATO versus Russia. 
2. Strategic Moves 
By doing a strategic moves analysis, one can determine if either player can 
change the outcome by either communicating, issuing a threat, and or a promise. The 
analysis will be conducted from both NATO and Russia’s perspective (Figure 27). 
From NATO perspective: 
NATO moves first:  
• If NATO does A, then Russia does C, which results in outcome AC with 
value (1,2). 
• If NATO does B, then Russia does C, which results in outcome BC with 
value (2,4). 
Regardless of what NATO does when moving first, Russia will maximize its 
outcome and prefers the military option. Therefore, NATO does not want to move first 
without issuing a threat and or promise. 
Force Russia moves first:  
• If Russia does C, then NATO does B, which results in outcome CB with 
value (2,4). 
• If Russia does D, then NATO does A, which results in outcome AD with 
value (4,1). 
If Russia moves first, it prefers option C. This is also Russia’s dominant strategy. 
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NATO issues a threat to Russia: 
NATO wants Russia to choose option D and therefore has to make a threat on C. 
• Threat: If Russia does C, NATO does A, resulting in AC with value (1,2). 
• Normally: If Russia does C, NATO does B, resulting in BC with value 
(2,4). The value of AC is worse for both players, so this is a credible threat 
and will eliminate option BC. However, this threat does not work by itself. 
NATO issues a promise to Russia:  
• Promise: If Russia does D, NATO does B, resulting in value (3,3). 
• Normally: If Russia does D, NATO does A, resulting in value (4,1). 
This is a promise, as it harms NATO and benefits Russia. This will eliminate 
option AD. 
It is not insightful to go through the strategic moves from Russia’s perspective, as 
we know Russia has a dominant strategy, and a first move to choose this strategy. 
In summary, Russia has a first move advantage and a dominant strategy for option 
C, solving the conflict using military means. In order to force another solution, NATO 
has to issue a threat on C, in combination with a promise on D. This will result in the 
preferred outcome BD.  
3. Interval Scaling 
An interval scaling allows one to reflect the weighted preference of options 
available to both NATO and Russia. Table 8 gives NATO’s options ranked and weighted.  
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Table 8.   Options available to NATO with assigned cardinal utilities. 
 NATO’s options 
10- Best  The best outcome for NATO would be that Russia is unable and/or unwilling 
to fight over this dispute, and that NATO is. This will solve this dispute in 
favor of NATO and strengthen the alliance. 
9 – Next Best The next best outcome is that there will be a diplomatic solution for the 
current dispute. It is likely that a diplomatic solution will eventually weaken 
the initial Russian claim, as the combined NATO countries have more 
influence than Russia does.  
3– Least Best The least desirable outcome for NATO is that it is unwilling to fight over this 
dispute and Russia is. Although some damage control needs to be done in 
order to save NATO’s reputation, the risks for the alliance to fight over this 
dispute with Russia are bigger than not to do so. 
1 – Worst 
 
The worst outcome is that Russia is willing to fight over this dispute and that 
NATO has committed itself to do so as well. Because of the nature of this 
dispute, it will prove extremely difficult to persuade the alliance to fight 
against Russia over this. This could severely weaken the reputation of the 
alliance, and worst case, end it.   
 
Table 9.   Options available to Russia with assigned cardinal utilities. 
 Russia’s options 
10- Best The very best outcome for Russia would be that NATO is not willing to fight 
over this dispute and is under the assumption that Russia will. Russia will stick 
to their territorial claim and will get their best outcome. This will also give a 
boost to Russia’s reputation. 
7 – Next Best The next best outcome is that there will be a diplomatic solution for the current 
dispute. However, chances are that this diplomatic solution will be a 
compromise of the initial Russian claim. This could mean that Russia has to 
give in on its original claim and this will make Russia look weak. 
6– Least Best The least best outcome is that both Russia and NATO are willing to fight over 
this dispute. Russia’s reputation will remain strong in the short term, however, 
conflict is costly and unfavorable for a struggling economy. Furthermore, it is 
highly unlikely that Russia will win this conflict, possibly resulting in a long-
term loss of reputation.   
1 – Worst 
 
The worst outcome is that Russia is unable and unwilling to fight over this 
dispute, and NATO is. The dispute is settled in favor of NATO, territory and 
future revenue is lost and so is Russia’s reputation.   
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Figure 28.   NATO versus Russia. 
The utility scale offers better insight into the perceived values of both players. For 
example, Russia’s worst outcome is far worse than its least best outcome, and NATO’s 
best and second best outcomes are really close together, compared to its least desirable 
and worst outcomes. The Nash Equilibrium has a value of (3,10), while preferred BD 
outcome has a value of (9,7).  
In Figure 29, the Pareto-optimal solutions are found on the green line BC-AD. 
The outcome BD, with value (9,7), is on this line. Determining the Nash fair point will 
facilitate an analysis of the (9,7) outcome, since a mixed a mixed strategy solution is 
unrealistic in this scenario. In order to find the Nash fair point of this game, it is first 
necessary to decide on a status quo point. This can be the security level for both players, 
with value (3,6), or the optimum threat position, with value (1,6). The latter will be used, 
since it is highly likely for NATO to threaten military force (AC). As shown in Figure 28, 
with (1,6) as a status quo point, the Nash fair point is (6, 8.5). What this fair point 
provides is a means for analyzing the (9,7) preferred outcome. In this case, NATO is 
receiving a premium of 3 points (9-6), while Russia is suffering a loss of 1.5 points (7-




Figure 29.  Pareto optimal and Nash fair point. 
4. Conclusion 
The game between Russia and NATO is interesting and could become a realistic 
Arctic scenario in the near future. Although the chance of conventional military conflict 
between Russia and NATO in the Arctic is small, it cannot be ruled out. There are two 
core assumptions that have a decisive impact on how this game develops. First and 
foremost is the assumption that Russia prefers to solve this territorial claim through use 
of military force, or threatening to do so, rather than solving it through other means. This 
ties in to a second core assumption that reputation is of vital importance to Russia and 
that they are willing to fight over it. This leaves the Russians with a dominant strategy 
and a first-move advantage. All that NATO can and will do, as shown in the strategic 
move paragraph, is to make a credible threat in combination with a credible promise to 
get to a peaceful solution. The value of this outcome (9,7), however, is not entirely fair 
compared to the Nash fair point (6, 8.5), and clearly favors NATO. In this case, it will not 
change the game. The insight here is to know that the expected outcome of this game is 
most likely not perceived being fair by the Russians, and could mean that NATO has a 
worse bargaining position in other future conflicts with Russia. 
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D. GAME 2: CANADA/UNITED STATES 
A second potential conflict in the Arctic involves Canada and the United States; 
specifically, what is the classification of the NWP? With the melting of the polar ice and 
a forecasted increase in all arctic maritime travel, the NWP will prove to be a lucrative 
shipping lane in the very near future. Canada currently maintains the position that the 
NWP is within domestic internal waters, and as such, dictates that international traffic 
registers all voyages with the Canadian Coast Guard. The United States on the other 
hand, argues that the NWP is an international strait, which therefore allows unlimited 
travel for all vessels who wish to pass.  
Both nations have significant self-interest objectives with respect to their claim. 
The United States seeks to achieve freedom of movement, primarily as a means of 
maintaining state security from potential threats approaching through Arctic waters. 
Canada views access to the NWP as a vital aspect of national sovereignty. At the center 
of the dispute is the UNCLOS, of which Canada is a member and the United States is not. 
The Canadian Forces Arctic Strategy stresses compliance with international law, and 
seeks cooperation to rectify disputes that will only increase as the Arctic continues to 
open. The United States is adamant that the NWP should be classified as international 
waters. While a peaceful resolution is a virtual certainty, this ongoing dispute deserves 
further analysis through game theory. 
1. The Game 
The setup of this game starts with the identification of the two parties involved. 
For this conflict it will be Canada and the United States, as already discussed. Canada 
will be portrayed as the row player, while the United States will be the column player. It 
is important to note that a final decision for designation of the NWP will be through the 
UNCLOS under the basis of international law. Furthermore, such a decision is likely 
many years from fruition. In the meantime, Canada has two rather obvious options; 
maintain a claim over the NWP or withdraw the claim altogether. While the options for 
the Unites States are not quite as simple, they are narrowed in scope to the following: 
continue to pursue the NWP as an international straight, or simply pursue a bilateral 
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agreement with Canada that allows freedom of navigation for homeland security 
purposes.   
There are some key assumptions when analyzing this game between Canada and 
the United States. For the sake of this game, it will be assumed that the United States will 
not tolerate any outcome that prevents it from accessing the NWP for matters of 
homeland security. Being the sole global hegemon, this is both a valid and realistic 
assumption. Despite its military might, the United States does wish to enable maritime 
navigation in the NWP in accordance with international law. Therefore, it is assumed that 
the United States will not simply ignore this issue and sail in NWP waters without 
Canadian consent (under the status quo conditions). It will also be assumed that the 
United States will obey the UNCLOS, despite the fact that it has yet to ratify the 
convention. Finally, any bilateral agreement would allow the United States freedom of 
Arctic maritime navigation only for the purposes of homeland security. It would exclude 
navigation for the purposes of trade, tourism, or any other economic stimuli. While 
Canada and the United States have a history of “agree to disagree” over the NWP, the 
melting of the polar ice has the potential to strain an otherwise strong diplomatic 
relationship. The following game (Figure 30) presents the options available to each 
country. 
 
Figure 30.   Canada versus the United States. 

















There are four possible results: 
AC – Canada maintains its claim over the NWP and the United States continues to 
pursue classification of the passage as an international strait. This is the current 
diplomatic position for each country.  
AD – Canada maintains its claim, and is willing to cooperate in finding a diplomatic 
solution. The United States agrees that the NWP is Canadian internal waters, but pursues 
a bilateral agreement that allows its use of the strait for homeland security interests. 
BC – Canada withdraws its claim due to international pressure and the United States 
pursues the passage as an international strait.  
BD – Canada withdraws its claim due to international pressure and the United States 
pursues a bilateral agreement. 
 
2. Conclusion 
The following courses of action (COA) present three different outcomes that 
could result from the NWP dispute between Canada and the United States. It is important 
to note that this quantitative analysis is just one approach for examining this dispute. The 
numbers from the game offer an interesting perspective to the options available to each 
country. 
COA 1. In an effort to make up for the favorable Canadian outcome of (10,7), 
Canada concedes the border in the Beaufort Sea to the United States. This Arctic border 
dispute—the extended continental shelf dividing line between Alaska and the Yukon—is 
another issue between these two nations. While another game would need to be analyzed 
to identify the true value to each country, Canada could make a promise to the United 
States that the surplus utility from the NWP deal would be repaid. 
COA 2. It is possible that the United States will not accept the (10,7) outcome, 
likely resulting in the AC (4,3) status quo. This would simply put off an inevitable 
resolution, potentially straining relations and incurring opportunity costs until a solution 
is found. 
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COA 3. Canada is able to claim the NWP before the United States ratifies the 
UNCLOS. This would be an ultimate first move for Canada, negating the need for a 
bilateral agreement. As it turns out, however, a bilateral security agreement in the Arctic, 
akin to NORAD, could prove extremely beneficial to Canada, making it a likely outcome 
regardless. 
The polar ice is melting and the status quo “agree to disagree” will no longer be a 
sufficient national strategy for issues such as the NWP designation. Canada and the 
United States require an outcome that protects Canadian sovereignty, enables United 
States homeland security, and bolsters relations between these two Arctic neighbors. 
From this game theory analysis, it is recommended that Canada maintains a claim over 
the NWP and agrees to a bilateral security arrangement with the United States. Since this 
result would favor Canadian interests, future concession would be required when solving 
the dispute over the Beaufort Sea boundary. 
E. GAME 3: CANADA/DENMARK 
For more than 30 years, Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark have been 
negotiating the borders between Greenland and Canada. On November 28, 2012, the two 
parties finally signed an agreement on how to settle the borders. The agreement draws a 
3000 km line from southern Greenland up through the Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, and the 
narrow Nares Strait, all the way up to the northern Arctic Ocean. However, the two 
nations do not agree on how to draw that line around the small landmass of Hans Island. 
Hans Island is a small, uninhabited barren knoll, measuring 1.3 km^2, located in the 
center of the Kennedy Channel in the Nares Strait. Nares Strait separates Ellesmere 
Island from northern Greenland, and connects Baffin Bay with the Lincoln Sea. There is 
no indication that the ongoing diplomatic sword strokes will subside, as both countries 
attempt to prove how the continental shelf is tied into their respective territories. 
Although politicians in both states are optimistic for a diplomatic solution, the dispute 
might well end up at the international court in The Hague.512   
512 Ritzau, “ Strid om Hans Oe kan ende ved Haag-domstol,” [Dispute about Hans Island May End 
Up at the Haag Tribunal] Boersen, April 17, 2012, 
http://borsen.dk/nyheder/politik/artikel/1/230368/strid_om_hans_oe_kan_ende_ved_haag-domstol.html.  
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1. The Game 
The two parties involved are Canada and Denmark, with Canada portrayed as the 
row player, and Denmark as the column player (Figure 31). It is important to note that a 
final decision on division of the territory will be under the basis of international law. 
Furthermore, this decision is likely years from fruition, with significant scientific 
research required to form the basis for a legal decision. In this game, Canada has two 
obvious options: maintain a claim over Hans Island or not. The options for Denmark are 
the same. The game itself is very simple; however, history shows that a solution is not. 
There are some key assumptions for this game. From a homeland security 
perspective, control of the Arctic region is of greater importance to Canada than it is to 
Denmark. Access to this part of the coastline provides direct access to Canada, and the 
United States. For Denmark, this coastline only provides access to Greenland, which 
although vast, is still quite isolated and inaccessible. However, when looking at it from an 
economic angle, the resources are relatively significant from a Danish point of view. 
From a Canadian perspective the resource base is less significant, with one of the world’s 
largest oil reserves within existing Canadian borders. This dispute is between two strong 
allies and has lasted for decades; hence, there is essentially no chance of it resulting in 
military conflict. However, given the rapid Arctic climate change, a resolution is required 
in the near future. 
 

















There are four possible outcomes: 
AC – Both countries uphold their claim on Hans Island. 
AD – Canada claims Hans Island. Denmark does not claim. Hans Island becomes 
Canadian. 
BC – Denmark Claims Hans Island. Canada does not claim. Hans Island becomes 
Danish. 
BD – Neither Canada nor Denmark claims Hans Island, and a negotiation ensues. 
In order to analyze the game, an ordinal ranking of the options available to each 
country is required.  
2. Conclusion 
The dispute over Hans Island has lasted for more than three decades. There is no 
sign of Canada or Denmark yielding to the other party’s claim. However, there is also no 
sign of this conflict turning into to a military crisis. In effect, history shows us that 
outcome AC, BC, or AD, will not happen. The only likely outcome is then found 
somewhere around BD, which represents a compromise. However, in its pure form, BD 
is not acceptable either. Nash arbitration shows what that compromise looks like from a 
mathematical perspective. However, in politics, subjective facts matter more than 
objective facts.513 This means that the numbers do not necessarily translate directly into a 
division of the territory. What do the numbers show? When meeting at the negotiation 
table, Canada expects to get between 62.5 and 75 percent of the territorial value while 
Denmark expects to get between 25 and 37.5 percent. Because of the likely subjective 
perceptions of the two countries, it is not possible to predict a specific outcome from the 
negotiations. The important realization is how the individual rankings determine what the 
negotiation set and the Nash point is. With this in mind, the negotiators can meet with 
realistic expectations.  
513 Professor Gordon H. McCormick, in discussion with the authors, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, June 22, 2013. 
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F. SUMMARY 
This study applies game theory to three ongoing Arctic disputes, with a view to 
providing a quantitative analysis that can possibly predict likely outcomes and optimum 
courses of action. The first section presents an analysis of a Russia versus NATO 
scenario, regarding the Lomonosov Ridge. In this scenario, NATO is required to make a 
combination threat and promise to counter the aggressive Russian dominant strategy of 
using military force. While a peaceful negotiation is the likely outcome, Russia would 
perceive it as biased towards NATO, and would therefore likely expect some form of 
repayment in future negotiations. 
The second game examines the designation of the NWP between Canada and the 
United States. Canada and the United States require an outcome that protects Canadian 
sovereignty and enables United States homeland security. The preferred outcome sees 
Canada maintaining a claim for the NWP, while the United States seeks to coordinate a 
bilateral security agreement. Since such a result would slightly favor Canada, it can be 
expected that the United States would be somehow repaid in future negotiations, such as 
dealing with the Beaufort Sea boundary. 
The third and final game examines the Hans Island dispute between Canada and 
Denmark. In this game, a fair result would give Canada approximately 62.5 to 75 percent 
of the territorial value, while Denmark can expect between 25 and 37.5 percent. While a 
division of landmass in these proportions is unlikely, these number represent the relative 
value of the island that each nation should seek in a diplomatic solution. 
In all three cases, game theory provides a very insightful view of the dispute. 
Game theory supports the previous statement from Kraska in Chapter IV by highlighting 
the importance of how the Arctic stakeholders choose to frame the situation will 
determine the possible outcomes. Game theory also shows within what framework the 
cooperative efforts must navigate in the evolving Arctic. Given the nature of the 
scenarios, mixed strategies are not realistic or feasible. Determining Nash fair points 
allows for an analysis of each likely outcome, drawing out strategic advantages and a 
level of fairness for each solution. As with all matters in international politics, this is but 
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one lens through which to view these disputes. Such results can be used when seeking 
diplomatic solutions, offering each country an approximation of what can be expected.   
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APPENDIX D.  DISCUSSION ON SOF DOCTRINE 
In this thesis, Chapter II and Appendix A on Arctic weather provided an 
understanding of the meteorological conditions to be expected in the Arctic as the sea ice 
continues to melt. The vast distances and lack of infrastructure augment the effects of the 
adverse Arctic weather conditions as described previously, and may result in special 
requirements to conduct successful military operations in the Arctic. In combination with 
the politically sensitive environment described in Chapter III, this may preclude the use 
of conventional forces or set forth certain requirements for conducting missions in the 
Arctic. This appendix will provide pertinent preliminary conclusions rather than merely 
list the roles and mission of SOF. In other words, the following discusses special 
operations roles and mission in an Arctic context.  
NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) describes special 
operations as “military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained, 
and equipped forces using operational tactics, and modes of operation not standard to 
conventional forces.”514 Furthermore, these operations can be conducted independently 
or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces, and may include combined and 
interagency operations, by, with, and through indigenous or surrogate forces.515 Tucker 
and Lamb differentiate between SOF in a leading role, independent or with conventional 
forces in support, and a supporting effort.516 They also argue that SOF missions can be 
divided in direct and indirect missions. Although a very limited description of SOF 
missions—in accordance with the U.S. DOD global campaign plan for the war on terror 
in accordance with JP 3–05517—this is useful as it underscores the diverse commando 
and warrior-diplomat skills that SOF must have in order to perform well in a highly 
political security environment. While SOF in the Arctic should not exclusively be viewed 
514 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP 
3.5), 1-1. 
515 Ibid. 
516 Tucker and Lamb, United States Special Operation Forces, 151. 
517 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, II-9. 
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from a NATO perspective, AJP-3.5 lays the doctrinal foundation for NATO SOF. 
Considering that four out of the A5 countries are NATO members, and the fact that the 
United States is a major contributor to international security policy, NATO and U.S. 
doctrine seems like a relevant basis to describe the roles and missions for SOF. Because 
this is not merely an analysis of SOF, but rather an analysis on future roles and mission in 
the Arctic for SOF as a consequence of political ramifications—just as the geophysical 
study in Chapter II and Appendix A laid out what special conditions may impact how to 
operate in the Arctic—elements from NATO AJP-01(D), U.S. DOD JP-1, NATO AJP-
3(B), and U.S. DOD JP 3–05 are included to highlight differences as well as similarities 
in alliance doctrine. This provides the necessary political-strategic foundation available to 
the alliance as well as doctrinal contrast, specifically indicating when SOF may be the 
preferred tool and equally important what conditions make conventional support essential 
for mission success. While NATO MC0437/2 “Special Operations Policy”518 is of a later 
date than AJP 3.5, it is policy and not doctrine. Furthermore, all the relevant parts of this 
policy are captured in the analysis of NATO and U.S. doctrine. Hence, MC0437/2 is not 
included in this study. The included NATO and U.S. doctrine is complemented by 
academic writings by Tucker and Lamb,519 and Robert Spulak.520 The authors all provide 
pertinent insights into the application of SOF, effectively complementing the thoughts 
behind SOF doctrine while intelligently critiquing the application of SOF. 
NATO’s essential and enduring purpose … is to safeguard the freedom 
and security of all its members. … Whilst it continues to provide stability 
throughout the Euro-Atlantic area … it is also evolving to meet new 
threats that include terrorism and the proliferation in weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). [NATO] … serves as a forum for the considerations 
of matters affecting members’ security.521 
AJP-01(D) predicts that “competition for scarce resources and global demand for 
energy resources in particular will intensify.”522 This prediction seems credible in light of 
518 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], MC0432/2 (Final), April 21, 2011. 
519 Tucker and Lamb, United States Special Operation Forces. 
520 Spulak, A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and Use of SOF, JSOU-R-07-7.  
521 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP 01(D)), 2-1. 
522 Ibid., section 0212 c. 
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this study. This seems to be supported by U.S. DOD JP-01 stating: “To succeed we must 
refine and proportionally integrate the military with all the tools of American power and 
work with our partner nations to do the same.”523 
Before analyzing SOF-specific doctrine, a fundamental discussion on NATO 
doctrine seems relevant.  
Doctrine is defined as fundamental principles by which military forces 
guide their actions … it is authoritative, but requires judgment in 
application…. Factors which influence the development of doctrine [is 
the] response to changes in policy…. Ultimately, policy and doctrine 
should strive to be consistent and mutually supportive. … A common 
NATO doctrine is essential to enhance interoperability.524 
This explanation is critical to recognize in the analysis of the evolving Arctic, the 
national policies, and the military (SOF) capabilities since doctrine and interoperability 
are integral elements of the NATO DOTMLPFI capability definition used later. U.S. 
DOD JP-01 supports this in the following manner, “The guidance in this publication is 
broad, authoritative, and serves as a foundation for the development of more specific 
joint guidance.… Interoperability and effective integration of service enhance joint 
operations to accomplish U.S. government objective(s).”525 Finally, according to AJP-01 
and JP-01, to be an effective instrument of Alliance strategy, the collective military 
instrument must be maintained and developed in a manner consistent with the demands 
that are likely to be placed upon it.”526 Furthermore, “[the joint publication is] … a 
bridge between policy and doctrine.”527 This element is vital to appreciate as it creates 
the basis for analyzing to what extent the hierarchy of (AJP and JP) doctrines actually 
bridge the gap between the scenario-based capability requirements and the doctrinal 
foundation.  
523 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 
States, i. 
524 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP 01(D)), 1-1. 
525 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 
States, ii. 
526 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP 01(D)), 1-3, 1-4. 
527 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 
States, I-1. 
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